K. Irelands. — Commons, House of

DEBATES.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 14TH, 1800.

THE Right Hon. the SPEAKER having taken the chair, several members were ſworn in, and took their ſeats accordingly.

A petition of the freeholders of the county of *Carlow*, whoſe names are thereunto ſubſcribed, was preſented to the Houſe and read; ſetting forth, that the freeholders of the county of Carlow approach the Houſe with the moſt ſincere aſſurances of their inviolable attachment to that connexion which ſo happily ſubſiſts between his Majeſty's realms of Great Britain and Ireland, according to the ſettlement of 1782, and with the moſt anxious deſire, as far as in them lies, to maintain it inviolate for ever; that they have obſerved with the deepeſt affliction, the revival of the meaſure of a Legiſlative Union, ſo lately rejected by the uninfluenced voice of the Houſe, which, by depriving them of a reſident Parliament, would remove the only real or practicable ſecurity for their properties, their liberties, or their lives; to that Parliament, ſupported, as the petitioners truſt it ever will deſerve to be, by the hearts of the People, they are indebted for their independence, and for its neceſſary conſequence, their late rapid increaſe in commerce, induſtry, and comfort; to that Parliament, and to it alone, can the petitioners look for permanence to the connexion with Great Britain, the very ſoul and eſſence of their exiſtence as a free and happy people, and they therefore on the part of themſelves and their fellow ſubjects, with deference, demand from the juſtice of the Houſe the preſervation of their rights and liberties, and the bleſſings of a free and independent Parliament, reſident amongſt them.

A petition of the electors of the county of the town of *Carrickfergus*, whoſe names are thereunto ſubſcribed, was preſented to the Houſe and read; ſetting forth, that the petitioners beg leave to expreſs their firm attachment to the perſon of the King, and the principles of the Conſtitution; with the deepeſt regret the petitioners learn that the meaſure of an incorporate Union of Ireland with Great Britain is again to be brought before the conſideration of Parliament, a meaſure which was condemned and rejected in the laſt ſeſſion; that petitioners are of opinion that ſuch a meaſure is fraught with the moſt alarming conſequences, annihilating their exiſtence as a nation, tending to endanger the preſent connexion between the two countries, and ſubjecting their liberties and properties to the uncontrouled diſpoſal of a Parliament in which they cannot be ade-

quately repreſented, and which, from its remoteneſs, could be little acquainted with their local conditions and intereſts, or hear few of their complaints; content with the Conſtitution as finally eſtabliſhed in 1782, and abhorrent to a ſpeculative innovation, irrevocable if once admitted, the petitioners humbly pray and confide that Parliament will maintain that Conſtitution inviolate, to preſerve which, the Members of the Houſe were elected, and that the Members will, at the expiration of their truſt, reſtore it to their conſtituents unimpaired, that it may be tranſmitted pure and unſullied to the lateſt poſterity.

A petition of the merchants, traders, gentlemen, freeholders, and inhabitants of the town of *Newry*, whoſe names are thereunto ſubſcribed, was preſented to the Houſe and read; ſetting forth, that the petitioners are firmly and unalterably attached to the Royal Perſon and Family of his moſt gracious Majeſty, and the principles of the Conſtitution; that the petitioners beg leave to expreſs their moſt heartfelt concern at finding the meaſure of a Legiſlative Union between this kingdom and Great Britain which has already been rejected by the uninfluenced ſenſe of the Houſe, is again to be brought before the Houſe for further conſideration; that in conſequence of the Conſtitution of the kingdom having been happily and finally ſettled in the year 1782, through the parental care of his Majeſty, the liberality of the Britiſh Parliament, and the virtue of the Iriſh Parliament, this nation has increaſed and is encreaſing in wealth, proſperity, and commerce, to a degree unexampled in the records of hiſtory; that the petitioners are unalterably attached to that Conſtitution and the bleſſings they enjoy under it, and therefore will never conſent to exchange thoſe bleſſings for ſo alarming and deſperate a meaſure as that of totally, irrevocably, and for ever annihilating the Parliament and Conſtitution of Ireland, an experiment of ſuch monſtrous magnitude as to involve in it the exiſtence of Ireland as a nation, the petitioners' property and their liberties, wholly extinguiſhing the one, and placing the others under the controul of a legiſlature in which the propoſed number of their repreſentation are ſo unequal as five hundred to one hundred; an experiment, that if once tried, can never be recalled, though they ſhould be loſt in its ruins; content, therefore, with the bleſſings they enjoy, the petitioners pray the Houſe to leave them in poſſeſſion of them, and to reſtore to them unimpaired, at the expiration of this Parliament, that Conſtitution which the members of the Houſe were elected to preſerve, to the end that the petitioners may tranſmit it to their poſterity.

A petition of the noblemen, gentlemen, clergy, and freeholders of the county of *Down*, whoſe names are thereunto ſubſcribed, was preſented to the Houſe and read; ſetting forth, that the petitioners view with the moſt dutiful gratitude the parental attention of their ever gracious Sovereign in recommending to his Parliament of this kingdom the adoption of a meaſure to cement the cloſer connexion and friendſhip of the two countries, which, if completed, muſt ſtrengthen the ſinews of the empire; and the petitioners hope their Parliament may think fit to receive and duly diſcuſs the propoſed

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plan so graciously recommended, and trust to the wisdom, discretion and integrity of their Parliament to adopt and promote the system as far as may appear consistent with the dignity of Ireland, and as it may tend to ensure the peace and prosperity of this country.

A petition of the freeholders of the *King's County*, whose names are thereunto subscribed, was presented to the House and read; setting forth, that the petitioners, sincerely attached as they are to his Majesty's sacred person and family, and to the present connexion of this kingdom with Great Britain, must entertain the most lively alarm at the approach of any measure which could weaken that attachment and endanger that connexion; that sensible of the excellency of the Constitution of this country they most ardently wish to have it maintained on the independent principles upon which it was founded in the year 1782; that is is necessary to the welfare of the people that their Parliament should be resident in the kingdom, in order to have a common interest with the nation, and should be solely composed of Irish Senators, over whom the Irish People could have a constitutional and effectual influence; that the petitioners, after the most solemn and mature deliberation, are convinced that the measure of a Legislative Union with Great Britain, would be radically destructive of the constitutional independence, the commercial interests, and the general prosperity of this kingdom, and that by destroying their liberty and obliterating their name, would sink them at once into impotency and degradation; that the experience of the eighteen years which have elapsed since petitioners obtained a free trade and free constitution, furnish them with numerous and unequivocal proofs of the value of these national blessings, and convinces the petitioners that from them alone have flowed that wealth and other resources by which they have been enabled to contribute to the multiplying expences of the contest in which the petitioners are involved, and thus prove their gratitude to their Prince and anxiety for the safety and honour of the empire; that the petitioners, with these sentiments deeply engraven on their hearts, are astonished at the design of the minister to deprive them of their Constitution, and to take from this ancient, populous, and flourishing Island its attributes as a kingdom, its strongest bonds of connexion with Great Britain, and its only solid security for the prosperity which it now enjoys; and therefore praying the House to avert these formidable evils and to restore confidence to the people of Ireland, by vindicating their rights by their decision on this important question.

A petition of the freeholders of the county of *Leitrim*, whose names are thereunto subscribed, was presented to the House and read; setting forth, that at this awful and alarming moment the petitioners feel themselves called upon to declare their opinion, that they consider a Legislative Union with Great Britain to be a dangerous innovation, fraught with ruin to the constitutional independence, commercial interests, and general prosperity of the kingdom; that this measure, by depriving petitioners of a resident and protecting Legislature, under which this country has hitherto prospered beyond example, by encreasing the number of absentees, and

the conſequent drain of the wealth of this kingdom, muſt augment the diſcontents of the kingdom, and thereby endanger the connection between Great Britain and Ireland, which petitioners are determined to ſupport with their lives and fortunes; that petitioners rely therefore with the moſt unſhaken confidence on the wiſdom and juſtice of the Houſe, that it will maintain unimpaired to them and their poſterity that ſacred Conſtitution which is their birth-right, which has been the ſource of every bleſſing to this iſland, and the enjoyment of which petitioners deem to be inſeparable from their exiſtence as a free people.

A petition of the gentlemen, clergy, freeholders and landholders of the county of *Weſtmeath*, whoſe names are thereunto ſubſcribed, was preſented to the Houſe and read; ſetting forth, that the kingdom has riſen within the laſt ſeventeen years with a rapidity unexampled in the annals of mankind from a ſituation of poverty and diſtreſs to its preſent high ſtate of proſperity; that the real and progreſſive improvement of our country is, under Providence, to be aſcribed to that free and independent Conſtitution ſo happily acquired in 1782; that the petitioners, feeling from experience the Conſtitution of 1782 to be the ſureſt guardian of the intereſts of this country and of its connexion with Great Britain, to which they are moſt warmly attached, they humbly entreat the firm and unremitted exertions of the Houſe to preſerve it unaltered and unimpaired.

A petition of the freeholders and inhabitants of the county of *Clare*, whoſe names are thereunto ſubſcribed, was preſented to the Houſe and read; ſetting forth, that at this awful and alarming moment they cannot ceaſe to expect from the repreſentatives of the people in parliament the preſervation of thoſe rights with which they have been entruſted by the nation; that they conſider the unexampled proſperity of Ireland as ſolely derived from her happy connexion with Great Britain, as beſt ſecured by the conſtitution eſtabliſhed in 1782, and that the one may be endangered and the other diſſolved by a Legiſlative Union, which they feel to be an experiment ſubverſive of that conſtitution by which alone both can be preſerved for ever; that they rely with the moſt unſhaken confidence on the wiſdom and juſtice of the Houſe that it will maintain unimpaired to them and to their poſterity that ſacred Conſtitution which is their birth-right, which has been the ſource of every bleſſing to this iſland, and the enjoyment of which they deem to be inſeparable from their exiſtence as a free people.

A petition of the merchants, traders, gentlemen, freeholders and inhabitants of the borough of *Downpatrick*, whoſe names are thereunto ſubſcribed, was preſented to the Houſe and read; ſetting forth, that the petitioners are firmly attached to the perſon and family of their moſt gracious Sovereign and the principles of their moſt happy Conſtitution; that the petitioners beg permiſſion to expreſs their great concern at finding the meaſure of a Legiſlative Union between this kingdom and Great Britain, which has been already rejected by the uninfluenced ſenſe of the Houſe, is again

to be brought before it for its further conſideration, the petitioners take the liberty of ſtating, that in conſequence of the Conſtitution of this kingdom having been finally ſettled in the year 1782, through the parental care of their beloved Sovereign, the liberality of the Britiſh parliament and the virtue of this nation, has encreaſed and is continuing to encreaſe in wealth, proſperity and commerce; the petitioners are unalterably attached to that Conſtitution and the bleſſings which they enjoy under it, and therefore will never conſent to exchange thoſe bleſſings for ſo alarming and deſperatea meaſure as that of totally and for ever irrevocably annihilating their parliament and Conſtitution; therefore, content with the bleſſings they enjoy, praying the Houſe to leave them in poſſeſſion of them, and permit them to tranſmit unimpaired that Conſtitution to their lateſt poſterity.

A petition of the freeholders and inhabitants of the town and vicinity of *Portarlington*, whoſe names are thereunto ſubſcribed, was preſented to the Houſe and read; ſetting forth, that the petitioners, ſincerely attached as they are to his Majeſty's ſacred perſon and family, and to the preſent free and honorable connexion of this kingdom with Great Britain, muſt entertain the moſt lively alarm at the approach of any meaſure which tended to weaken that attachment and endanger that connexion; that the petitioners are convinced that the meaſure of a Legiſlative Union of this kingdom with Great Britain will be deſtructive of the conſtitutional independence and general proſperity of Ireland; that the petitioners, during the late horrid and unnatural rebellion and foreign invaſion, have evinced the moſt unſhaken loyalty and attachment to his Majeſty's perſon, crown, and dignity, and to the Conſtitution of this kingdom, and for the maintenance of which they pledge themſelves in the moſt ſolemn manner againſt the attempts of foreign and domeſtic enemies; and therefore praying that the Houſe will avert this formidable evil and reſtore confidence to the people of Ireland by reſiſting in their legiſlative capacity this abominable meaſure of Union.

A petition of the freeholders of the county of *Louth*, convened by public notice from the high ſheriff, and of the landholders of ſaid county, whoſe names are thereunto ſubſcribed, was preſented to the Houſe and read; ſetting forth, that the petitioners did hope that after the meaſure of a Legiſlative Union had been rejected by the wiſdom and ſpirit of the Houſe in the laſt ſeſſion, this kingdom would not have been agitated by the revival of it, and they hear with ſurpriſe and concern, that his Majeſty's miniſters not only propoſe to bring it forward again, but that they have had recourſe to influence unknown to the Conſtitution, and unpractiſed in any former period, to carry it into effect; that the petitioners are firmly and unalterably attached to the Britiſh Empire, and conſider this meaſure as tending to injure the whole of it, but more particularly Ireland, by riſking an alteration in the exiſting connexion between the two kingdoms, to the preſervation of which our preſent Conſtitution has not only proved ſufficient, but has ſince its confirma-

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tion in 1782 encreaſed the happineſs, the reſources, and the proſperity of this country beyond any example in hiſtory during a ſimilar length of time; that the ſufficiency of the Conſtitution, ſo confirmed, to maintain that connexion, has been proved, by its having overpowered a moſt dangerous and deep laid conſpiracy to ſeparate us from Great Britain, by its having cruſhed an alarming rebellion which was the conſequence of that conſpiracy, and by its having preſerved the connexion unimpaired through all the dangers of that rebellion, attended with three invaſions of the common enemy, and has preſerved it ſo firmly, that nothing but the raſh and ill-adviſed endeavours of miniſters to carry this meaſure againſt the ſenſe of the nation (if they were fatally to prevail) could endanger its perpetual continuance; that the Conſtitution ſo confirmed has not only proved ſufficient to maintain, but has encreaſed the bonds of that connexion; for although various jealouſies and difficulties exiſted between the kingdoms from time to time previous to 1782, the petitioners have had none ſince that happy period, and the two nations have ever ſince proceeded towards each other with mutual acts of friendſhip and conciliation, and added reciprocal good wiſhes and mutual intereſts to ſtrengthen its continuance; that the petitioners therefore feel a free and independent Parliament reſident in Ireland to be not only ſo abſolutely eſſential to that connexion as to be the only means of preſerving it, but they deem it their only ſecurity for every bleſſing of Conſtitution, trade, wealth, happineſs and proſperity, which they do or can enjoy, and in the words of the Houſe in 1782—" we claim it as our birth-right," and humbly expect and implore from this Houſe its preſervation; that the petitioners have not heard of any evil or inconvenience attending their preſent ſituation, nor of any benefit, however remote or ſpeculative, even promiſed from the meaſure, which can juſtify ſo hazardous a change; that the miſeries of the preſent awful times in a great part of Europe juſtify their abhorrence of any innovation on the preſent happy Conſtitution, much more one from which there would be no retreat, no redreſs, if it ſhould fatally prove, as they are ſatisfied it would, ſubverſive of every bleſſing they enjoy; that if the moſt devoted loyalty to the beſt of Sovereigns that ever ruled the empire, if this unalterable attachment to a perpetual connexion with Great Britain, and if their own proſperity, which is inſeparable from that connexion, were not ſufficient to make them deprecate the meaſure, they ſhould add this further motive for the Houſe to reject it, that this kingdom is too large, too populous, and too thriving, to admit the poſſibility of its legiſlation being carried on in another country, where its local intereſts cannot be underſtood, its wiſhes heard, or its wants examined with due promptitude and efficacy, and the neceſſary attendance on which muſt ſo add to the preſent impoveriſhing drain of abſentees, as to reduce its proſperity, and endanger its future tranquillity; and therefore praying themſelves to the conſideration of the Houſe, and praying relief.

We whoſe names are hereunto ſubſcribed, conceive it neceſſary thus publicly to declare our ſentiments on the ſubject of a Legiſla-

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tive Union; and concurrent with the ſenſe of the nation, to give our decided diſapprobation to the renewal of that meaſure already condemned by the Houſe of Commons.

We will yield to none in our affection for our King, and attachment to our Conſtitution—we deſire to preſerve Britiſh connexion, and therefore we deſire to preſerve our independence.

Since the glorious period of 1782, when the independence of our Conſtitution was finally eſtabliſhed, we have ſ en this kingdom advancing in a manner almoſt unexampled in the hiſtory of nations; as its commerce and agriculture, its arts and manufactures have extended and improved; its reſources and revenues have encreaſed; and in proportion to its improvement has this kingdom become a more effectual ſupport to the ſtrength of the empire at large.

Connected with Great Britain in the ſtricteſt bonds of intereſt and affection, it is our moſt ardent wiſh to avoid a meaſure which we cannot now doubt, would ultimately tend to endanger that connexion which it ſhould be the policy of both nations to preſerve, and their mutual intereſt to render ſecure and permanent.

Having thus, in the face of our country and of Europe, declared our opinions, we cannot be recorded among the abettors of that fatal policy, who ſtill continue to ſtruggle againſt the collected mind of Ireland; whoſe pertinacity will not allow them to recede, and whoſe perſeverance will leave nothing to our poſterity but the inheritance of perpetuated ſtrife, protracted tumult, and interminable calamity.

The Houſe having reſolved itſelf into a committee, Mr. ANNESLEY in the Chair.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER.—Sir, I ſhould think it an abuſe of the time of the Committee, if I entered into the diſcuſſion, as if this was an entirely new queſtion, and had come before the Houſe now for the firſt time, I ſhall therefore not enter into that wide range of argument which I ſhould deem neceſſary under other circumſtances. The principle of this meaſure has been very ably inveſtigated in a publication by a gentleman whom I ſaw juſt now, who has ſhown in the cleareſt manner the beneficial effects that muſt reſult from it. The noble Lord beſide me, ſtated the whole ſubject with ſo much ability and preciſion, in bringing it before the public, that I ſhould be much to blame if I were to follow them through the general principle, or, if upon this particular queſtion I was to enter into any minute detail—Preſcribing this rule to myſelf, and at preſent thinking it would be rather inconſiſtent than of ſervice to adopt a contrary conduct. The objections which have been made to this meaſure claſs themſelves in a general way under three heads, they apply to conſtitutional, to financial, and to commercial points.

It has been ſtated that this meaſure is one, not founded in any neceſſity, nor induced by any imperfection in the conſtitution of 1782, but ſuggeſted to the mind of the Britiſh Miniſter by a deſire

to impoſe injurious reſtrictions upon the people of this country. This objection is pregnant with this aſſertion, that the conſtitution of 1782 does not contain any imperfections which render this meaſure neceſſary, and that there exiſt no other cauſes which ought to have originated it. I will, therefore, recall to the recollection of the Committee, ſome circumſtances which I think will fairly ſuggeſt other cauſes for this meaſure beſides the imperfection of the conſtitution of 1782. And then it will be for the Committee to conſider whether theſe aſſertions are well-founded. With reſpect to the other cauſes which originated the meaſure, they may be generally ſtated to conſiſt in the religious diſſenſions, in the national contentions, and in the political convulſions which have agitated this country for a conſiderable time. And I think it will appear that I have not only juſtified the miniſter in bringing forward this meaſure, but that he would have neglected his duty, and have been impeachable if he had not. The agitations which have haraſſed this country have been of the different deſcriptions I have already mentioned. Religious contentions; national contentions between England and Ireland; and theſe political convulſions of which we have all been witneſs, conſidering them in different points of view, they have divided themſelves into three periods. The religious diſſenſions exiſted up to the time when the Catholics were reſtored to their rights. From that period much time has been occupied by the national contentions between England and Ireland; viz. from the American war to the commencement of the French Revolution. From that period to the preſent our agitations have ariſen from political convulſions among ourſelves. The religious diſſenſions ſubſiſted from very remote antiquity down to the time when their rights were reſtored. After the ſtatements which have been made of the hiſtorical tranſactions upon this ſubject it would be unneceſſary for me to enter into any detail. I ſhall therefore only ſhortly recall the recollection of the Committee to theſe tranſactions in order that they may know the ſituation of the country upon this ſubject when the buſineſs was brought forward.

We find the country divided into two great religious parties, the Proteſtants and the Catholics.—We find the Proteſtants in poſſeſſion of political power and of the government of the country, and the Catholics much exceeding the Proteſtants in number and what has been emphatically called phyſical force. We find that the whole property of the country had been confiſcated in various rebellions, and the property of which the Catholics were thus diveſted were given to the Proteſtants. We find that during the period of the ſevere Catholic Code of Laws, one more ſevere than ever exiſted, their complaints never ceaſed: they never ceaſed applying for redreſs at proper periods, firſt for their property, and then for their civil and political rights. We find that at length under the benign influence of his preſent Majeſty, that Code was relaxed, they were reſtored to their civil rights, and with ſome exceptions, they were put upon a footing with the Proteſtant people of Ireland. We find that when they were reſtored to their civil,

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they put in a claim for what they conſidered as their political rights This claim they brought forward in the moſt diſtinct manner, and it was publicly regiſtered. On the other hand the Proteſtants of the country did, in as diſtinct a manner decline to comply with it, and we find this refuſal recorded. The Catholics ſtill perſiſted in their claim: I wiſh to be underſtood as not making any charge againſt them; I am ſtating facts, not arguing upon motives. I ſtate the ſituation in which they ſtand. They are now committed upon this great ſubject—claim, on the one hand, and refuſal on the other. This is the reſult of the hiſtorical facts, and this is the ſituation in which the country now ſtands. While the Catholics were in a ſtate of agitation I will not ſay that they did recal the notion of confiſcated property—I will not ſay that they advanced the idea of the reſumption of property if they were reſtored. But this I will ſtate becauſe every man knows it, that ſome of their friends were induſtrious enough upon different occaſions to introduce that ſubject. This certainly did produce very conſiderable apprehenſions in the minds of timid Proteſtants, and did cauſe them to be more diſinclined to the claim which was made by the Catholics. The queſtion was thus left at iſſue, and it is not eaſy to conceive how it could be brought to a deciſion without convulſing the country. If gentlemen will not deny this ſtatement, they cannot deny that there muſt remain a ground of future diſſentions and jealouſies, and I wiſh to aſk them if they are able to point out the means by which they can be diſpoſed of, in order to put an end to the agitations of the country upon this ſubject. May I apply to ſome gentlemen oppoſite to me, and aſk them, if they can ſuggeſt any means by which this queſtion can be diſpoſed of. May I aſk a right hon. gentleman (the Speaker) if he can ſtate any means which can, in his opinion, put a ſtop to it, will he inform the Houſe and the nation how it can be effected? I am ſure every man will liſten to him with attention and reſpect. Will he tell us what meaſures can be adopted by which the Proteſtants will be contented and the Catholics ſatisfied? Will he aſſure the Houſe, that when he has ſtated theſe means, that the Proteſtants will accede to them, and that the Catholics will truſt their intereſts in his hands? Has he been authorized by them to bring this buſineſs to a deciſion? If he is conſiſtent with himſelf, I think he will not conſent to grant their claims. I am not now arguing what ought to be granted, but what would probably be his advice, if he were now to give it. Let me aſk the hon. gentleman next to him the ſame queſtion; I am ſure his advice would be directly oppoſite to that of the right hon. gentleman, ſo that we find the two gentlemen differing widely in the remedies they would preſcribe, yet both concurring in oppoſing the only meaſure that can effectally ſucceed. In ſaying this I wiſh not to give any opinion upon the Catholic claim; It is not now the queſtion before the Houſe, but I ſtate this, that upon ſuch a queſtion between two great parties, ſome deciſion ought to take place. If the Miniſter of England has ſeen theſe circumſtances in the ſituation of the country, and thought that the animoſity of

the parties would continue, would he not be much to blame if he thought there was a poſſibility of finding out any means which could be adopted with the approbation of the country, would he not, I ſay, if he had neglected to prepare them have deſerted his duty and ſinned both againſt God and man? If he had neglected the only means in his power to put an end to the diſſenſions of four millions of people, he would have been a baſe man and have acted with treachery both to the King and the People.—I now deſire to aſk whether there is not to be found in this ſubject one of the originating cauſes of the meaſure now before the Houſe.—I have ſtated another ſubject of diſquiet in this country which prevailed from the period of the American war to the French revolution. At the time when the American war broke out there were conſiderable diſcuſſions upon almoſt every conſtitutional point. In conſequence of theſe diſcuſſions Ireland turned her attention to American politics: ſhe conſidered her then ſituation as owing to the narrow policy of Great Britain, and ſhe did determine to make an effort to retrieve her condition. In conſequence of this determination a reſolution was ſent over to Great Britain, in which Ireland aſſerted her right to a free trade. Her deſire was heard by England, a free trade was granted, the nation for a time was contented, and the agitation paſſed away. But this country is never to be without its agitations whether from religious or other cauſes. There is a temper in this country which renders it more prone to agitation, and more quickly and eaſily affected, and that to a degree of intemperance than any other country. This tranquility was of ſhort duration: the next ſource of diſquiet was an effort for a free Conſtitution. It was demanded of Great Britain, and was with equal grace conceded. Thus Great Britain at once abandoned the narrow policy by which ſhe had been actuated, and that authority over Ireland which ſhe had aſſumed, and Ireland was again tranquil. This took place in 1782; but in 1783 a new ſubject of agitation aroſe about the Protecting Duties, which produced conſiderable diſcuſſion in Parliament. It was not long however, before a new queſtion aroſe, I mean the Commercial Propoſitions between Great Britain and this country, which were brought forward in 1785.—After the diſcuſſion of theſe, which produced a great ferment both in England and Ireland, the queſtion of the Regency occurred, which unfortunate event threw this country into a new ſpecies of confuſion. There aroſe a degree of Parliamentary agitation, more violent than we had ever known in this country; but by his Majeſty's happy recovery quiet was again reſtored. Thus we find, that during theſe ſubjects of agitation aroſe in ſuch a manner, that this country was never at reſt for any conſiderable time, ſo as to enable her to purſue her proſperity. In theſe queſtions of contention between the two countries, the Parliament of Ireland exerciſed what was her unqueſtionable right, but they ſhewed that the connexion between England and Ireland was not defended by the Conſtitution of this country, but that it was open to diſſolution. It appeared alſo, that in queſtions of War and Peace we might exerciſe that diſcretion

cretion which we had exerciſed upon the queſtion of the Regency. Theſe circumſtances cauſed great apprehenſion with reſpect to the ſituation of this country as connected with the Imperial Conſtitution. They ſhewed that the connexion was not ſecured, and conſequently that the empire was expoſed to conſiderable danger. In this may be found another cauſe of the Union now propoſed: and until gentlemen can ſhew that the connexion is not in danger, it cannot be denied that ſome meaſures ought to be taken to ſecure it.

From the period of the French revolution, a new ſyſtem took place in this country, which, by a regular progreſs, advanced to convulſion and rebellion. In 1791, the conſpiracy of the United Iriſhmen took place; in 1793, it appears by our Statute Books, that that conſpiracy had gained many friends in this country—your Statute Books will ſhew you what was your ſituation in 1793, you paſſed a Convention Bill to prevent them from arrogating to themſelves the functions, and ſuperceding the authority of Parliament; theſe Statutes will ſhew you the diſtractions of the country and will prove the neceſſity of the adoption of ſome vigorous remedy. The French principles took effect in Ireland—principles, calculated for the deſtruction of religion, of ſocial order, and of every thing that ought to be dear to man. They were digeſted into French philoſophy, founded upon French folly and French wickedneſs; they were calculated to revolutionize the public mind; firſt in religion and politics, and then in morality; to ſubvert that religion, which is the correction of the high and the protection of the low in ſociety; to introduce that ſyſtem of horrid depravity which had placed a proſtitute as an object of adoration upon the Altar of God; to teach the child to forget his duty to his parent; to teach the ſervant to deſtroy his maſter; they tended to violate every ſanctuary of ſociety; to create in the minds of men a deſire of change, and to induce them to overturn every foundation upon which civil ſociety reſted.

The French, by their famous decree of November 1792, avowed themſelves the protectors of rebels in every ſtate. The conſequence of theſe principles gaining ground in this country were firſt convulſions, and ultimately rebellion. It is very material to conſider to what extent they had proceeded; it is very material, becauſe in this ſtate of things with reſpect to political affairs, we find one of the cauſes of the meaſure now under our conſideration. Theſe principles were ſupported by men of conſiderable rank and abilities in this country. I am ſorry to ſay they had an apparent ſupport from the ſpeeches of gentlemen in this Houſe, which gave a kind of countenance and encouragement to the traitors, whoſe only aim was to ſubvert the Conſtitution of the country. I am ſure that theſe ſpeeches, and publications of the ſame kind, have tended to inflame the people to make them diſcontented, and to render it probable that if the had attempted an invaſion, it would have been attended with conſequences perhaps fatal to the kingdom, and deſtructive to the proſperity of the empire. An invaſion was attempted, encouraged as it were, by theſe ſpeeches and theſe publications;

I do not charge them as traitors, but I say that if they were inclined to encourage treason, they would hold precisely the conduct which they did. I cannot pass this part of the subject lightly, every man in Ireland who is a traitor is against the Union. (Several Members called out no! no!) Gentleman say no, I cannot be understood to say that all who oppose the Union are traitors, but I mean that there is not a traitor, not a conspirator, not an United Irishman in the country, who is not against the Union. An opposition to this measure has been the great and professed object of those unexecuted traitors who have been sent out of the country, of those unarraigned traitors who have been suffered to remain in it.

I must take the liberty to read as part of my speech, some extracts from a publication professing to state the sentiments of the author, and those with whom he acted. I hold in my hand this manifesto to the People of Dublin, I read it because it cannot be contradicted, that it does profess to state the principles of the gentleman who wrote it, and of those with whom he acted, and as they have not disavowed it, it may be fairly considered as stating their sentiments and conduct. I read it, not against him, but as descriptive of the opinions of those with whom he acted. The general tendency of it will be found to degrade Parliament, and to lead the country into that situation which unfortunately followed. It begins with stating that the object of Government was to render "The King in Parliament every thing, and the People nothing!" It then proceeded to state, as remedies for the evils which were stated, to oppress the country, Catholic Emancipation and Parliamentary Reform. You recollect, that you appointed a Committee, and that it appeared from some traitors who were examined, that they considered Parliamentary Reform and Catholic Emancipation merely as a feather, that they were brought forward only as pretexts, and that it was of no importance whether they were granted or not. It then goes on to state,

"There may be a conspiracy, there may be republicanism, "there may be a spirit of plunder mixing in the public cause, and "let no man persuade you that it is not the cause of liberty on the "one side and tyranny on the other."

I could go on and read extracts of a similar nature. Here we may find another cause of this measure; when gentlemen of great abilities preach the doctrines of rebellion, and call it liberty; and when we find that a rebellion did follow, which destroyed the principles and endangered the existence of Government.

But it is said that the Constitution of 1782, is sufficient to redress all those evils! Let me ask what is the Constitution of 1782? By the British Constitution the British Legislature consists of three estates, the King, Lords and Commons; in them is vested the Legislative and the Sovereign Power. Their functions however, are of a double description: besides the Legislative they have other powers equally constitutional, necessary and indispensable. In the Crown is vested the Executive, in the Lords the Judicial, and in the Commons the Inquisitorial Power. These powers are as necessary as

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the Legiſlative, and give efficacy to the Conſtitution. The Conſtitution, as far as it relates to Legiſlation, would be an inert motionleſs body, if it was not for the other powers, the executive to put it in motion, and the others to controul and reſtrain the executive, which would otherwiſe deſtroy them. Without all theſe, you cannot have a Britiſh Conſtitution. It cannot work; you cannot have the benefit of it, if you have not theſe powers ſo divided. But how do you ſtand with regard to the Legiſlature? You have three branches, one of which, namely, the Crown, is reſident in another country, ſubject to the influence of a Britiſh Miniſter, and the controul of a Britiſh Parliament; you cannot therefore have the benefit of the Britiſh Conſtitution, as that portion of your Legiſlature which is in England is ſubject to the controul of a Britiſh Parliament. But again with reſpect to the operative functions of the Executive, and the inquiſitorial powers of Parliament—our Executive is veſted in the Crown, and acts under the controul of the Britiſh Parliament; your Executive therefore is not the ſame, inaſmuch as it is ſubject to that controul. With regard to your inquiſitorial power, where is it? you are completely diveſted of it; you have not that controul which will preſerve to you the benefits of the Britiſh Conſtitution. In what manner can it be ſaid that you have any portion of the inquiſitorial power? You have what has been called a fugacious reſponſibility. You have, however, a ſpecies of controul, ſometimes exerciſed by the Parliament, which is not unconſtitutional, but ſomething very like it. Your two Houſes of Parliament are ſimilar to thoſe in England; you may therefore if you pleaſe refuſe your aſſent to any meaſure propoſed. This plan has often been reſorted to; the grant of ſupplies, and the redreſs of grievances, may be made to go hand in hand. But how does this operate if the executive power is not ſubject to any other controul, it is not the Britiſh Conſtitution if the executive had nothing to aſk, for it would be of no avail, but if he had it would be effectual. But how does this ſtand? You have uſed it whenever you had an object to carry—you have ſaid, let us vote a ſhort money bill, a ſhort mutiny bill, becauſe you had no other means of controul. If you arm yourſelves thus for warfare with this exerciſe of legiſlative controul, when would you uſe it? Certainly when you could uſe it with effect, that is when the country is in war, when the King comes for ſupply, and when your aſſiſtance is of great importance to the empire. You are deprived of your conſtitutional controul, and you are obliged inſtead of it to reſort to that which you cannot uſe without the greateſt riſk to the empire. This very circumſtance proves that your executive is under the controul of the Britiſh Parliament. In whatever way you conſider it, it appears entirely incompetent for promoting the national advantages of this kingdom, and for the ſupport of the connexion between the two countries, which is ſo neceſſary for the welfare of both.

Theſe are the cauſes in which this meaſure originated, and which rendered it neceſſary in order to prevent ſeparation. You are invited by this Union, not only to ſhare in the Britiſh Conſtitution,

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but to participate in the proſperity of Great Britain. Inſtead of a Union of Monarchies, you are invited to a Union of the Sovereignties of the two countries. When the Act of Annexation paſſed, the Engliſh Parliament legiſlated for Ireland; therefore there was no occaſion to unite the legiſlatures, there was no neceſſity for a Union until you threw off the power of the Britiſh Parliament: you are invited to do what? To reſtore yourſelves to the ſovereignty of your country, to participate not only the ſovereignty of Ireland but of England, and of the empire; you are going to extend your power, to partake of the councils which regulate the Britiſh empire and all its dependencies; and this is called the degradation of Ireland. But it is ſaid that the number of members you are to ſend over to the Britiſh Parliament will not be ſufficient to preſerve your influence; yet it is evident from the ſtatement made upon this ſubject by the noble Lord beſide me, that the numbers we are to return are proportioned to our relative importance in the empire. Gentlemen, however, contend, that five hundred and fifty-eight members muſt out-number one hundred; but this argument is only uſed becauſe they will not give an idea of diſtinctneſs between the two countries. If after a Union the intereſts of the two countries were always to be in oppoſition to each other, undoubtedly the Iriſh members would be out-voted; but when the intereſt of the two countries are identified, when that which is the intereſt of the one muſt be the intereſt of the other, there can be no ſuch oppoſition. That number will be ſufficient to protect our intereſts, becauſe it is true in politics as it is in mechanics, that when a great body is in motion, it may be guided and influenced by a body that could not reſiſt it. I am really fearful of being tedious; I would not unneceſſarily occupy the time of the Committee, after what has been ſaid with reſpect to the ſubjects of trade and finance; but I cannot avoid calling the attention of the Committee to one circumſtance, which is, that if this meaſure is not adopted the expences of this country will render it impoſſible for her to go on; ſhe muſt in a ſhort period become a bankrupt if this opportunity is not taken of reducing her expences.

I will ſhew gentlemen a ſtatement of the difference of the expence this country will incur by adopting or rejecting this meaſure, and I am ſure it is well worth attention. With reſpect to the parliamentary part of this ſubject I will only ſay one word, and that is with reſpect to the compenſation which it is propoſed to give for boroughs. It is an admitted principle that private advantage muſt give way to public good. It is aſſumed by thoſe who ſupport this meaſure that it is indiſpenſable that a certain number of boroughs ſhould not return members to the Imperial Parliament. It is but juſt that thoſe who make this ſacrifice ſhould be remunerated. This principle of compenſation has always been acted upon.—When the Court of Wards was aboliſhed a compenſation was given to the Crown. The ſame ſyſtem was acted upon in Scotland, where the the principles of the conſtitution are as well underſtood as they are here, a full compenſation was made to the individuals when the heritable juriſdictions were taken away. It is therefore clear

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that private advantage ſhould give way to public good, and that thoſe who make ſuch ſacrifices ſhould be compenſated. But it is ſaid that this idea of compenſation is a ſyſtem of bribery; if it is the moſt extraordinary ſpecies of bribery that ever was practiſed, and fit only for the parliament of Bœotia, for arts equally on both ſides. When once the principles by which the compenſation is to be paid is laid down, it will not be in the power of the Miniſter or of the parliament to ſay who ſhall or who ſhall not be compenſated. If no compenſation was granted, is it not clear that every perſon who has a borough muſt ſee that if he votes on one ſide it will affect his intereſt, whereas if he votes on the other, his intereſt is unconcerned; but by this principle of compenſation he will be at liberty to exerciſe his judgment without any poſſible bias; and therefore, I ſay, it is compenſation only that can enable a borough-man to vote upon this ſubject with a clear conſcience. With reſpect to the commercial part of this ſubject, I ſhall only lightly touch upon it now, becauſe a more proper time will occur during the preſent proceedings upon this ſubject, I will therefore only at preſent ſay, that this plan includes all the advantages which were propoſed to be given in the Commercial Propoſitions of 1785: it does more, it gives you the full and entire participation of the trade of Great Britain, which the Propoſitions of 1785 did not do. Her duties upon linen and woollen yarn were not taken off as in the preſent caſe, and the whole of the commercial ſyſtem was left open to the diſcuſſion of the contending parliaments. By the Propoſitions Ireland was to pay a certain contribution when her income exceeded a certain ſum; conſequently you were to pay a contribution which muſt always encreaſe as your proſperity encreaſed. But by this meaſure you have a fixed contribution which cannot encreaſe beyond the fixed proportion.

As you ſtand at preſent, you are open in time of war to whatever demand the Miniſter may make; but in the caſe of an Union the demand muſt be limited—you cannot be aſked more than your proportion; and therefore, I ſay, that both as it regards the trade and the contribution which this country is to pay, it is a meaſure infinitely more advantageous to her than the Propoſitions of 1785. I ſhall now, Sir, after thanking the Committee for the indulgence with which they have heard me, preſume to move the firſt reſolution.

Mr. GRATTAN ſaid, that with reſpect to the ſubject before the Houſe, it had been already diſcuſſed; and indeed the hon. gentleman had tripped over the ground with ſo light a foot as to have made no impreſſion. He thought from the manner of the hon. gentleman's ſpeech, that the ſubject had been deſerted; he did not mean intentionally deſerted, but there was in the whole of the hon. gentleman's ſpeech ſomething ſo frivolous, ſo inane, ſo ſlimſy, ſo gaudy, that he ſeemed rather to be a courtier adjuſting his argument before a looking-glaſs than a ſenator ſpeaking on the affairs of a country. The hon. gentleman ſeemed to ſupply his deficiency of ability and of argument by perſonality, and he did not think the hon. gentleman deficient in perſonal ſatire, though he thought him very deficient in the force of argument;

gument; inſtead of argument the had ſubſtituted ſlanderous inſinuations againſt an individual. The hon. gentleman ſeemed to ſet the propriety and the neceſſity of the Union upon the ground of Catholic Emancipation—Parliamentary Reform—Particular Speeches made in that Houſe, and publications on political ſubjects out of the Houſe. Reſpecting Reform, it had been once attempted to ſtifle that meaſure in a perpetual Mutiny Bill. The hon. gentleman ſupported that Bill when it was brought in, and he remembered that the very ſame gentleman afterwards voted that Bill to be a grievance. It was attempted to ſtifle Parliamentary Reform by ſelling to the Britiſh Miniſter the Iriſh Parliament—by a Union of the two Legiſlatures. The noble Lord hoped to quiet the minds of the People and for ever put to reſt the idea of Parliamentary Reform and Catholic Emancipation by purchaſing the Parliament of Ireland with the money of the People. It reminded him of the poet's deſcription of the man who

Wiſely hoping party rage would ceaſe,
He buys both ſides to give the country peace.

Was there to be no ſuch thing as publications on political ſubjects in the country? Did the hon. gentleman believe that the Parliament of the country would be removed without the People hearing of it? Was there to be no freedom of the preſs, was that to be removed alſo with the Parliament? Let not the hon. gentleman ſpeak or hope ſo wildly as to ſay, that becauſe the Parliament is to be removed there ſhall be no publications. The ſuppreſſion of public opinion through the medium of the preſs, might be more dangerous than the freedom of diſcuſſion. Was the only way to ſtop the licentiouſneſs of the preſs to ſtop the grievance—to take away the materials—what is the grievance?—the Parliament. The hon. gentleman had read a letter of his, (*a*) give him leave to ſay the hon. gentleman had miſrepreſented every period of it. There was not a paſſage related by the hon. gentleman that was fairly ſtated to the Houſe, and though he miſrepreſented them to anſwer his own purpoſe, yet he was unable to argue upon them; and therefore it would have been wiſer for the hon. gentleman not to have uſed them.—The hon. gentleman had ſtated a ſentence out of that publication which he endeavoured to eſtabliſh as intended againſt the preſent Parliament, which he muſt have well known did not apply to this Parliament, but to the borough Parliament of James the firſt; it alluded to the packed Parliament of that reign. Would the hon. gentleman deny that Parliament was packed? Would he deny that the retainers of the caſtle had endeavoured to deſtroy the liberties of the country? Would he defend that Parliament? Would he deny that fact? Would he ſay the attempt to pack a Parliament was never made by any miniſter? Would he ſay it was not attempted in the time of Lord Buckingham? The hon. gentleman had miſrepreſented him in other inſtances, and endeavoured to apply the paragraphs to the exiſting Parliament, in a language that a ballot-finger would be aſhamed of. He muſt have well known that ſome of the obſervations in that publication applied to the Parliament of 1769, which Lord Townſhend

(*a*) *Mr. Grattan's Addreſs to his Fellow-citizens of Dublin, printed by Stockdale.*

Townſhend boaſted of, and which the Miniſtry had ſince boaſted they had procured at the expence of half a million. He had heard and always thought that the influence of the Crown might overturn the Conſtitution. Had not attempts been made on the integrity of the Parliament to induce it to give up itſelf? Could any man believe that any Miniſter could be ſo daring, ſo bold, as to think by a public robbery to ſteal the Parliament out of the country; that any Miniſter could have the impudence to aſk a free and independent Parliament to give itſelf to Great Britain? Would the hon. gentleman look the Houſe of Commons of Ireland in the face and boldly and honeſtly tell the Houſe, that no Miniſter at any time had attempted to bribe a Parliament to vote away its own eſſence? If the hon. gentleman would get up and deny this, he would be glad to hear him. Would the hon. gentleman ſay that no Miniſter in any country ever attempted to do ſuch an act?

The hon. gentleman had told the Houſe, that the inflammatory ſpeeches that had been made in the Houſe, and the inflammatory publications that had been given to the public out of the Houſe, had inflamed the public mind, and irritated the public feeling; but the hon. gentleman muſt have well known he was wrong in his ſtatement; for he muſt have, no doubt, ſeen the declaration of O'Connor and two others; and what was their declaration?—that they had formed their connexion with France before ever thoſe ſpeeches were made, and he knew that they had declared, if at that time Parliamentary Reform had been acceded to, they would have broken off that connexion. The hon. gentleman muſt have known that thoſe perſons did declare they had no intercourſe with the Oppoſition, but on the ſubject of Reform. But when the hon. gentleman came into the Houſe of Commons of Ireland, with a treaſonable motion in his hand, with a conſpiracy againſt the King, Lords and Commons of Ireland, it was natural for him to charge an honeſt and an independent man with the crime of which he himſelf was guilty, and to charge the true and ſincere friends and ſupporters of the Conſtitution with unqualified, abominable, and contemptible calumny.

If he was to ſay what was the cauſe of the rebellion that aggrieved this country, if he was to ſay what was the cauſe of thoſe convulſions that agitated the kingdom—he would ſay it was not the Parliamentary Declaimers that was the cauſe—it was not the publications out of the Houſe that was the cauſe—but it was the Parliamentary pedlar, firſt ſpeculating for bread and then for ſtation, that cauſed the diſcontents of the country. He lamented the blots of the body, and he pitied the individual; he looked with reſpect towards the body itſelf, becauſe he knew it poſſeſſed a patient principle, which was the pledge of future virtue. There were defects in the Conſtitution: the ſide of the Houſe on which he was wanted to remove them; they tried to cure the diſorders, they recommended medicine, but the other ſide decried the medicine, they refuſe to give relief, they thought and they ſaid the patient is ſo ill don't try to cure him, he is paſt cure; kill him at once. What is the complaint? the patient has a pain in his head; give him what will relieve him; no, that won't

won't do, say the other side of the House; the head-ache is incurable, cut off his head. They first propose the cure of the Constitution, and then they propose the death of it. He would always defend his public character and conduct against any gentleman on the other side of the House, however he may recommend himself to power. With respect to that part of the hon. gentleman's speech which went to want of responsibility in the minister, he would examine it—What was the argument?—That the Constitution of Ireland was not sufficient to secure the responsibility of the Irish Minister. The English Minister certainly is not responsible to this country, but the Irish Minister is, if he does not run away from the country, but if he runs from the country and from punishment, he then is not responsible, and public justice would probably be eluded. What was the case of the Marquis of Buckingham?—he was obliged to pacify the House or he could not have staid in the country. The Constitution was not so bad as the hon. gentleman wished to insinuate. With respect to trade and to treaties, where was the security if the Parliament was removed that either would be protected by the Imperial Parliament? Ireland had as much influence as her wealth and her population entitled her to. The hon. gentleman said, that the power of this country was great in the scale of war, and that to get rid of that power the country must give up her Parliament. If this country could not controul Great Britain in making or carrying on war, it was because the population of England was ten millions, and that of Ireland only four. Suppose the King of England to reside in Ireland would not the Parliament of England still have more power than that of Ireland, because the physical force of the country would continue. How did the noble Lord mean to supply the weakness of this country and give it more strength?—by taking away the Parliament? Three hundred men of fortune and independence in Ireland were not sufficient to controul the country in matters that concerned the country alone, and therefore let the three hundred men be reduced to one hundred, and let those hundred men be sent to England and then what would be the consequence?—Why there would be no power at all. It has been denied that the country possessed any Constitution; it was now asserted that the country had a Constitution; it was asserted that the country was so powerful she ought to give up her Constitution. It was endeavoured to be imposed on the People of Ireland that they ought to be satisfied with any Constitution. If the Constitution be not sufficient for all the purposes of power, which he denied, it was no Constitution; it might require a few alterations, but the great object of the People of Ireland ought to be to preserve their Constitution, to preserve that Constitution which the Minister would put to the sword.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER rose in reply, and expressed his sorrow that the hon. gentleman had not been present when he first addressed the House, as he would then have known that he had expresly declined entering into an extensive field of observation on the question, because it had been ably discussed before, and must be again discussed in detail. (He then reverted to his for-

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mer and made other quotations from Mr. Grattan's pamphlet to prove that he had not misrepresented him,) He did not come into Parliament for bread; he was in that situation that rendered him independent of every man living—He never owed an obligation to any man; and if he had been put into an enviable situation it was not by a mean compliance to the wishes of any party: he never deserted any measure he thought he was right in supporting; he did support the measure of a Parliamentary Reform, even when he was a servant of the Crown. He represented an independent borough. He scorned to apply to any party for support. If he had intended an attack upon the hon. gentleman, it was not his person, or his talents he would attack, he would have spoken to him of treason and rebellion; he would have spoken to him of the rebellion from which he fled, after he had assisted in originating it by his inflammatory speeches and his writings; he would have spoken to him of his right to sit in the House after his return before his character was inquired into—he would have had it inquired into before the hon. gentleman should have got leave to sit in the House: he would have told him of his private association with rebels and traitors, whose lives were justly forfeited to the country by the counsels and speeches of the hon. gentleman. He would have called on him, (as he trusted he had done), to justify his conduct to the world. The hon. gentleman is charged with being the associate of traitors, has he denied it?—he does not deny it.

Mr. Grattan.—In reply said, he did not wish to interrupt the hon. gentleman which he might have done, because there was not a word he uttered that was not a gross violation of the privileges of the House. He was persuaded of the difficulty the hon. gentleman laboured under when he attacked him, and therefore he wished to hear him out, knowing, as he did, that on a comparative view of their characters both public and private, there was no one thing the hon. gentleman could say, that could take away the character of an honest and an independent man: the public would not believe the charge—he despised the falshood; the condition of the slave is beneath the sentiment of friendship. The hon. gentleman had said, that by his counsel the rebellion had been brought about, the hon. gentleman ought to have known that no man of honour would have made that charge against him, and the hon. gentleman draws his conclusions from the report of the secret committee of the House of Lords. Had any man out of the House, said what the hon. gentleman had mentioned in the House, his answer would be a blow—He would not care how high his situation, how frivolous his character, how contemptible his speech; whether he was a privy-counsellor or a parasite; whether he was a pedlar or a half fool, or a half coxcomb, or a half swindler, his answer would be a blow. The hon. gentleman had said, he was connected with the rebels. It was false, it was utterly, totally, and meanly false. He ought not to have come down to the House with falsities. He would not treat the hon. gentleman like a ruffian. He would not tell the hon. gentleman that he treated him like a coward because the hon. gentleman was a member of Parliament; but if he had said when

the hon. gentleman had declared he would feel that he had acted as a coward? Would the hon. gentleman rely on the report of the Houſe of Lords for the foundation of his aſſertions. If he did he would prove to the committee that there was a phyſical impoſſibility of that report being true. He would not connect himſelf with a ſet of men who were in the act of treaſon againſt the conſtitution, who, if the conſtitution was in its full force and energy ought to be impeached of high treaſon againſt the conſtitution. If he had been connected with rebels why did not the hon. gentleman impeach him. He defied the hon. gentleman, he defied the government; let the whole phalanx of the government come forth, he defied them all—he would neither give them quarters nor take it at their hands. He ſcorned to anſwer any man for his conduct, whether he was a coxcomb or a political jack-a-naps, whether he brought himſelf into power by a falſe glare of courage or not, he would ſcorn to anſwer any wizard of the caſtle throwing himſelf into fantaſtical airs; but if an honorable and independent man was to make a charge againſt him, he would ſay; you charge me with having an intercourſe with rebels, and you found your charge upon what is ſaid to have appeared before the committee of the Houſe of Lords; Sir, the report of that committee is totally and egregiouſly irregular. (Mr. Grattan then read a letter which he received from Mr. Nelſon who had been examined before that committee, ſtating that what was reported reſpecting Mr. Grattan was not the teſtimony that had been given.)

From the ſituation he held, and from the connexions he had in the city of Dublin it was neceſſary for him to have frequent intercourſe with various deſcriptions of perſons. The hon. Chancellor of the Exchequer might as well have been charged with a participation of the guilt of thoſe traitors for he had communicated with ſome of thoſe very perſons on the ſubject of parliamentary reform. At the time of the emancipation of Ireland in 1782, he took a leading part in the affairs of that day, in the formation of that conſtitution that was now endeavoured to be deſtroyed. And what were they debating about? About that very conſtitution of which he was the author and which he gloried in, and for which the hon. gentleman ought to praiſe him. The hon. gentleman had ſtated that want of ability made him abandon the profeſſion of the law, the hon. gentleman had been of that profeſſion too, and probably when he ſpoke of inability to follow it; he ſpoke from a conviction of his own talents, and found that the houſe of a great man was a more convenient way to power and to place, that friends were better than clients; and that it would be better for a ſtateſman of ſmall talents to ſell his friends than to ſell his clients. Whatever great bodies of the people had ſaid or done to him, he forgave them from his heart, he felt he had done too much for his country to be vexed at them. He would rather they ſhould not feel the acknowledge; what he had done for them and call him traitor, than that he ſhould ſell them. He would always defend himſelf againſt the ruffian; but with the large body of the people it was different; he felt he had done them ſo much ſervice, that though they might be his enemy, he could never be their enemy.

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He did not run away from the danger of the rebellion; he was away when it happened and he would not have returned without taking a part, and he was convinced that the miniſters of the crown were the traitors to the conſtitution. There was a rebel camp on one ſide—there was the miniſter's camp on the other, as great rebels to the conſtitution as the men that oppoſed them. He was charged with returning to take part in a new political ſtorm. He returned to ſupport the conſtitution, he returned to confront thoſe cowards that had calumniated him. He returned if neceſſary to lay the remains of his weak conſtitution on the floor of the Houſe for the welfare of his native land.

General HUTCHINSON.—As I have been ſometimes in the habit of taking part in the debates of this Houſe, it is impoſſible for me to avoid giving the reaſons which have operated to decide my conduct on this important occaſion.

The firſt argument againſt the Union is, that we ſurrender the indepence of our Legiſlature, and ſubmit ourſelves to the controul of a foreign parliament. Now, I ſay, that we are already under the controul of that parliament, in all queſtions of external legiſlation, and muſt ever continue ſo, as long as England retains her ſuperiority over us, and Ireland remains an inferior member of a great empire. The firſt moment you make a practical uſe of your independence, and preſume to interfere in the great queſtions of imperial legiſlation, your own exiſtence is threatened, the diſſolution of the empire approaches. Your co-equality with the parliament of Great Britain is the dream of fancy, which can never be realiſed. You muſt tread in all her ſteps. Her friends muſt be your friends. Her enemies muſt be your enemies. Who would fear your hoſtility? who would reſpect your neutrality? You are at preſent confined within the narrow ſphere of internal policy, and condemned to legiſlate alone for a turbulent diſtracted province. You may deny your inferiority, and guild your ſubmiſſion with the proudeſt appellations. You may talk of rights which you poſſeſs but in name; and of powers which you dare not exerciſe; but you cannot move out of the ſphere within which it is decreed you ſhould act, without diſſolving the connexion, ſubverting the empire, and ruining yourſelves. Let me aſk you do you acquire nothing when you obtain the right of interfering in the great and imperial concerns of a great and noble empire? When Europe and Aſia, the Eaſt and the Weſt ſhall be opened to the Iriſh gentleman for the diſplay of thoſe talents which ſo eminently diſtinguiſh him.

Much has been ſaid of the adjuſtment of 1782. For my part I do not know what finality means in human affairs. It might have been final as far as the then exiſting circumſtances of things admitted; but it never can be ſuppoſed to bind all poſterity, and to act as an interdict againſt the wiſdom, the experience, the neceſſities of ages yet unborn. We have lived to be witneſſes of events, which could not have been in the contemplation of the moſt ſagacious man then alive. The French revolution has aſtoniſhed and ſhaken a trembling world; has menaced the diſſolution of the Britiſh empire, and deluged this country in the blood of her own citizens.

citizens. What resource does the settlement of 1782 afford in our present disastrous circumstances? We were not then threatened by external hostility, and domestic aggression. The embers of a rebellion, scarcely yet extinguished, were not then warm under our feet. Remedies could not be applied at that time to disorders which exist now. You then established the independence of your parliament, and rescued your rights from the usurpation of a foreign legislature. The contest was worthy and magnanimous on your side; the concession was wise and salutary on the part of Great Britain. But we cannot be guilty of such treachery towards ourselves, and of such delusion towards our constituents, as to be unwilling to acknowledge that that settlement neither gave peace, strength, or security to this unhappy country. You contended then for liberty---you contend now for government---for your honors, your properties, your principles, and your lives. In 1798, did rebellion array itself in order to procure the independence of parliament? No, they armed for its extinction. Was it to strengthen, to secure, to render immortal the British connexion? No, it was to dissolve it for ever, and to establish in its room French alliance, French confiscation, and French anarchy. Eternal hatred to England, eternal amity with France, was the sworn creed of those doctors of the new light, of those apostles of the modern doctors of liberty and equality. Irish independence under French protection, was the watch-word which echoed through their ranks on the day of battle. Irish independence, which if it could be obtained without guilt, would be the height of folly and madness to aim at. Suppose for a moment, that there was no honest prejudice in favour of Great Britain---no common links of attachment---no ties of blood---no similarity in manners, laws and language---yet still, I say, that connexion and union with Great Britain ought to be the council and sound policy of Ireland. Surely, it is better for you to be a component part of a great and free empire, than a weak and petty state, standing alone, resting on the forbearance of a treacherous and despotic ally.

During the discussion of this subject, I have heard something of the treachery and perfidy of Great Britain. For my part I cannot apprehend it, because I am sure she cannot be false to us, and remain true to herself. I do not mean to panegerize what was once the conduct of Great Britain towards this island: her circumscribed folly induced her to adopt an idle and dangerous line of policy, which her capacious wisdom has long since taught her to respect. It would be something more than adulation to a greater country not to acknowledge that we are as necessary to her as she is to us. England, like other countries, has her follies and her faults, her vices and her crimes; but there never was a nation to whom a peculiar degree of sound sense and solid reason might be so justly attributed. Do you think that at this day she remains unconvinced that your prosperity is her prosperity, your resource her resource? What has she acquired by your poverty? In the last war she more than once payed your army from her treasury; in this she has assisted you by her credit, and guaranteed to her merchants your loans.

loans. Your population, your ports, the redundancy of your corn, your military energies, are all neceſſary to Great Britain. She has been the conſtant ſufferer by all your calamities; the partner of all your diſtreſs. Do you think that it is, by perfidy and treachery a wiſe nation can hope to ſtrengthen herſelf, or ſecure you? No, She muſt be convinced that when you ſink, ſhe totters—when you fall, her power vaniſhes; her empire menaces ruin; her reign is extinguiſhed.

For my own part, Sir, I cannot look round this iſland, or ſurvey Europe without being thoroughly convinced of the neceſſity of ſome change. The preſent conſtitution of Parliament cannot laſt ---the experience of two centuries is againſt it. The failure is manifeſt; it has weakened the empire without ſtrengthening you. Formed for the infancy of a foreign and a little colony, it has ſunk before the manhood of a great nation, and has become private property and not public right. The diminution of the legiſlature has been in the direct proportion with the encreaſe of the country. If this parliament had been found entirely competent to preſerve the national tranquillity—if no external circumſtances had taken place to require a cloſer connexion with Great Britain —I ſhould not have voted for the Union. But if within every thing is hollow, if without every thing is menacing—let me aſk you where is your remedy againſt eternal diſtraction? Where is your ſhield againſt foreign invaſion? What is property without ſecurity? What is liberty when life is in danger; and when the houſe of a country gentleman muſt either be his garriſon or his tomb.

I am perfectly convinced of the political neceſſity of endeavouring to preſerve a ſenſe of national dignity. It is the ſource of all pre-eminence—the fountain of glory to nations, and of honour to individuals—the origin of all power, ſtrength, and greatneſs. I wiſh, amidſt the wreck and ruin which ſurrounds us, that we had any thing to nouriſh this noble paſſion—any thing to ſoothe vanity, or conſole pride. But the hiſtory of this country for the laſt ſix centuries has been the ſad, degrading, melancholy picture of barbarous diſcord and ſavage acrimony—of party zeal and ſectarian ſtruggle---a fugitive government without fixed principles---a Miniſter without reſponſibility---a parliament fearleſs of the people, from whom they did not derive their origin—a triumphant ariſtocracy, and a nation in chains. Your rights were invaded—your commerce annihilated—your conſtitution lay in the duſt. You ſubmitted to be ſlaves abroad, provided you were allowed to be tyrants at home. Certainly for the firſt eighty years of this century the government of this country was the moſt arbitrary and oppreſſive of any in Europe. Every weak habit in the human intellect---every bad paſſion of the human breaſt-- every baſe diſpoſition of our infirm nature, were called into action---preſided at the judgment ſeat of juſtice, and expounded a code, whoſe monſtrous abſurdity was only to be equalled by its ſanguinary cruelty---a code, unexampled in the annals of civilized man, which put three-fourths of the

inhabitants

inhabitants of this country out of the protection of the law, which gave any ruffian, who profeſſed to believe the eſtabliſhed religion, a power of invading the property of the innocent Catholic, and of ſeizing on the fruits of his induſtry. This criminal legiſlation offered premiums to hypocriſy and perjury, and endeavoured to ſecure the State by undermining the morals of the citizens. Certainly during the courſe of his Majeſty's long and auſpicious reign a wiſer and more liberal line of conduct has been purſued towards this country; but in human affairs it is much eaſier to commit than to remedy an error—the wiſdom of one age cannot always repair the folly of another. Though much of thoſe laws have been repealed, the conſequences of a barbarous code are ſtill evident amongſt us. The dregs of this deadly poiſon ſtill remain, and have implanted in too many boſoms thoſe unhappy jealouſies---thoſe ill-founded ſuſpicions---thoſe idle fears---thoſe ſanguinary paſſions, which with black malignant, rancorous, religious fanaticiſm, alone can exiſt.

The effects of this ſyſtem were ſuch as might naturally have been expected---Ireland in many reſpects ſunk below the level of other European countries. It was impoſſible to hope for love to the law, zeal for the conſtitution, or attachment to the government; for protection is the parent of obedience, reverence and ſubmiſſion are its honorable children. That pure, unſullied, unalloyed allegiance, the vital principle of States, the only ſolid foundation of legitimate rule, which will not yield to the clumſy chain of force, but is created by benefits, acknowledged by gratitude, and nouriſhed by hope, can only be expected by a good and beneficent government from a happy and contented people. Surely there muſt have been ſome pre-diſpoſing cauſe, which rendered the admiſſion of French principles more eaſy and more general in this country, than almoſt in any other in Europe. God has not curſed the land with barrenneſs, nor the people with intellectual darkneſs —much of the energies of an acute, a brave, and a generous nation have been ſuffered to prey upon its own powers, to rot and periſh in obſcurity, indolence, and wretchedneſs. The vice and virtue of ſubjects muſt generally be attributed to the government under which they have lived. Hard and oppreſſive laws naturally tend to corrupt the human heart, and to make man brutal and ferocious. If to this ſhall be ſuperadded the tyranny of manners, more inſulting and humiliating than any ſyſtem of law, nothing can be more wretched than the ſtate of ſuch a nation, nothing more dangerous and more menacing than ſuch a government, reſting on ſo frail and tottering a foundation. What is the ſecurity of the tyrant? The debaſement of his ſlave. What is his puniſhment? The corruption of his own principles.

The light of the French revolution with all its fond deluſions, broke on a country where there was neither equal law nor equal liberty; where the line of ſeparation between the rulers and the ruled was immenſe; where the ſpirit of perſecution was ſubſtituted for the ſpirit of peace and charity, and even atoned for the want

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religion itself. This island was therefore a prepared soil for the reception of Jacobin principles, and they have flourished with all the growth of rank luxuriance. If almost the whole people of England have flocked to the standard of royalty---if they have shewn the highest zeal for their constitution, and the greatest reverence for their laws, it has neither been the effect of passion nor of prejudice, but the wise and deep-rooted sentiment of the benefits which they have derived from the one, and of the protection which the other has afforded them. With a limited population---with natural resources by no means of the first magnitude, they have become a great and flourishing empire---commanding commerce---displaying a triumphant flag in every quarter of the globe---protecting Europe by its resources, its councils, its courage and its energies---rallying again the powers of the Continent to the standard of order, religion, and government---and covering the best institutions of social man with the adamantine shield of true philosophy and immortal reason. From whence then arise the different circumstances of two islands only separated from each other by a narrow channel? Open the annals of your own country---ask your own hearts, and you will then find the solution of the problem. In what events of your history can you take pride? The past is without glory---the present is disastrous and humiliating---all is darkness and desolation around us. Oppression, rapine, anarchy, rebellion, follow each other in sad and melancholy gradation. The British constitution appears to have lain a dead weight upon us, inoppressive and oppressive---the magistrates without authority, the laws without respect. It would be absurd to argue, and a libel on the national character to assert, that the fault has been entirely with the people. He who was capable of maintaining that Ireland has been well governed, would pay an ill compliment to your understandings and be guilty of an idle perversion of the truth. We must acknowledge and deplore the sad circumstances of the times in which we live: Licentious manners---profligate morals---the perversion of all sound and honest principle---the ardent desire of the poor to invade the property of the rich, have not only menaced the entire overthrow of all governments, but the utter subversion of civilized society.

If these disorders, the common malady of the times, have been more severely felt in Ireland than almost in any other country; the reason is obvious: the law and the government warred too long against the dearest interests of the people. I will not do any nation in Europe the honour to place them in natural endowment above the inhabitants of this island: though certainly in acquirements they are inferior to those that surround them. It is nonsense to suppose that they could not be made as amenable to law as other men, or that they could not be convinced of the blessings of good government order and industry. There is even an energy in their character, and courage in their minds which might lead to great and noble exertions. I can safely put my hand to my heart and declare, that no Irish gentleman ever had prouder views for

his country than I had; but my hopes are blasted—those ideal projects---those visions of national greatness are fled to return no more. Temporate reformation is impossible——Revolution is imminent---we must resist it, or perish. There is no remedy for our present disorders; the contagious poison of jacobin principles has been poured upon wounds still fresh and bleeding: the too-general diffusion of those abominable principles were the real origin of the late rebellion. I am persuaded that religion, Catholic emancipation, or parliamentary reform had very little to do with it; they might at first have been the pretext, but they never were the efficient cause: it was an attempt to carry on a war on a new principle, which had not its origin here, but which has invaded every country, and threatened every government. They did not seek to reform the parliament, but to overthrow the State; they did not wish to emancipate the Catholic, but to proscribe the land-holder of both communities: they armed the strength of the poor man with the dagger of the assassin to plunder the rich, in order afterwards to enslave both. Jacobinism appears for a time to have erected its favourite throne in this ill-fated country; that infuriate power, alike remorseless and ungovernable---unawed by conscience ---unsubdued by reason---laughs at the credulity of man, and mocks his sufferings; it talk of our equal rights to destroy every right; it fires the palace to invade the cottage; it depose, it murders kings, to trample on their subjects; a persecutor without religion, a sanguinary bigot without faith; it does not war with one law, but with every law; it does not attack one government, but every government; it does not proscribe one religion, but every religion; all that habit has rendered dear, time rendered venerable, or faith rendered sacred, falls before its exterminating sword.

Had the parliament of Ireland worked the good and the happiness of the people of Ireland, I would not have voted for this measure, however beautiful and elegant the theory of Union may be; for in political life I shall ever prefer practical experience to distant speculation; but I am convinced that Ireland would be better governed after the proposed arrangement, than under the present system. I disapprove of the past, I have no hopes for the future; I have no doubt that the conduct of the united parliament will be wise towards the empire, and consequently fair and honorable towards Ireland. The animosities of sects in our time will never cease; reconciliation is impossible; there is no charity amongst us ---there is no hope of peace. It is necessary to remove us from a paltry, narrow, circumscribed theatre, where all the little passions of little minds can display themselves in the fullest extent; where religious controversy will still continue to afflict and disgrace us--- where there is too much prejudice calmly to discuss, and too much passion to be wise. Go and unite with a nation more fortunate and enlightened than yourselves; you take with you a country shackled and manackled---outraged and deformed by the wicked policy of man, but arrayed in all those capabilities which bountiful nature, with a profuse and prodigal hand, has poured upon her. Go, and

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may your future history be as honourable and glorious, as your past has been calamitous and disgraceful.

I have now given you my reasons for voting for this measure. They may be weak and futile --they may be such as cautious prudence would not suggest, or timidity avow; they are the sentiments of a man who values you too highly, and respects himself too much to think concealment justifiable on a vital question. I should wish to retain your good opinion, but I am determined never to forfeit my own. If I have wounded the pride, or shocked the prejudices of many amongst you, I sincerely regret it; but I never can repent it. The times in which we live place us above all the cold civility of parliamentary forbearance. Every man is not only at liberty, but is bound to assign the reasons which have governed his conduct. I have given you mine, without private interest, without passion, and without fear. No popular delusion, no idle clamour, no false misrepresentation shall ever induce me to depart from what I consider to be a great fundamental truth; that, the best government for these countries is one executive and one legislature; a connected people, and an united parliament. Whatever may be the fate and fortunes of this great measure, I shall ever assert, I shall ever defend my conduct; to have voted for the Union shall be the pride and boast of my political life.

Mr. MARTIN.—Also rose to support the measure. He said, as what he meant to offer to the Committee applied particularly to Mr. Grattan, and that as that gentleman was not in his place he would reserve to himself an opportunity of speaking when that gentleman returned.

M. ALEXANDER, also, supported the principle.

Mr. TIGHE, said, that if what had been urged by the gentlemen who were favourable to the measure of an Union could be called debate, the arguments tended but to this, that as soon as the measure passed there will neither be freedom of speech nor liberty of the press in Ireland. It had been attempted to make the question, a question between the Catholics and the Protestants. It was no such thing; and this was laid as one ground to destroy the constitution. The present state of Ireland was made another pretence for subverting the constitution of Ireland. Temporary expedient was made another argument. The constitution possessed one fundamental maxim, a maxim that ought never to be lost sight of, that ought never to be surrendered, and that was, to be governed by an independent parliament, consisting of an hereditary national house of lords, a distinct national house of commons, and to have a distinct national resident independent representation of the people. In better times the measure brought forward by the minister would have been discussed not in a free and independent house of commons, but on the scaffold. It was from France that the minister of this country imbibed the principle of making the liberty of the country subservient to temporary expedience; but for that, the states-general of France might have remained and the constitution be saved under a limited monarchy. But this country he trusted would never forsake the great land-mark of their liberty.—What were the Eng-

liſhman's ideas of Union? When Edward the Third prepared for the conqueſt of France, the People of England prayed that they might never be added to France, that there never might be an union between the countries; and the anſwer of the king was ſo gracious that in the fourteenth year of his reign it was enacted into a law. The ſtar of liberty that roſe in Ireland in 1782 will never ſet but in the midſt of deſpotiſm and over a ſea of blood. To preſerve the connexion between Great Britain and Ireland every man ought to ſign a petition againſt the Union. He would thine himſelf unworthy of the ſituation he held in the country, of the little property he poſſeſſed, of the truſt repoſed in him as a repreſentative of a free people if he did not ſit in the houſe of commons of Ireland to defend the conſtitution and to ſupport the Britiſh connexion. It will be by the conſtitution of Ireland and not by the Britiſh army that connexion will remain.

Colonel Coote expreſſed in ſtrong terms his ſupport of the meaſure of Legiſlative Union, from the conviction of his heart and judgment; that he did not aſcribe improper motives to any of the gentlemen who oppoſed the meaſure; he was aware, that on the firſt view of it, it appeared humiliating to the country, and therefore required us to penetrate its drapery, and to weigh the advantages in a large and liberal ſcale, and not in a local one to be convinced of its utility. He was ſorry to differ from thoſe he loved and reſpected, and from many men of character and property in the county he had the honour to repreſent. He, however, had the ſatisfaction of knowing, that there were alſo many men of value in character and property, who thought favourably of the meaſure, and that the weight of property was decidedly in favour of it. When the opinions of the people are divided, the conſtitution has not pointed out any mode by which the inſtructions of our conſtituents are to be followed; and Judge Blackſtone declares that members of Parliament are the repreſentatives of the whole kingdom.

That to him it appeared that the intereſts of Ireland called for, and required the meaſure, that Ireland is weighed down by internal diſcontents, jealouſies, and animoſities, and therefore our preſent political ſyſtem carries along with it the ſeeds of its own deſtruction; a ſyſtem he had never ſupported, having uniformly reſiſted the change of thoſe laws, under which the country was happily governed, and the repeals of which have ſince produced diſcontents and diſtractions, and almoſt convulſed Ireland. "*Poſſit liberare animum ſuum*;" having acted a conſiſtent and firm part in the ſupport of the Proteſtant intereſt and government of Ireland? What is now the political ſtate of Ireland, if we give more power to the Catholics? We ſhall have a Catholic Parliament, and can the empire long ſtand with a Proteſtant Parliament in England, and a Catholic one in Ireland? Muſt not the Proteſtant power and church of Ireland fall to the ground? But it is argued, how will Union put an end to Catholic claims and emancipation, to this the anſwer is obvious, that in the Imperial Parliament their claims will be heard without paſſion or prejudice, and without the riſque of ſeparation between the two

kingdoms, and whatever the result shall be, the interests of the empire will be secured, and the Protestant power and government of both countries preserved, and not left to the chance of collusion and distraction. If we concede reform in Ireland, what will result from it but to enable the Republican to overthrow the Constitution, and to separate Ireland from England. Therefore to eradicate these political evils from the Constitution, he was a decided friend to Legislative Union, as the best remedy to heal our wounds, to prevent the agitation of political evils, and the instigation of rebellion. That the terms and detail of the measure were now before the public, that it now would appear what it really was, to be entitled to our support as an object of policy, and not of revenue, and the itinerant declaimers against Union can no longer delude the people, by telling them that Mr. Pitt only sought by a Union to impose on Ireland the burdens and the the debt of England. It now appeared that Ireland would be essentially benefitted in respect to finance and contribution, and that new channels for trade, new resources of wealth would be opened to us. To those narrow and contracted minds, who had fears from their suspicions of a future violation of the terms proposed to us, he begged to oppose the evidence of fact and experience. The national faith of England with Scotland for a century inviolably kept, it is proved in every instance, by the land tax, and by a large tract of country the property of a Mr. Forbes, near Culloden, which under an old grant from the Crown was exempt from the excise and distillery laws, and remained so, highly injurious to the revenue, without any infringement by this exemption; the lands were lately purchased by Government by an act of Parliament.—If property is to suffer from a Union, he must equally suffer with others, he had no such fears, nor had he ever altered his plans for improving the country where he lived, or dismissed a labourer, and with pride and pleasure he could say, that he expended his income in employing people, and encouraging industry; that he hoped to see the value of property increase and not diminish, as it had done in Scotland, and he predicted that it would be in Ireland as it was in Scotland, the posterity of those who opposed the Union with Scotland, now revere the memory and the patriotism of those who brought it about: so will the posterity of those who now so warmly oppose us, revere the character and government of Lord Cornwallis, who, I hope, will accomplish this truly patriotic measure; and the thinking part of Ireland will soon applaud our conduct.—"*Opinionum commenta delet vatunca judicia confirmat.*"

Mr. Beresford said, he rose to declare himself a decided enemy to the Union. He thought it necessary to say a few words, because it had been said, those who opposed the measure were apparently connected with rebels—he was of no party but on the side of virtue.

Mr. Ross Mahon—In presuming to offer my sentiments to the Committee, I am well aware that I may incur the charge of much presumption, but from the opinions I have ever held upon the subject, I have felt it a duty to my country to give my best support to the measure of a Legislative Union. I feel that I owe it also to

myself

myſelf to explain the ground upon which thoſe opinions are formed, ſince I differ with many whom I highly reſpect, both within and without theſe walls, and I ſhall hope for the indulgence of the Committee, both becauſe I do not often intrude myſelf upon the notice of the Houſe, and becauſe I can with truth aſſure them that the ſupport I have given to this meaſure, is not only uninfluenced, but unaccompanied by any object of a private nature.

If I conſider Ireland in that ſtate of advancement which I think her capable of attaining, provided the connexion laſts, it is not only probable, indeed evident in theory, but proved in practice, that differences upon imperial queſtions muſt ariſe between the two countries if they retain ſeparate Legiſlatures, and have diſtinct intereſts, it is not in human nature, that Ireland improved in wealth, population, and conſequent weight in the empire, ſhould bear with thoſe inferiorities to which the moſt ſtrenuous oppoſers of Union profeſs themſelves willing to ſubmit; that ſhe ſhould bear with the influence of Britiſh Councils over her concerns; with her own want of influence in thoſe of peace, war, and foreign treaty, in all which ſhe muſt feel increaſed intereſt; and I am convinced that under a ſyſtem which renders the bulk of our population inimical to Britiſh connexion, a ſyſtem to which I can ſee no favourable end except in Union, the very dependence of our Crown upon that of another country, to which we may feel ourſelves equal hereafter, and of which we profeſs ourſelves to be independent, muſt ultimately be felt a grievance; and total ſeparation follows as the only means of redreſs by the patriots of that day, a thought becoming the dignity of powerful, independent, and imperial Ireland.

If I am juſtified, as I think I am, in conſidering that a tendency to ſeparation will be a conſequence of our proſperity, do we not, by rejecting the meaſure, render it the evident but unfortunately the neceſſary policy of Great Britain, to check our growth, leaſt we ſhould out-grow our connexion; to retard our progreſs by artificial means; to reſt ſatisfied herſelf with negative inſtead of poſitive advantages, from her connexion with this country, and to renew that ſyſtem which, whilſt it diſgraced Great Britain ſo long, kept us down as a nation, until apprehenſion on one ſide, and a ſenſe of injury on the other, ſhall have wrought up both countries to that diſgrace of mutual jealouſy and rivalſhip, which in ſome hour, fatal to both, ſhall compel Ireland to throw off, what we ourſelves, by rejecting this meaſure, ſhall render a galling and oppreſſive yoke, inſtead of a bond of mutual amity and common intereſt, to commit what then in truth, gentlemen, might term a ſuicide upon herſelf, by becoming a province of France, or ſome country inimical to Great Britain, and the engine wherewith our enemies might affect the downfall of the Britiſh empire.

Let me not, however, be miſunderſtood, or ſuppoſed willing, from an apprehenſion of future ill, to ſubmit to preſent diſadvantage, by accepting of terms degrading to the honour, or injurious to the intereſts of Ireland, God forbid that I ſhould riſe from a ſeat in the Commons of Ireland, with the baſe, the traitorous deſign,

intentionally

intentionally to ſurrender one atom of the rights or independence of my country; but I muſt have a mind ſtrangely conſtructed indeed, if to accept a proportionate ſhare in the ſupreme Legiſlature of that empire, in whoſe fate ours is involved, but in whoſe political arrangements we poſſeſs no direct weight or influence, be a ſacrifice of our independence, or a ſurrender of our rights, for to me it appears an acquiſition of power, an attainment of the only true, the only rational, the only laſting, the only honourable independence that Ireland can ever hope to enjoy; it depends upon the treaty we make, whether the meaſure be degrading to our honour, or injurious to our intereſts. I perhaps reſent that ſyſtem as much, and I am ſure I deſpiſe it as heartily as any man who hears me; but is it becauſe I reſent, deſpiſe, and think it impolitic, that I am to follow the example of gentlemen on the other ſide, and adopt myſelf? It does not, in my mind, follow, that according to that ſyſtem, if one country benefits the other muſt conſequently ſuffer, (the hazard of ſeparation not taken into account;) on the contrary, it is in imperial that I look to local advantages to both countries, and there is not one which Great Britain may ultimately receive that muſt not, in my mind, more ſpeedily, and in a ten-fold degree, be felt by Ireland. England, I believe, is ſenſible of the weakneſs and abſurdity of that policy, at leaſt we have the word of her Miniſter to that purpoſe; ſhe finds by experience that the encreaſe of our trade has not injured her own: but ſhe cannot look with indifference at our proſperity leaſt the weakened bond which holds us together ſhould at length fail; ſhe calls on us to ſtrengthen it for our mutual benefit: ſhall we then in the madneſs, and the idle boaſt of an ideal independence, neglect the only opportunity that ever has or ever may again occur to remedy the evils which we feel.

I deny that we are called upon to make any ſurrender, except a ſurrender of the defects of our Conſtitution and the misfortunes of our ſituation, unleſs we term it a ſurrender to give up a dominion over our Catholic fellow-ſubjects, which I am as anxious to give up as they are to receive, but which I ſhould not be the true friend either of Catholic or Proteſtant if I would give up, unleſs when I could do it with perfect ſafety to the ſtate. We ſhould, however, recollect that ſhe has that yet to give, without whoſe influence, however diſtant, our boaſted independence were nothing worth; without whoſe influence we could not avail ourſelves of one of thoſe advantages, natural or acquired, which we poſſeſs; ſhe has to give us the reality of the Britiſh Conſtitution inſtead of its empty ſhadow, its baſe deformed repreſentation. We ſhould recollect farther, that it is from the removal of obſtacles to our proſperity, not from poſitive acquirements that we have hitherto received and are ſtill to look to advancement: And if we will but turn our eyes on our own ſituation, we ſhall find obſtacles ſufficient to retard the progreſs of any country, and ſuch as muſt long ſince have ſunk us, had we not been buoyed up by that country with which we now heſitate to become one. We ſhall in our own ſituation, behold the edifice raiſed on a falſe foundation, and the ſuperſtructure faulty throughout.—

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We ſhall find that our Parliament does not, as it affects to do, and as the Britiſh Parliament does, emanate from the people; but that the government of the country is the rule of the few over the many, the dominion of an ariſtocracy, founded, as Mr. Adam Smith ſays, on the moſt odious of all diſtinctions, thoſe of political and religious differences, and that by the frame and conſtitution of that Parliament the people are excluded their ſhare in political power, the choice of Repreſentatives to ſerve them in Parliament. We ſhall find that our eſtabliſhment in Church and State runs counter to our population, rendering the ſmaller portion of our population dependent on Great Britain for ſupport in power and in property, and the greater portion conſequently inimical to Britiſh connexion. We ſhall find upon the whole that a diſtinctneſs ariſes from ſeparate Legiſlatures, creating between ſtates compoſing the ſame empire, and the different claſſes and perſuaſions compoſing the ſame ſtate, that endleſs rivalſhip and implacable animoſity, which invariably render this country a drawback upon imperial exertion in time of need, and in which I think I can ſee ſeeds of diſſolution to the Britiſh empire.

Sir, it is to correct theſe radical faults, to remove this diſtinctneſs, to place all upon a firm, true and laſting foundation that I contend, it is to theſe circumſtances that I attribute all our misfortunes, they render our government incapable of being well and ſteadily adminiſtered for the direct intereſts and happineſs of the people, party jealouſies and party ſtruggles for political power fetter it in its operations, and oblige it one day in ſupport of Britiſh ſuperiority, the next of Iriſh independence, to-day of Proteſtant aſcendancy, to-morrow of Catholic emancipation, now in ſupport of one party, again of ſome other, amongſt a corrupt and ſelfiſh ariſtocracy, to deviate from that ſteady, juſt, and, I will add, liberal line of conduct, which the true intereſts of the empire at large and of the community would point out, and to adopt ſuch meaſures as the expediency of the moment may render neceſſary for the temporary preſervation of a connexion, more deſirable to Great Britain from the danger which this country would afford as a weapon in the hands of an enemy, than from any poſitive advantages, which in the preſent form of our connexion, ſhe can derive from it herſelf.

I ſhall therefore conclude, that an injury is likely to reſult from it, and if the Britiſh Conſtitution, unobſcured by the foul medium of a ſeparate Legiſlature, and diſtinctneſs of intereſt between the countries, ſhall ſpread its bright rays over this hitherto unhappy land, I as an Iriſhman, ſhall think the change happy indeed.

One effect, however, I can trace, and that is an effect to which I am the friend, as I am of the moſt perfect liberality to my Catholic fellow-ſubjects, when it can take place with ſafety to the ſtate, but not otherwiſe, I mean an encreaſe of weight to the people in the Legiſlature, and if a number of repreſentatives, adequate to the true weight of this country in the empire, ſhall be choſen from the counties and principal towns in Ireland, and choſen by popular voice, the Union does nearly, by the whole amount of the repreſentation

of

of Ireland, go to encreaſe the weight of the united people in the united legiſlature. If it is objected that the patronage of the crown, from being limited to a ſmaller number, may injuriouſly counteract the weight of the people, let the fault be corrected, either by encreaſing the number of repreſentatives, or by ſuch regulations as may diſmiſs the patronage of the crown; but it ſeems to me to be merely a matter of detail, and no argument againſt principle.

If the Union has a tendency to this, as to the empire at large, in how much greater a degree does it operate as to Ireland in particular; in the diſtinctneſs of intereſt between the countries, in the neceſſary inferiority of ours, and in the frame and conſtitution of Iriſh Parliaments, I can ſee why the Iriſh people do not carry their due weight in the empire at large, or in their own country in particular; but I cannot ſee why a number of gentlemen of the firſt character and properties in Ireland, not only themſelves the moſt intereſted in the welfare of this country; but if an additional tie were wanting, choſen by popular voice, and relying upon popular approbation for re-election, ſhould urge with leſs zeal the intereſts of Ireland in the imperial than in the local Parliament, or urging them ſhould do ſo with leſs effect, becauſe only all diſtinctneſs of intereſt between the countries was done away, and Iriſh proſperity became Britiſh advantage. I reſpect as much as any man alive the opinions oppoſed to me; but upon a ſubject of ſuch importance, I cannot ſurrender my judgment unleſs my reaſon is convinced.

Am I, on account of the arrangement made in 1782, (however Ireland may boaſt of that arrangement, and England bluſh at the neceſſity of its being demanded,) am I on account of that arrangement to be deterred in 1800, from remedying thoſe defects in our ſituation, whoſe practical bad conſequences, two events beyond the reach of human wiſdom to foreſee, I mean his Majeſty's unfortunate illneſs, and the revolution of France have clearly pointed out? Am I to prefer the leſs profitable expenditure of money by a few Iriſh country gentlemen, even ſuppoſing (what I abſolutely and poſitively deny,) that the number of our abſentees ſhould encreaſe; to that which is moſt wanted amongſt us, the wide diffuſion of capital uſefully employed, which could not fail to flow into our land, the moment that in addition to lower rate of taxes, lower price of labour, and thoſe advantages which nature has laviſhed on this country, was added to that ſecurity to property which a common and more pure legiſlature could not fail to give, but which our preſent falſe and corrupt ſyſtem never has, and I verily believe, never can poſſibly afford?

Am I, as an Iriſh elector, the only political ſituation in which I ever ſhall ſtand if the meaſure takes place, to prefer the ſuperintendence of a local legiſlature over local concerns, to a due participation in the ſupreme legiſlature of the greateſt empire in the world, of which we now compoſe a diſtinct and a dependant part? Am I to believe that it is by the impoveriſhment of this country, and the deſtruction of its trade, that the greateſt financial miniſter that ever exiſted, means to render it an object of reſource in a commer-

cial empire, of which this iſland is the ſpot beſt calculated, from climate, ſoil, inſular ſituation, and innumerable other circumſtances, to bring to the higheſt degree of perfection agriculture, manufactures and commerce? Sir, it is contrary to my reaſon, and I cannot believe that ſome of thoſe who oppoſe this meaſure, and I am convinced oppoſe it from principle, are influenced themſelves by ſuch arguments as they advance to us. If ſuch ſhall be made apparent to me, I truſt I ſhall oppoſe the meaſure as ſtrenuouſly as thoſe who make much more noiſe in this Houſe. I hope with as pure intentions, until they are proved to me, I muſt abide by the concluſions which my own humble underſtanding enables me draw. I ſhall, to the lateſt hour of my exiſtence, glory in having preferred the true intereſts of my country, to a momentary popularity: if, on the contrary, events will prove me wrong, whilſt no man will more ſincerely lament his error, I ſhall yet find that conſolation which I wiſh to every gentleman who has given his vote on the one ſide or on the other of this important queſtion, in being able to reflect, that to the beſt of my ability I have exerted myſelf ſteadily, zealouſly, diſintereſtedly, and honeſtly, to promote a meaſure, which I believe, as I believe in my exiſtence, to be the only one which can give to my own country, and to all claſſes, all deſcriptions, and all perſuaſions of my Iriſh fellow-ſubjects their due weight in the empire, and which I think calculated to raiſe the Britiſh empire to a degree of power, and to give it a degree of durability unequalled by any country in the annals of the world.

Sir JOHN PARNELL oppoſed the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He combated the queſtion of Legiſlative Union, not only as contrary to the principles of the Conſtitution, and a violation of the ſettlement of 1782; but that even upon the terms propoſed, no real advantage was intended to be given to this country, and were it even the caſe, there was no advantage offered that might not as well be granted without as with an Union. He then entered into a long diſcuſſion of the terms propoſed by the noble Lord, and aſſerted that the calculations which he had made were not founded, and that they would not be ſupported by the real ſituation of the two countries. He contended that the noble Lord had taken his calculations from periods in which he was not juſtifiable, for he had taken them when the expences of this kingdom were at the higheſt, and the revenues at the loweſt, and that if they were fairly taken, the proportion would not be as 7 to 1½, as ſtated by the noble Lord, but as 1 to 13.

Right Hon. the SPEAKER begged the indulgence of the Houſe, as it was impoſſible for him to raiſe his voice high. When the ſubject now before the Committee was introduced into the Houſe on the laſt Seſſion of Parliament, there was no mention made of the details, and the Houſe could then only go into the principle of the meaſure. Conſolidation of ſtrength and intereſt was then ſpoken of, words which were nothing but high ſounding without any meaning; but now the details were before the Committee, and they were to look, not merely on the principle, but on thoſe details. It

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was the fashion for those who supported the measure, to deal in language he could not hear with patience, to assert the degradation of the country, to ransack history for the purpose of ascertaining the dependance of the country, and the People and the Parliament were told that they must change their situation and become united with England because their situation is so bad that it could not be worse. He appealed to every man who heard him, whether since the free Parliament was established, the country had not risen in every respect of trade, wealth, and manufactures, more than any other country in the world in the same given time, and to what was that to be imputed?—to our free Constitution. And what did the supporters of the measure of a Union mean to do?—to destroy that free Constitution. They want to deprive the country of its free Constitution. They say the Constitution of this country cannot exist independent of the British Parliament. The dependence of this country is not on the British Parliament; it is on the Crown of England; and that authority over the country is exercised by the Crown of Great Britain, by approving of or denying to give the Royal Assent to Acts passed by the Irish Parliament. It is an authority never exerted to our disadvantage. Has Great Britain from the revolution to the present hour ever exercised that power to our injury? Has England ever since the establishment of our free Constitution give a negative voice to any of our Acts of Parliament?—If she has not, our situation is practically independent, and theoretically dependent. What would the supporters of the Union have you do? They would have you be bound by Acts passed in the Imperial Parliament; they would have you be theoretically independent and practically dependent.

It was a curious circumstance to observe that in the last year, when this question was first proposed, the noble Lord told the House that the reason for the necessity of an Union with Great Britain was, that we were rich and prosperous, and he tells the House this year that the reason why we ought to have an Union is perfectly different from what it was at that period; that the country is so poor now, that an Union is absolutely necessary; that the country is so poor that England is desirous to make the country a present of half a million of money in time of war, and of one million of money in time of peace. Could any man that knew the candour and ingenuousness of the noble Lord and heard him make such a statement, believe it to be the genuine sentiment of his heart?

Before he went at large into the argument, he would advert to the circumstance of half a million in peace and one million in war being made a present to the Irish nation. Did the noble Lord mean to say that the zeal and loyalty of this country which it had manifested in granting the supplies, is to be termed as an argument against the country to take away the Parliament? Did the noble Lord mean to say that he has sat on the Treasury Bench, soliciting the country to go as far as she has gone, that having exerted herself beyond belief, and that he now comes forward and says he must give us an Union to save us from destruction? Did the noble Lord mean, in

return for our loyalty and affection, to ſmother and deſtroy us?—Did he mean to ſay that the Britiſh Miniſter could take better care of the proſperity of this country than her own Parliament could do? Was this the ſentiment of the noble Lord laſt year when he boaſted of the Engliſh militia having come over to Ireland; when an eſtabliſhmnet was made for them; when he not only called on the Houſe for the whole ſupplies, but tacked to it a requeſt for the back quarter to bear the whole expence, which was given to him and would have been encreaſed if it had been requeſted? Did the noble Lord then think the Houſe was going beyond the means of the country? Did he think he was making the People of Ireland pay more than they were able? And did the noble Lord now hold the doctrine, that becauſe the People of Ireland did go beyond what they ought to have gone, that they muſt now go a little further, and give up their Conſtitution?

The noble Lord tells the country that in war it will ſave conſiderably by the Union, and he recurs to the expences of laſt year, and he tells the country that they will ſave a ſeventh and one half. The expences of Great Britain was 32,700,000l. was it fair to ſtate a million ſaving from a year of ſuch an extraordinary expenditure? But even with this extraordinary expenditure of laſt year, how does the noble Lord bear himſelf out in this calculation that we would have ſaved a million by his arrangement. The expence of Great Britain was 32,700,000l.—the expence of Ireland laſt year was 4,708,000l.—the expence it would have been at by his ratio of $7\frac{5}{2}$ to 1 is 4,492,000l. which would have been a ſaving only of 215,000l. inſtead of 1,020,000l. which he ſtates it would have been, and which as a right hon. friend of his (Sir J. Parnel) ſtated to-night, is a very fallacious account, for the noble Lord takes a hypothetical expenditure up to next March, inſtead of the fair and actual expenditure to March 1799. It is in this way, Sir, we are to be bribed by the million a year to part with our free Conſtitution. when the actual ſaving would only have been 200,000l. had this meaſure taken place. It is cajoling us out of our free Conſtitution, which by the bleſſing of God we ſhall ſtill preſerve to the lateſt times.

But this was not all, if we are to take a retroſpect, and by this we can go on facts, ſuppoſe that this Union and this ratio had been eſtabliſhed ſix years ago, we ſhould have had upwards of three millions to pay more than at preſent—and inſtead of ſaving one million, for as England raiſed laſt year by the Income Tax 11,500,000l. we would have had to pay in proportion a ſum of 1,800,000l. and by which our debt would have been encreaſed more than 14 millions above its preſent amount.

Theſe are the benefits we would have derived, and God knows to what further length it might go. The fact is, that all theſe calculations, which are ſtated to cajole us out of our Conſtitution, can have no weight with men of ſenſe. The Union will not make any difference favourable to us in our expences—if Ireland pays leſs, England muſt pay more. The general expences of the empire muſt be defrayed—the Houſe muſt be kept up—we wiſh to pay our part

of

of it according to our ability. If England wants money, we will give all we can; we will ſave when we can do it, and aid in every way as far as we are able: let us only keep the purſe in our own hands. So far from any ſaving on our eſtabliſhment, the noble Lord ſtates an encreaſe in the peace eſtabliſhment of 500,000l. a year.

Is there to be no reduction of any kind? No—you are to have the whole of your Civil Eſtabliſhment, your Exchequer, your Secretaries, your Commiſſioners, your every thing but your Parliament—It is the Parliament they want to remove and nothing elſe.

It is encroaching on the patience of the Houſe to go on—but I wiſh to make myſelf underſtood—and I am perſuaded that no honeſt Iriſhman when he conſiders and views attentively all thoſe circumſtances, and every thing reſpecting this wanton, unprecedented attack upon a country which has been going on in ſuch rapid improvements by a local Parliament, will ever give his conſent to aboliſh and annihilate it. He paid every attention to find if there was any thing he could meet with in the detail that could leſſen the horror he felt at the meaſure; but in every ratio that is ſtated there is the greateſt want of information, and complete ignorance of the relative ſtate of the countries. The noble Lord aſſumed the ratio of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1, and taken the average on very vague and uncertain ground by an aſſumed calculation on our exports and imports and exciſe; whereas the true criterion of relative wealth is upon objects of internal tranſactions and conveyances, particularly the ſtamps and the poſt-office. By taking thoſe which he has unaccountably left out, the average is 30 to 1 inſtead of $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1. In the exciſe alſo, taken ſeparately, and in the cuſtom duties not bonded, there is the ſame proportion. The whole arrangement is ſo complicated, that it is naturally impoſſible to bring it into practice; ſeparate accounts of revenue muſt be kept for the different appropriations to the debt of this kingdom, to the ratio to be paid to the united empire and to other purpoſes: ſo that inſtead of a Union, it is no Union—it is with a removal of Parliament to keep ſeparate intereſts. The noble Lord, has, however, provided that we ſhall not die at once—we are to be ten years in dying by the gradual abolition of the duties; at the end of 20 years we are to be in a ſtate ſo as to form an identity with England: 20 years is a very ſmall period in the life of a nation; but notwithſtanding which, a reprieve for 20 years would be of ſome importance to this kingdom.

Would the ſoldiery and the ſhipping be reduced, if there was an Union? No—the expence would be the ſame Union or no Union.

In the articles enumerated by the noble Lord, he forgot ſome which were particularly advantageous to a country. The ſtamps were not mentioned, which were certainly a criterion of the proſperity of the country; they bore to England an average of 1 to 18 from this country.

The poſt-office had been excluded; the revenue on that head was 80,000l. a year to Ireland.

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Was he to give the noble Lord credit for all the benefits to arise from the Union, how long were they to continue?—By the noble Lord's account, about twenty years! a short period in the life of a nation: and even if the propositions were of advantage, would it not be reasonable in Mr. Pitt to give a temporary advantage to the country in order that he might afterwards destroy those advantages as he liked? How would this temporary advantage affect the country at the expiration of the twenty years, when from the Union England would encrease in vigour and in trade, Ireland must at the discretion of the United Parliament give up those advantages which she now possesses, and those advantages which are held out to her, and is to bear equal taxes with England, when England has gained that decided advantage that would for ever injure the trade of this country.

The next thing the noble Lord had alluded to was the propositions of 1785—he would be sorry if, before he sat down, he could not convince the noble Lord, and every man who heard him, that the advantages they held out were infinitely beyond those of the noble Lord. He would be sorry he had been instrumental in forwarding those propositions if they contained so little advantage and benefit for Ireland, and so much injury as is now proposed. In the propositions of 1785, care was taken of every manufacture in the country, there was not a single branch that could be protected that was not What were the propositions of the noble Lord?—To raise every duty that was below ten per cent. up to ten per cent. and lower every duty that is above ten per cent, down to ten per cent. In the article of wrought copper, that bears 10½ per cent. and by the proposition of the noble Lord, it is to be reduced to 10 per cent. There are at present 13 cotton manufactories in the country, they work about 5000 pounds of cotton, yearly. The duties on this article was from 30 to 50 per cent. and this the noble Lord proposed to reduce to 10 per cent. Could any man believe that the manufacturer will not withdraw himself out of a work when he felt the disadvantages under which he must labour; when he recollected that in twenty years every article is to be at the mercy of the United Parliament? Will not the manufacturer withdraw his capital, and that no man will set up in a manufacture where he sees he cannot gain, but must to a certainty be a loser? If the linen manufacture of this country was to be secured by the Union, the propositions would contain some article to that effect, but it does not contain any one article to give the linen of this country a preference for any one manufacture of Ireland over that of any foreign country. If the noble Lord would refer to the Journals of the House, and examine the report of Sir Lucies O'Brien in 1773, he would there see the compact entered into on the subject of the linen trade of the country. He could not help making one observation on the introduction of that part of the Propositions relating to the commerce of the country. It was the result of a deliberation in England between the noble Lord and the Minister of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer: the noble Lord, no doubt, did every thing

thing he could at that conference to make the Propoſitions fair for Ireland; and yet what was the conſequence—the moment they came to be ſtated to the Houſe, he is convinced that they are wrong, and that they would be of diſadvantage to the country, the moment the Parliament became united. It was not want of good will towards this country that originated the diſadvantage; but the want of the power of proper information on the ſubject, from the hon. gentlemen who held the conference not being in the country. He was convinced if it was poſſible to have made them more to the advantage of the country than they were, it would have been done by the noble Lord, and yet notwithſtanding the good ſenſe and ſound judgment of thoſe who framed the commercial part of the Propoſitions, one ſingle calico manufacture was able to convince the noble Lord of the diſadvantages to be derived from that part of the ſyſtem in a few moment's converſation, which the combined abilities of thoſe who framed the Propoſitions could never foreſee.

In the article of iron, the duty in Ireland is 12s. in England 3l. was there proviſion in the noble Lord's Propoſitions that the united Parliament ſhould never equalize the duty on this article with England, and thereby leave the manufactures of this country totally deſtitute.

Salt and hops were never to have their duties lowered! though the duty laid upon hops merely for the encouragement of the brewers, was always the object of Iriſh Parliament, and yet there was no proviſion that the united Parliament ſhould not take off the exciſe in England, and by that means gain a decided advantage over this country. In the courſe of two years the duty upon ſalt was raiſed from one ſhilling to three pounds; it was ſcarcely poſſible to believe that ſuch a riſe could take place on any article of import. What was to become of the duty upon coals? there was at preſent eight or nine ſhillings per ton, and this was to continue for ever, though the revenue raiſed on this article was principally levied with a view to the improvement of the city of Dublin. In England the duty upon coals is taken off in going to great manufactories, going to the copper works in Wales, to ſeveral of the works in Cornwall, to ſeveral parts of Scotland; but they are not to go duty free to any one part of Ireland but the duty is to continue with this difference; the Engliſh duty is to be taken off in England, but the Iriſh duty is to remain. He mentioned this circumſtance becauſe if a queſtion of this nature was to ariſe in the united parliament we could not expect to have any able advocate who could point out the diſadvantages ariſing to this country with ſucceſs; and therefore, there could be but little hopes of ever obtaining any advantages for Ireland; it would be impoſſible to have any care taken of this country in the united parliament, if the repreſentatives ſitting in the Houſe of Commons of Ireland, were not able to do it for themſelves.

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courſer clothes. As to ſuperfine wool this country has it as cheap as Great Britain, and therefore it can be no way concerned. What was another recompenſe that Ireland was to receive for giving up her parliament? She was to participate in the territorial revenue paid by the East-India Company to Great Britain! An act paſſed in the year 1793 to compel the East-India Company to pay to Great Britain 50,000l. and yet in the year 1800 the Company had not paid one penny. The act upon which this is founded would render it impoſſible for Ireland ever to derive any benefit from that compact, for it is in the controul of the lords of the treaſury to remit or poſtpone the payment to any period they choſe. He begged to aſk one ſhort queſtion, was there any one poſſible advantage or benefit to Ireland that ſhe does not now enjoy, that could be procured by the Union? Is there any one benefit that the Iriſh parliament is not as competent to procure for this country and more competent to procure than the United parliament? Has there been one argument advanced that could convince any reaſonable man that any advantage could occur to Ireland?

A ſcheme ſo contrary to every conſtitutional principle never entered the head of any man in this country, as that which had been preſented to the Houſe by the noble Lord relative to the reſolution which notices the conſtitution of the country. A ſcheme by which he eſtabliſhes a ſort of mongrel lords—lords and commons—commons and lords—ſo circumſtanced as to be neither the one nor the other, but to have a bit of both ſo as to render him incapable of being either. It is a principal of the conſtitution that a lord ſhall not interfere in the election of a commoner to ſerve in parliament, a principle which this ſcheme directly overthrows. The majority of the nobility are to loſe their privileges and their birthright; they are not to be repreſented at all. A few are to be ſent over to England—they are to continue for life—twenty-eight peers from Ireland are to ſit in the Engliſh houſe for life—they will probably remain there. What would the noble Lord do with the reſt? He leaves them without authority, he reduces their influence, his conſequence muſt fail. If any man was to adviſe a ſcheme to depreſs the nobility of the country, it would be ſuch a ſcheme as that already propoſed.

With reſpect to the Commons of Ireland, they were to be reduced from 300 to 100. If the accumulated wiſdom of 300 men has been neceſſary for the purpoſes of legiſlation; a violation of the conſtitution would be the conſequence of reducing them to 100, by leſſening the number he leſſened the wiſdom and energy of the country. Surely 300 Iriſh gentlemen would have more weight in the united parliament than 100 could have. No man of trade will give himſelf the trouble to go to England—he could not give up his time to quit this kingdom in order to ſit in the united parliament—He could not give up his time and his buſineſs to ſpend eight months of the year to attend the buſineſs of a repreſentative of the Iriſh nation in England; if the parliament remained where it was the man of trade and the country gentleman

man could give thoſe neceſſary attendance, which, if removed, it would be impoſſible to give. In the ſame manner the gentlemen of the law, would be precluded from giving their attendance in the united parliament: the abilities neceſſary to ſupport the Iriſh nation would be excluded; for no gentleman of that profeſſion whoſe legal knowledge, and of great buſineſs, could ever give up his profeſſion to go to England, whereas, if the parliament continued in Ireland, he might attend to both, with honour to himſelf and advantage to his country.

Another neceſſary conſequence of the Union would be that the taxes would become perpetual. The advantage of preſerving the purity of elections would alſo be loſt—the free repreſentation of the people of Ireland would be loſt if the meaſure of an Union was paſſed. A conteſted election could not be tried in Great Britain without ſuch an expenſe as would deter any man from proſecuting his petition how groſs and palpable ſoever the bribery and corruption was, by which he was excluded from a ſeat in the repreſentative. And if any man did proſecute the petition, what would be the conſequence? The ſheriff nominates the candidate, who nominates the ſheriff? If any man doubts who nominates them, and how they are nominated, if any man doubted how they would act, let him look how they have acted in refuſing to convene the freeholders when requeſted, in order to petition parliament againſt the abominable meaſure of a Legiſlative Union. When the Houſe had ſuch facts before them; when the ſheriffs behaved in ſuch a manner in the face of the parliament; how would they behave when they would be under no apprehenſion of reprimand. But ſuppoſe a gentleman did endeavour to ſhew the falſity of the returning officer, how could he compel witneſs to attend, if they did not chooſe to do ſo, or were afraid to do ſo? How long would the witneſs be detained in newgate for refuſing to attend?—Who would ſend him there? Did the noble Lord mean to give Ireland a new conſtitution? Was it not in idea to increaſe the influence of the crown, to ruin the conſtitution of the country by taking away the parliament, and ſuppreſſing the poſſibility of a free repreſentation.

On the whole of this argument it muſt be clear to a demonſtration that this meaſure which is called a Union, does not deſerve the name of Union. How could the intereſt of both countries be identified? The parliaments might become one; but the identity as it is called could not exiſt, it would be a union of the parliaments; and that which can only be a Union of the parliament is called a Union of the nation.

In the inſtance of revenue it is acknowledged to be neceſſary to keep the preſent debts diſtinct, and ſo long as they continue ſo, there muſt be ſeparate accounts. How can the countries be conſolidated? There are to be diſtinct accounts—diſtinct debts—and as long as thoſe continue it is impoſſible there can be a conſolidation of the nations. In point of the conſtitution a right is preſerved to the king for ever, of making Iriſh peers to keep up the diſtinction of the peerage. If it had been determined to have had no

ſeparate intereſt, why not ſuffer the peerage to diminiſh to 28, and then let them be created peers of the united realms, and not peers of Ireland alone. Another diſtinct intereſt is, with reſpect to the parliament, that peers may be commoners in one country and not in the other. Another reaſon that the intereſt cannot be conſolidated: it is provided that the debts of the country ſhould be ſeparate—the current expenſes of the country are to be ſeparate. It is acknowledged that the independence of the country is ſo poſitive that when it may be neceſſary to raiſe money, it muſt be by loan in Ireland, when in England it is raiſed by taxes. The ſupporters of the Union go further; they acknowledge that this ſeparate intereſt exiſts, and they provide for it—they endeavour to poſtpone the jealouſy of the country for twenty years—they acknowledge the neceſſity of a ſeparate parliament, for they acknowledge thoſe advantages to Ireland which can only be retained by ſuch a parliament. The duties in the channel trade are to be kept up, in that there is a ſeparate intereſt ſo long as Ireland feels this diſtinction. A ſeparate intereſt is acknowledged in the parliament of Ireland; for it is provided that the parliaments ſhall not be one, but that they ſhall be called by the name of the united parliaments.

He had been called upon to declare, if he had any authority to ſtate what would become of the queſtion of religion in Ireland if this meaſure did not paſs? He would aſk the hon. gentleman what authority he had to introduce it into the preſent queſtion at all? How was it connected with the queſtion of Union? Did the hon. gentleman mean to ſay, that the parliament of Ireland had not ſenſe enough, nor candor enough to take care of religion in this country, and therefore that they muſt reſort to a Britiſh parliament. What was the reaſon for throwing this ſlander upon the Iriſh parliament? He would tell what it was, it was to keep up a religious diſtinction and animoſity in the country. He knew no diſtinction—he would exhort every man in the land to join heart and hand together in oppoſing the common enemy. He knew no diſtinction. If the people would join their hearts, if they join with other friends to oppoſe this meaſure; he would ſay all religious diſtinction was aſleep. The Roman Catholic and the Proteſtant are equally the natives of Ireland, bound by duty to the ſoil of Ireland and to the proſperity of Ireland; and he would call them unnatural indeed if they did not join almoſt the voice and ſtrength of Ireland in oppoſing this damnable and deſtructive meaſure: for this he would ſay, if he were to ſtudy the Engliſh language for months, to procure language ſtrong enough to meet his wiſh, he could not procure words by which he could ſufficiently expreſs his horror of the conſequences that may probably reſult from the meaſure if carried into effect.

Would driving men of property out of the kingdom ſettle and tranquillize it? Would creating gallowſes in the country, would flogging the inhabitants tranquillize the country? Would keeping alive religious diſſentions tranquillize the country? Was it to tranquillize this country that thoſe religious diſſentions were raiſed? Who

raiſed

raiſed them? That Bench (*pointing to the Treaſury Bench*), not the men that now ſit on it. Where was it firſt imagined? In England—not in Ireland. The country did not wiſh to have thoſe diſtinctions kept alive; they deſire only to have their own parliament—they know the value of their conſtitution. The parliament of Ireland know how to deal with the people of Ireland: and they poſſeſs the ability to deal with them.

There is an obſervation which goes to ſhew the impoſſibility of 100 members returned to the united parliament, having any influence in favour of Ireland. In Ireland the law fixes forty days for convening the Parliament. What is the regulation in England? fourteen days only are allowed to call the parliament. Would it be poſſible, if the Iriſh members ever returned to this country, and the united parliament was called, for them to attend. It would be utterly impoſſible, and therefore, where it was wiſhed to carry any meaſure unfavourable to this country, the members would be excluded from the debate by the impoſſibility of attending.

A perſon would believe that the country had got 20 years more forward in the world than it really was; and that the noble Lord had come forward 20 years too ſoon; and that inſtead of coming forward now he ought to delay the meaſure for 20 years longer; to try if in that period it would be the intereſt of both countries to be identified. His advice to the noble Lord was to poſtpone the meaſure for 20 years; and if he came forward at the expiration of that period, he would come forward with more knowledge and experience, and with greater certainty of the ground upon which he goes; and probably he may not then meet with the ſame difficulty he labours under at preſent, to perſuade the Houſe that he comes forward with the unbiaſſed unanimous uninfluenced voice of the people in favour of his meaſure.

On the whole of theſe Propoſitions made by the noble Lord, he ſaw nothing deſirous or advantageous to the country: he ſaw every thing injurious and to be avoided. He could not perceive there was any one, the ſmalleſt benefit to ariſe from them. What had been produced by the noble Lord as benefits, were in trade and revenue.

He would give one deciſive anſwer to all that had been urged.—He then proceeded, "If you would give me all the revenue and trade of England, I would not part with the freedom of my native country. I know of no wealth or trade that ever can exiſt long or be worth preſerving if you have not liberty to let it reſt on: it could not remain—it would be a nuiſance. The whole meaſure reſolves into this—the queſtion is nothing more than to take away your Parliament. It is not a queſtion of Union or ſeparation, but of Union or Britiſh connexion. It is not whether you will have this or that conſtitution, but will you have a Parliamentin Ireland or not? I put it in that light becauſe I can ſee it in noother. You are to have a civil eſtabliſhment, you are to have a ſovereign king, and in ſhort you are to have your preſent eſtabliſhment of government; you are

to have every thing but that in which conſiſts the eſſence of the whole, and what is that?—A reſident Parliament. If this meaſure was to take place, this country would be a colony on the worſt plan, paying contributions and without a Parliament." He objected to the whole of thoſe meaſures when he recollected they were to be procured by the moſt unconſtitutional of all means, the loſs of the Parliament. He was ſorry to hear the intention of purchaſing boroughs mentioned in the Houſe, yet that ſcheme had not been given to the public. He would not charge the preſent Houſe with bribery and corruption, but would any other Houſe that held out ſuch language as this—"your Parliament conſiſts of three hundred members: one hundred of them are going to a foreign country. In order to accompliſh this you muſt firſt ſell yourſelf, and then the boroughs; the money ſhall be raiſed on the country that is to be ſold; and you who have ſold the country ſhall pocket the money." Did the noble Lord think that the people of England would ever admit that the boroughs of the country were private property, and were to be bought and ſold? Did the noble Lord think that the Engliſh nation would not be jealous of one hundred men who will be ſaid to have come out of their own Parliament, after having ſold their country, and that they would not believe the ſame one hundred men would not be ready to ſell the other? The great Lord Chatham knew the folly of ſuch a meaſure; he would not ſuffer ſuch a meaſure; he would not ſuffer an addition to the Commons of England, becauſe it would have made the democracy too great.

He felt regret when he found himſelf in a minority and on ſo great and important a queſtion, but he ſpoke from the bottom of his heart when he ſaid he could never believe that the majority in the Parliament of Ireland when they came to conſider ſeriouſly of the meaſure, would go againſt one hundred and twenty members of the Houſe, having the ſenſe of the country, expreſſed from every quarter, when they recollected that twenty-five petitions from counties lay on the table of the Houſe; when they recollected that ten or twelve more petitions from towns were alſo on the table; when they thought of thoſe meetings legally convened from whence the petitions had not yet been received; when they thought of the numbers of petitions at preſent on the road againſt the meaſure; when they felt that the public ſentiment was decidedly averſe to an Union; he was convinced they would retract the intention of carrying ſuch a meaſure againſt the general voice of the nation.

It was ſaid the people of the country were irritated: it might be ſo, but how has the people of the country been irritated?—Not by the letters ſtated to have been written with that intention. The letters alluded to were written for the purpoſe of obtaining the ſenſe of the nation on this meaſure. Had not every member of the Houſe a right to know the ſenſe of his conſtituents? Were not meetings refuſed to be convened by the Sheriffs? Did not the military interfere when thoſe meetings were called in an equally legal manner? And how was the ſenſe of thoſe parts of the country where ſuch interruptions were given to proceed but by letters?—

If

If the country is irritated it is becauſe this meaſure is brought forward not only againſt the ſenſe of the Parliament, but againſt the ſenſe of the nation. Have not thoſe methods which ſucceeded in overthrowing the French Monarchy been reſorted to in order to overthrow the power of the Iriſh Parliament? The appeal nominal has been reſorted to in order to procure ſignatures in favour of the meaſure againſt the ſenſe of Parliament; and therefore it was, that he meant to conclude his ſpeech, not by negativing the reſolution, but by moving that the chairman ſhould leave the chair.

Mr. Speaker then concluded, "I am perſuaded the Houſe will never paſs the Union. I entertain too great an opinion of the ſound ſenſe of many gentlemen who have voted for the meaſure. I am perſuaded they have not ſeen it in its true light. They did not know that if they once adopt it, and afterwards felt they were wrong, that there is no retreat, that they can never mend it: whereas, if the miniſter will wait until the ſenſe of the nation feels the propriety and the neceſſity of it, they then will be juſtified in adopting it. I cannot prevail upon myſelf to conceive that if any man could be bribed, he would put into his pocket the amount of the bribe he ſhould receive for voting away the Conſtitution, when he ſhould ſeriouſly recollect that by that vote he was undoing his country; it is impoſſible to believe it. Before the miniſter leaves this Houſe. I do conjure him to reflect upon what he is doing: to conſider the ſituation into which he is likely to plunge himſelf and his country, and to bleſs the hand that ſaved him. If we are wrong, we are wrong on the ſafe ſide, becauſe we are for preſerving the Conſtitution—the other ſide of the Houſe are for plunging it into a confuſion that they know not where it will end, and at the ſame time aſſert, that they are doing it a great bleſſing. I would ſay a great deal now, but I am exhauſted: I ſhall therefore conclude, Mr. Anneſley, by moving that you leave the chair."

Lord CASTLEREAGH.—His Lordſhip ſaid, that he by no means wondered at the courſe which the hon. gentleman had purſued in his argument, when he recollected that he had ever aſſerted his ſatisfaction and content in the ſituation of Ireland; that he conſidered us in a ſtate of health and happineſs; that we wanted nothing to better our condition, and that all *was right and well.* If the right hon. gentleman could indeed view with indifference the complicated miſeries under which we ſuffered, and bleſs the conſtitution which has produced them, if he can view with calmneſs and complacency that ſyſtem of evils and depravities which has ſpread misfortune and deſolation over every part of the iſland; and if he wiſhes to continue it as productive of benefit and happineſs, ſurely his heart muſt be made of uncommon materials; nor can he be ſenſible to the wretchedneſs of mankind. It is on this view of things (his conſideration that all is well,) that he founds his oppoſition, and calls aloud upon every deſcription of the people, whether loyaliſts or traitors, to unite againſt this meaſure. And what does he promiſe us? 1ſt, that after he has dragged a few years longer through a ſtate of wretched inſecurity, he ſhould leave

leave the country ſubject to the ſame conteſts as before; ſubject to a renewal of thoſe miſeries and ſtruggles which have nearly overwhelmed us in total ruin. He appeals not only to all deſcriptions of men, but to all ſects, and places religion herſelf in the Anti-Union army. Let them, ſays he, but oppoſe the Union, let them defeat this damnable meaſure, we will then ſettle all our differences among ourſelves. But does he ſay how he will ſettle them? does he propoſe any plan? does he ſuggeſt any ſyſtem? No, he leaves every thing open for a renewal of new miſchiefs; for the revival of freſh diſorders; for the repetition of a new gradation from jealouſy to diſcontent; from diſcontent to faction; from faction to conſpiracy; from conſpiracy to rebellion.

The right hon. gentleman had accuſed him of uſing in the laſt and in the preſent ſeſſion contradictory arguments; that laſt year he had aſſerted the growing proſperity of Ireland, and this year its poverty and bankruptcy, as grounds to prove the neceſſity of Union. He begged leave to ſay he had by no means argued in that manner. He had laſt year ſtated all the imperfections, all the anomalies of the conſtitution; he had ſtated that they had increaſed, and that they would increaſe with the wealth and power of the iſland; he now ſtated, that thoſe imperfections and anomalies produced thoſe expences which oppreſſed us, that they neceſſitated the continuance of thoſe expences; and thoſe expences, notwithſtanding our increaſe of wealth and power, were ſuch as we could not ſupport. It was upon theſe principles that he had ſtated the permanent future expences of Ireland, as beyond her means; he had alſo ſhewed the neceſſity of imperial contribution if we remain ſeparate from Great Britain, and he had ſhewn, that the reſult of this double expenditure, for domeſtic and imperial purpoſes, will lead us to the verge of bankruptcy. This ſtatement was incontrovertible, and the right hon. gentleman had felt it of ſo inconvenient a quality, that he had exerted all his great powers to refute it. But he aſked the committee whether he really had refuted his ſtatement? What is the line adopted by the right hon. gentleman? He makes an eſtimate of war expenditure alone, formed on the average of ſix years, to anſwer an eſtimate which was formed on the average of ſeven years both of peace and war. He forgets, or omits to ſtate, that during the firſt three years of the war our war expenditure was trifling, and that the want of a greater eſtabliſhment had nearly produced our entire deſtruction. He cloſes his ſtatements with the laſt year, and leaves out the preſent year, which is the year of the greateſt expence. Is this refutation? He takes a different average, a leſs number of years, and excludes the year of the greateſt expence. Is that refutation? The right hon. gentleman is at a loſs to know where to find the expences of the preſent year: Are not the account, for the firſt ſix months on the table? Have not five months of the laſt half year nearly expired? How then is it difficult to prove the expenditure of that period? He held an account in his hand, calculated to Lady Day, and it proved that the whole expence of the year

would

would nearly amount to 6,000,000l. and yet this was the ſum that the right hon. gentleman had pleaſed to leave out in his calculations. Upon this year, which the right. hon. gentleman omits entirely, I, (ſaid his lordſhip,) have grounded my calculations, becauſe we muſt continue that expence in the enſuing year, and becauſe my argument was proſpective; and I looked to the beſt criterion of our future expence, which I meaſured by the preſent. The right hon. gentleman had uſed another fallacy, he had not continued the expences of peace and war, and argued on the double proportion. He had ſtated the war expence alone, and ſaid it was in the ratio of nine to one; and he omitted to ſtate what would be our ſaving in peace, which would have been nearly one-third of our whole expence. The right. hon. gentleman had adverted, but ſlightly, to the future peace eſtabliſhment, and ſeemed to ſkim over that part of the ſtatement. I have, however ſhewn, (ſaid his Lordſhip) that our future peace eſtabliſhment could not fall ſhort of 1,500,000l. a year, and let him impeach that ſtatement if he can. I have ſhewn that the increaſe of pay to the army was nearly one-third. I have ſhewn that the permanent ſtaff of the militia would amount to 120,000l. a-year, and that we could not keep up the ſkeleton of a yeomanry force, which was indiſpenſable, at a leſs charge than 60,000l. Can theſe charges be avoided? What then becomes of the hon. gentleman's attempts to equalize our revenues and eſtabliſhments, by lowering the latter beneath reality, and raiſing the former beyond any poſſible produce? He would aſk the right hon. gentleman himſelf, whether he would be ſatisfied on a peace, with an eſtabliſhment of 12,000 men? He would not. He would be the firſt to oppoſe the idea, and therefore all his arguments on the ſmallneſs of the future expences in peace, were fallacious. I have alledged and proved, (ſaid his Lordſhip) that if we continue a ſeparate kingdom, we muſt have a deficit of 600,000l. a-year: I have ſtated that every year of war would create an additional burthen of 350,000l. a-year: that an Imperial contributinn in peace would add 350,000l. more, and that if the war continues three years, we ſhall have a deficit of 150,000l. a-year, excluſive of any imperial contribution.

But it was aſked would Union put down expence? Would Union produce economy? He anſwered yes—Union would produce tranquillity; Union would increaſe internal ſecurity; Union would eſtabliſh a general fund for the expences of the Empire, and Ireland could not contribute beyond her proportion. If, ſaid the Noble Lord I did not think Union calculated to produce repoſe, and confidence, and ſecurity, I ſhould conſider it as an inadequate meaſure indeed; but it is my firmeſt conviction that the firſt fruit of it will be peace; that peace will leſſen our expences; that we ſhall become as ſupports to the fabrics of the Britiſh empire, and no longer hang upon her as a mill-ſtone ſinking her to the bottom. But how will Great Britain bear the additional expence of ſupporting Ireland? In the firſt place, I feel aſſured that the effect of Union will be to diminiſh the expences of the empire, and in the ſecond

I aſſert,

I aſſert that it is better for Great Britain for a time to ſpend an additional million, in order to make this a happy country and to conſolidate its reſources with her own, than that we ſhould continue to ſupport the whole of our own expences in a ſeparate ſtate of inſecurity, threatening the exiſtence of the Britiſh Empire. The object, the great object of Great Britain is, that the two countries ſhould be one: one in proſperity, in ſecurity, in happineſs. She is anxious that our wealth ſhould accumulate, when it ſhould be no longer equivocal that our reſources would prove reſources of the enemy But ſhe muſt at preſent look to our requiſitions with jealous anxiety, while ſhe doubts that Ireland would become a ſtore-houſe and magazine for France.

The hon. gentleman had next endeavoured to impeach the criterion which had been ſelected, but it was not merely a negative impeachment; he had not ſhewn thoſe to be falſe which he had ſtated, but complained of the omiſſion of others. He had complained that no criterion had been eſtabliſhed from our internal trade: what was the reaſon? It was impoſſible to eſtimate that trade; he had himſelf ſtated that the value of an Income Tax would form the beſt poſſible criterion; but an Income Tax did not exiſt in Ireland, and he could not argue from what did not exiſt.

It was objected that he did not introduce the produce of Stamps in the two countries; and what was the cauſe? The ſtamp duties were different in the two countries as the rate of duties impoſed, and as to the articles on which they were levied; it was therefore impoſſible to make a compariſon when ſuch difference exiſted.

His next objection was, that he had omitted the article of Salt: but how could a criterion be eſtabliſhed in this article when the duties on ſalt in Great Britain were 10s. a buſhel, the duties on ſalt in Ireland were 2s. a buſhel, and if a compariſon were made on the quantity, and not on the value of the article, could that be a fair method when ſalt was the chief article of the conſumption of the poor, and the poor were moſt numerous in Ireland?

The third objection was, that he had omitted the Poſt-Office Duties: but how could a compariſon be made on this article of revenue, when it was known that the rate of poſtage was different in the two countries, and a compariſon could only be truly made if the rates were the ſame.

It ſeemed as if the right hon. gentleman wiſhed to eſtabliſh criterions from ſeparate proportions of ſeparate articles; but the real ground he had juſt taken to eſtabliſh criterions was this, what quantity of income can any country ſpend on the different great articles of conſumption? It was the reſult formed from the value of the whole conſumption, which could alone form a true criterion; a true criterion formed upon a ſeparate article was fallacious, becauſe that article might not be equally reliſhed and proportionably conſumed in the two countries.

The right hon. gentleman had contended that to ſelect the period of common taxation to commence with the extinction of the debts of the two countries, was ſelecting the period moſt unfavourable

able to Ireland, but the reverſe was the fact. What will be the caſe, Sir, when Great Britain ſhall have extinguiſhed her debt? ſhe will have diſcharged taxes to the amount of twenty millions a year. She will then have merely her ordinary expences to provide for, and of courſe ſhe will want very few taxes indeed. If, then, Ireland ſhall commence a ſyſtem of common taxation with Great Britain when her taxes ſhall be few and low, the taxes of Ireland being common with Great Britain, will be equally light. In that caſe the Engliſh ſcale of taxation will deſcend below the Iriſh ſcale of taxation, and Ireland by adopting it will receive a benefit not an injury.

The right hon. gentleman had next objected to the commercial ſyſtem. It was, however, formed upon the commercial propoſitions of 1785, which had been ſupported by the right hon. gentleman, and he defied any fair man to find any principle in theſe propoſitions which was not contained in the ſyſtem before the Houſe. He contended that the preſent ſyſtem exceeded in benefit that of 1785, as it communicated the raw materials of England, by taking off all prohibitions, as it transferred to this kingdom the duties on coals, and the half ſubſidy, and as it was not attended with a contribution ariſing from the increaſe of the hereditary revenue. If the propoſitions of 1785, ſecured protecting duties ſo long as the Parliament of Ireland choſe, the preſent ſyſtem ſecured them for 20 years, and then left the alteration of them to the wiſdom of an Imperial Parliament, in which Ireland would have 100 Members, and when the intereſts of Ireland muſt be equally conſidered with thoſe of Great Britain, becauſe they were the ſame.

The Right Hon. Gentleman had alluded to the injury which the cotton manufacture would ſuffer. He had, however, given notice to the Houſe that he intended to make ſuch a proviſion in favour of that manufacture as ought to ſatisfy every reaſonable man. But did the right hon. gentleman defend the ſyſtem of the preſent duties on cottons. Would he aſſert the policy of maintaining prohibitory duties upon articles of Britiſh manufacture? Would he maintain the enormity of ſuch a ſyſtem which went to puniſh the conſumers of this country, and to lay a ground for Great Britain to retaliate? Was it right or equitable that the conſumers in Ireland ſhould be taxed in the articles of calicoes and muſlins from 30 or 40 per cent. that a few manufacturers ſhould make ten per cent. profit on thoſe articles? Did he ſuppoſe the monſtrous principle of prohibitory duties? If the right hon. gentleman had thought it neceſſary to place the cotton manufactures in a hot-bed in order to make it ſtrike root, ſurely he did not mean to eſtabliſh the neceſſity of continuing ſuch falſe encouragement. He muſt ſurely wiſh upon every true principle that prohibitory duties ſhall be gently and gradually lowered, and the ſupport of a contrary ſyſtem was the ſupport of a ſoleciſm, not of a principle.

But the right hon. gentleman has argued, that becauſe an alteration of the propoſed Reſolutions has been ſuggeſted with reſpect to the duty upon cottons, this circumſtance furniſhed the ſtrongeſt proof of the neceſſity for a local Parliament to act upon local information;

He ſtates, (ſaid his lordſhip,) that when I was in England on the buſineſs of Union, I was ignorant of the ſtate of the cotton manufacture, and that it was merely ſince I returned, that I obtained information by converſing with the manufacturers themſelves. It is hardly worth while to diſcuſs ſo flimſy an argument: The anſwer however is plain. The Reſolutions which I have preſented are drawn upon a general principle; that principle is the reduction of duties on the Trade between Great Britain and Ireland, ſo that they ſhall gradually become to each other like two counties of the ſame kingdom. But I was aware that objections would ariſe to this principle, as it affected certain manufactures, and I was prepared to adopt ſuch alterations, as upon mature conſideration it ſhould be found expedient to adopt. My object was to aſcertain and eſtabliſh a principle, and to allow no variations from it which neceſſity did not warrant,

With reſpect to Linens it was now plain even from the admiſſion of the right hon. gentleman, that our local Legiſlature could not be relied upon to perpetuate advantages which depended on the Britiſh Market and the Britiſh Parliament. But the right hon. gentleman, ſaid that an Union would not ſecure thoſe advantages, becauſe it was ſtipulated in the Propoſitions of 1785, that Great Britain ſhould ever give a preference to Iriſh manufactures over foreign, and that the plan before the committee contained no ſuch proviſion. But ſuch a proviſion was not neceſſary in his plan, becauſe the Propoſitions only gave a preference to Iriſh Linens over foreign; whereas this plan placed Iriſh and Britiſh Linens on the ſame footing.—There was a ſecurity better than any principle of preference: It was a ſecurity founded on the perpetual intereſt of Great Britain, and of the manufactures of Great Britain. He would now for a moment revert to the right hon. gentleman's wiſhes about Cottons, and ſuppoſe that Great Britain were to feel in a ſimilar manner with the right hon. gentleman as to Linens; ſuppoſe Great Britain were to take up the principle of general protecting duties, and adopt that ſovereign panacea, which he recommended for Iriſh manufactures; and ſuppoſe ſhe were to lay a duty of ten per cent on Linens, could the hon gentleman object to the fairneſs of the meaſure, although it would ruin the Linen Trade of Ireland?

With reſpect to the Woollen Trade, the hon. gentleman ſeemed to have changed his doctrine that we were not fit for that manufacture, at the ſame time that he does not think the importation of Britiſh Wool to be of much advantage. But what was the caſe? Had we not evidence that all the wool of the country was worked up at home into manufacture? Was it not therefore probable, that if we could obtain more wool we ſhould manufacture more? Would it not be an advantage to have the finer kinds of Britiſh Wool to mix with our own? Had we not advantages in reſpect to fuel which were not enjoyed in ſeveral parts of England, Where the woollen manufacture was carried on? And was it of no conſequence to the country, that a plan was offered them which ſecured for ever their Linen Trade and opened the proſpect of a Trade in Woollens.

The right hon. gentleman had next objected to the relief offered to the landed intereſt, in taking off the duties impoſed on the export of proviſions. He argued the loſs of revenue, but ſurely that, in an arrangement of ſuch a nature was no conſideration; and the change of a tax from one article to another could not be deemed an increaſe of the national burdens. But it was objected that the export duty on proviſions was paid by England, not Ireland. Did the right hon. gentleman mean to aſſert the juſtice of ſuch a meaſure? Did he mean to contend that firſt we ſhould oblidge Great Britain to give us the monopoly of her market, and then we ſhould tax her for giving us that monopoly? But ſuppoſing the duty was at preſent paid by Great Britain, the conſumer, let it be recollected, that if Great Britain allowed the importation of proviſions from other parts, and admitted a free competition, that it would then fall, not upon the conſuming, but upon the producing country. So that the export duty on proviſions was in one view an unjuſt tax, and in the other an injurious one.

The right hon. gentleman objected to the loſs of revenue in reducing the preſent duties from 12½ per cent to 10 per cent. But what was the caſe in the Propoſitions of 1785? Was not the general principle of that meaſure to confine protecting duties to 10½ per cent. and was not that the ſyſtem of the right hon. gentleman?—When the right hon. gentleman had ſtated that all duties which were under 10 per cent. at preſent were to ceaſe, he had not fairly ſtated the reſolutions, which contained no ſuch proviſion; they only prevented their increaſe in future.—How had the right hon. gentleman miſtated the regulations reſpecting coals, in order to inflame the city of Dublin, which he lamented did not require any acts of irritation? It was urged by him that the local tax impoſed on coals imported into Dublin, (which bye the bye was a tax of his own invention) was to be continued for ever. There was no ſuch regulation in the articles whatever, for their principle was, that the general duties on coals ſhould remain the ſame, but that ſuch part of the duty, as was now retained in England, and went into the Britiſh Exchequer, ſhould hereafter be paid into the Iriſh Exchequer; but there was no reference to local duties of any kind whatſoever, which might at any time ceaſe when circumſtances would allow it.

Again, the right. hon. gentleman objected that Great Britain ſhould give up the half ſubſidy upon foreign and colonial goods re-exported to Ireland, as it would diſcourage our attempts to carry on a direct trade inſtead of a circuitous one. Here the hon. gentleman had made a falſe argument; for the relinquiſhment of the half ſubſidy would not alter the quantum of duties, but would merely transfer that part of the duty now paid into the Britiſh, into the Iriſh Exchequer where it might reſt.

The right hon. gentleman had ridiculed the idea of our receiving a participation of the revenues received from the territories of the India Company, by ſtating that this revenue had never been paid. He begged leave, however, to ſtate, that this was not the

caſe: and he had every reaſon to believe, that from the flouriſhing circumſtances of the Company, and the great increaſe of thei territories, the Indian contribution would become a permanent and regular reſource; and he had been aſked whether we were to participate in any further revenues which the Britiſh Exchequer ſhould receive at any time from that Company; he was authorized to ſtate, that this kingdom would at all times have its full participation. The right hon. gentleman had endeavoured to ſhew, that the plan before the Committee could not produce an entire incorporation of identity with Great Britain; but he ſhould recollect, that the circumſtances of diſtinctneſs which were to remain were temporary, and not inconſiſtent with unity of government, and that they were admitted for a time, in order to ſave the intereſts of Ireland from being in the leaſt impaired. But what was the conduct of oppoſition? Firſt they contended againſt any Union at all; and ſecondly they contended againſt any thing which fell ſhort of abſolute Union and total identity.

The noble Lord ſaid he ſhould reſerve his reply to other objections of the Rt. Hon. Gent. to another ſtage of the diſcuſſion. He would now conclude with theſe obſervations, that he had attended minutely to all the arguments of the Speaker, and he conceived they might all be refuted, and that nothing had been advanced to ſhake his opinion as to the neceſſity of the meaſure before the Committee: he ſaw that its adoption would be attended with tranquillity, with economy, with ſecurity, and he was convinced that its rejection would leave us open to a renewal of thoſe ſtruggles and calamities which had recently overwhelmed the country, would oblige us to adopt a ſyſtem of eſtabliſhment and expence, which the revenues of this country could not ſupport, and would finally terminate in bankruptcy and ruin.

Right hon. Mr. Beresford, went alſo at large into a comparative view of the Propoſitions of 85, and the preſent, ſhewing the ſuperiority of the latter. In the former, moſt of the old reſtraints and prohibitions had been retained, while on the preſent occaſion ſuch modifications and arrangements were propoſed as would place the commercial intercourſe and connexion of the two countries on the moſt fair and equitable footing. On the ſubject of ſubſidizing duties, he explained ſome objections made by the Speaker—who aroſe, and profeſſed himſelf convinced and ſatisfied on that part of the ſubject, by the ſtatements of Mr. B.—and among the advantages reſulting from a juſt reciprocity of the raw material, Mr. B. aſſerted that in the article of Engliſh wool, Ireland would benefit one-third in the value by merely returning this article, after being ſpun, into the Britiſh market, without following the manufacture further in its progreſs.

Mr. Dawson, ſaid, that he had all along oppoſed the meaſure of Union in its principle, and the motive of his oppoſition ſtood unchanged. The noble Lord ſaid, when the terms were known, the Houſe and the country would fall in love with the meaſure; but if there was one plan more monſtrous than another, it was the

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ſpecific plan propoſed by the noble Lord. After the very trifling majority which the noble Lord had been able to procure—after the great and reſpectable minority with which he was oppoſed, he had hoped that the noble Lord inſtead of proſecuting, would have expreſſed his relinquiſhment of the meaſure; but he was ſorry to ſay, that a confidential Law Officer of the Crown had given that Houſe and the country to underſtand what they had to expect from the Miniſter; he had avowed that the meaſure was to be carried even by a majority of one; but he expreſſed his confidence, that the Miniſter would not get the country gentlemen of Ireland to go along with him in ſuch a procedure. In the laſt ſeſſion of Parliament, when an unbiaſſed majority had thrown the meaſure of Union out of that Houſe, the noble Lord ſaid, that he muſt be frantic if he attempted to preſs it; yet, although the oppoſers of the meaſure had been augmented from 111 to 118, ſtill the Miniſter perſiſted. Could it then be conſidered a language too ſtrong, if he were to tell the noble Lord that he was not merely frantic, but ſtark ſtaring mad! The Commons of Ireland were againſt the meaſure—[a cry of no!]—certainly the Houſe was numerically for it; but he contended that the property and unbiaſſed ſenſe of the Commons of Ireland was adverſe to the meaſure—the country was adverſe to it—the mercantile intereſt againſt it—[another cry of no] he did not wiſh to miſtate, but there had, in the courſe of that ſitting, been a petition preſented on the part of the merchants, &c. of Dublin againſt an Union, and he was well informed that there was a ſimilar one from the principal traders of Cork, on its way, or by that time received in town. Mr. Dawſon then took a ſlight view of the terms, particularly that part affecting the Iriſh peerage, and concluded by voting for Mr. Anneſley's leaving the chair.

Mr. W. Smith, ſaid, that when the hon. gentleman who ſpoke laſt, had indulged in offenſive alluſions to thoſe who ſupported the queſtion of Union, he had uttered that which he would not venture to apply individually; but ſuch a mode of oppoſition to the queſtion before the Houſe was perfectly appropriate annd conſiſtent in the plenipotentiary of the county of Armagh; but in alluſions of the kind, he felt, there was nothing worthy a man of ſenſe. The hon. gentleman had expreſſed himſelf extremely anxious about the Iriſh peerage: he too might be allowed ſome credit for a ſimilar and equally ſincere anxiety, but his ſentiments on that ſubject were of a very different nature. The regulations reſpecting the peerage were mere anomalies, which would by no means alter the eſſence of their privileges, nor leſſen their dignity, but muſt materially conduce to the benefit of this country. The hon. gentleman while he dwelt on ideal indignity, did not ſuffer himſelf at all to conſider the poſitive advantages which his country, of which he profeſſed to be ſo ardent an advocate, would derive from the regulation—but if the hon. gentleman did not know, or did not chuſe to acknowledge thoſe advantages, he, was not inſenſible to them, nor ignorant that by the regulations which

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the hon. gentleman complained of, a great number of the Iriſh peerage who could not be admitted to a Legiſlative influence in the Imperial Houſe of Lords, would have an opportunity of conſtituting a very great portion of the Commons, and thus of ſtrengthening and maintaining the intereſts of Ireland in the United Parliament. With reſpect to the other points of regulation affecting the Peers of Ireland, that auguſt body had conſented to ſacrifices which would ever be mentioned to their honour—ever remembered with gratitude—and, inaſmuch as they had proved themſelves ſuperior to perſonal feeling or vanity, when put in competition with the public good, would communicate a luſtre to their characters and names far beyond the power of title or of privilege to beſtow; and, if the Commons were equally inclined to forego perſonal conſiderations for the general welfare and proſperity of the country, this Houſe would diſplay a different aſpect; invective would not be ſubſtituted for argument; paſſion would give way to that calm and dignified conſideration which the man of unbiaſſed mind and patriot feeling would ever give to a public queſtion; and whether the meaſure propoſed were of an injurious or beneficial tendency, would be equally an argument for coolly entering into its merits, with that man who felt he had no other parliamentary intereſt than the good of his country.

That as the queſtion before the Chair, could properly be debated only on the principle of the meaſure, and as every thing that could be ſaid to the principle had already been offered to the Houſe, he would be obliged to give a ſilent vote, or repeat arguments which he had uſed before, or which had been advanced by gentlemen with whom he had the honor to act. He declared on his honor, that the ſentiments which he had expreſſed on a former occaſion, had undergone no other alteration, except a further and ſtronger confirmation; except in a more ſettled and encreaſed conviction of the neceſſity of the meaſure, and the certainty of great and many benefits reſulting to this country, while the ſtrength and reſources of the empire would be augmented, and placed on a ſolid and permanent baſis. He hoped he would not appear preſumptuous; he was ſure that his own mind and intentions would acquit him from the charge; but truly there did not appear to proceed from the other ſide of the Houſe a ſingle argument that ought to have any influence on the queſtion, but that of encreaſing in that Houſe the conviction of its neceſſity and its policy; and it was fair to ſay, that of this the ſilence of his ſide of the Houſe was a proof, for if the Anti-Unioniſts had offered arguments, they muſt neceſſarily have furniſhed matter for reply. On the contrary, arguments which had been repeatedly controverted, were again preſſed forward with not the faintest colouring of novelty, while the weakeſt arguments offered on his ſide of the Houſe ſtood unrefuted. What were all the arguments advanced by gentlemen oppoſite to him, but changes rung, that the meaſure of an Union would ſubvert the conſtitution? Was that argument for ever to be refuted, and for ever to be urged? Gentlemen knew

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very well that it was a position subversive of the best principles of the Constitution; that it was eternizing abuses and defects; that it was stifling the corrective principle, that principle which had so long upheld in purity, and vigour, and happiness, the British constitution; in a word, that it was a position which would take from the Sovereign his Scottish crown; nay, the British crown; and shut out for ever this country from all political improvement.

Government was charged with having appealed to the physical force of the people—but it was not the fact—government appealed to the property and to the respectability of the country. No! it was those who make the charge that incur its application and its guilt—it was the Anti-Unionists who had appealed to the physical force of the country, in the encouragement of mobs, and the promotion of aggregate meetings. Gentlemen contended for the efficacy and the virtues of the present system of connexion—but what was it? One empire with two Legislatures and two Sovereignties; one contending for superiority—agitated by rivalry, and confessing and acting upon a distinction of interests! How did the matter stand? Either the two countries were independent or they were not. If independent, what became of the integrity of the empire, which the Anti-Unionists professed themselves ready to maintain, and if they were not independent, what became of those objections to an Union, founded on national pride and ideal independence? But it was degrading to the understanding of men of sense and information to say that our Legislature being one and the same with that of Great Britain, could either affect our national dignity otherwise than by placing it on a great and honourable foundation, or subvert our Constitution, otherwise than by giving to it purity, strength, and stability.—Was there, said he a man at the other side of the House, who would not feel the strongest sense of indignation if a principle of separation were to be imputed to him? Was there a man who heard him that would not lay down his life to maintain the integrity of the empire? He felt assured there was not. How then, he asked, did an opposition to this measure accord with such feelings and professions—for certainly, if the two countries were to form one empire in the most effectual and stable manner, an Union of Legislatures must incontrovertably be allowed a desideratum.

With respect to the argument, that the proportion of Irish members would not have due weight in the legislative scale, he begged leave to say that the assertion was monstrous and absurd, and in proof that it was so, he begged gentlemen would see to what a length the argument might be carried. What a wretched dependance, what a miserable security for their rights would every separate county or shire of England have; for instance, that of Middlesex sends about twenty members to parliament, and these, according to the argument advanced from the other side, would have to contend with 538 members; a position the most absurd, and which can only be supported by an argument existing only in the present state of separability, and which must vanish the moment

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an Union takes place; that is the argument of diſtinct intereſts. Never was there ſaid Mr. S. a more wild and abſurd eſtimation of the freedom of the country, than to ſay that an Union would place Ireland in a dependent ſtate. The fact was, that Ireland would be no more dependent in the ſcale of the empire than by that mutual and relative dependance which the parts of a whole muſt neceſſarily have on each other; no more dependant than any one of the counties of Ireland was on the entire kingdom. It was not on a contraſt of the number of members that depended the ſecurity of either country, but on an identification of their intereſts, an identification which an Union would effect. It was aſked what grand benefit would reſult from an Union? Although ſeveral might be detailed he would content himſelf with mentioning the moſt obvious and fundamental one, that of its being an indiſſoluble ſtrengthening of the connexion between the two countries. It might be anſwered that they were already ſtrengthened by an Union of Crowns; true, they were ſo, but an Union of Legiſlatures would ſtrengthen them ſtill more, and therefore that which would encreaſe an admitted good; that which would ſtregthen a cheriſhed and approved principle, had certainly every argument in its favour, none againſt it. After ſomefurther argumentative matter, Mr. Smith concluded by voting againſt the motion.

Mr. Egan—At this late hour of the night; morning I mean, I muſt take the liberty of delivering my ſentiments on this queſtion. Enervated as I am, and as you Mr. *Anneſly*, cannot but perceive, I can only congratulate myſelf and the Houſe that in the courſe of my life I never wrote a pamphlet on any ſubject; and I do therefore congratulate the Houſe that they ſhall neither have the blade bone nor the haſh of any pamphlet of mine ſerved up. But, Sir, you are not to have all my congratulations, I muſt keep a certain portion for myſelf; and I felicitate myſelf that if I have an enemy in this Houſe, who conſiders me as his, though he ſhould exclaim in the bitterneſs of his heart, "O! that mine enemy had written a book!" he can only wiſh it, he cannot ſay I did it. He cannot get up and charge me with having, in the 32d page of my pamphlet, made an aſſertion, which in the 111th page of the ſame work, I expreſsly contradicted.

Three gentlemen have ſtarted this night from the loſing poſt againſt the honourable gentleman who has ſo ſeldom an opportunity of ſpeaking. They have attempted to cry him down, and the only way they had to do that, puts me in mind of the manner in which a Scotchman once undertook to cry down Homer; he ſaid he would get ſome poor ſcholar like Mc. Pherſon to tranſlate him.

The noble Lord who firſt got up to anſwer that honourable gentleman, firſt claims my attention. The noble Lord has been pleaſed to ſay on a former occaſion; if it did not come from the noble Lord it certainly came from that ſide of the Houſe, that there was not a man in this land who was not a direct rebel, or a man of equivocal loyalty that did not ſupport the meaſure of an Union. Let me tell you, the men I take to be rebels, and with whom I don't aſſociate—

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ſhall I ſtep out of the Houſe to get a character more tranſcendant? No, Sir, I can lay my finger on him. A man whoſe weighty and irreſiſtible arguments, the light infantry from the other ſide have been unable to bear down; that man, Sir, who has been and continues to be the beſt ſupport of his Majeſty's government in this kingdom, and whoſe whole life has been honourably and ſerviceably divided between his King, his Country, and the Conſtitution. Shall I go to the other Houſe of Parliament to look for thoſe men of equivocal loyalty who oppoſe the Union? If I do, Sir, I ſhall ſee there a noble Lord, your old friend, Mr. Anneſley, and the friend of his King and the Conſtitution, whoſe amiable manners and whoſe ſolid virtues make him illuſtrious as a Peer, and beloved as a man; in whoſe pure and antient eſcutcheon no blot can be found, and ſhall I be told that I am in bad company when I am in his company? And ſhall I ſee that great and illuſtrious character, marked by his Sovereign as a father, that man who has diſtinguiſhed himſelf for his attachment to the Conſtitution of his country, by falſe repreſentations diſmiſſed from an honour which he diſregards but as it ſerved to evince his loyalty, and the crime of diſloyalty imputed to him becauſe on this great and momentous queſtion, he was a friend to his King and not a traitor to his country? And is this the meaſure and the means that is to recommend this unfortunate, this corrupt, this apoſtate meaſure that is to annihilate us for ever, that is not to leave to mark the ſpot where the Iriſh Patriot expired with the name of his country.

It has been imputed to this Houſe that we get into nothing but infamous invective, contrary to the decorum of Parliament; from what mouth do I hear that imputation? From one that is reeking with the foulest and moſt abominable invective. Has not the dignified and the venerated name of Charlemont been traduced? I thought veneration for the dead ought to have gained eſteem for the living. They ought to be afraid that the hallowed ſhade of that venerated and departed patriot was about the Houſe. They ought to have been afraid that he would have deſcended in the majeſty of honeſty and honour and integrity, and have extinguiſhed the ludicrous inconſiſtency of audacity and corruption.

I have this night heard a gentleman make a ſpeech which I admire, and much reaſon I have to admire the ſpeech; a ſpeech which, no doubt, poſſeſſes every quality to excite admiration, ſince it has been made no leſs than three times in and out of Parliament; but though my talents are but very humble, if gentlemen will be good enough to draw on me at 31 days ſight, I think, by getting up at four o'clock in the morning, I could ſnatch as much time from my buſineſs in this Houſe and out of this Houſe, as would enable me, with the friendly aſſiſtance of a cup of ſtrong tea or coffee, to clear my underſtanding, to write 31 or 32 pages of a pamphlet or ſpeech, or ſpeech and pamplet occaſionally, as it may ſerve my purpoſe, and give a good ſolid anſwer to any queſtion. Probably I have been too long ſpeaking. I know ſome gentlemen on the other ſide of the Houſe conceive ſo; but while I am on my legs, as I pre-

tend to ſome degree of prophetic ſpirit, and as I did pay great attention to every word that fell from the hon. gentleman under me (the Speaker), and convinced as I am that the noble Lord will carry the Union by hook or by crook, as we lawyers ſay; and as this is probably the laſt time I may ever ſpeak in this Houſe on the ſubject, I am determined to take my diſtributive ſhare of the time that is yet left to us. Let the gentlemen on the other ſide take a nap if they do not wiſh to hear my laſt nonſenſe. If they were to continue the debate, and you Mr. Anneſley were to ſit in that chair until the day of judgment, and were to look as well on that day as you do now, I would deliver my ſentiments. But as probably you would rather leave the chair, and may not be altogether as indifferent on this head as I am, and as you may not wiſh to be ſtuck up there until dooms-day, I ſhall vote for your quitting the chair, and when you do, I moſt earneſtly hope that it is the laſt time any man may be put into it for the ſame purpoſe. Mr. Anneſley, I have read books, and, I am afraid, of the worſt character. I have read Locke on Civil Government; a bad man that ſupported by his writings the principles of the revolution in 1688; and another writer, I forget his name, who wrote at the period of the revolution, the principles of which are now-a-days conſidered ſo exploded and blaſphemous; and what does he ſay, Mr. Anneſley?—Why, Sir, it is this, that if a man wants to write down a good character, it is only neceſſary to call him bad names, for it is the nature of man to reliſh ſuch attacks, and he is ſure to have the multitude at his ſide. It puts me in mind of the bad company I have got into, I think it was a faction they called it. Is not the honour of private life, the moſt unblemiſhed virtues of public life, the moſt venerated character to become a ſhield againſt the attacks of political fanatics? Shall we be told, that no man has a right to hold out the ſhield of his private character againſt the deadly weapon? Shall a creature of yeſterday—ſhall we be told by a man whoſe family was not known, when that man was rocking in the cradle of honour—ſhall he aſſume to himſelf an authority which he diſgraces.—(Order! Order!)

Mr. ANNESLEY requeſted Mr. Egan to ſpeak to the queſtion.

Mr. EGAN—I thought, Mr. Anneſley, they had left you ſo fixed that it was impoſſible for you to riſe to call me to order. (Chair! Chair!) I do not think I am out of order. The queſtion before the Houſe is, that you leave the chair; and if I am ſpeaking to the queſtion, muſt it be only by rote like a parrot, and muſt my whole argument be reduced to "*Sir, you are to leave the Chair—Sir, you are to leave the Chair—Sir, you are to leave the Chair?*"—No, Sir, I am endeavouring to aſſign my reaſons why you ſhould leave that chair. What is the accuſation made againſt this Houſe? That it is a baſe, rebellious, and corrupt, Parliament, and ought to be aboliſhed, and in the abolition of our Parliament ought to ſubſtitute an Union. What elſe has been aſſerted?—that hiſtory proves for ſix hundred years paſt, that we have been a deſpicable nation, and that every ſucceſſive government has been obliged to govern us with deſpotiſm.

deſpotiſm. You have been told that for half a million of guineas the country would extinguiſh itſelf.

I have had the ſatisfaction, when a right hon. gentleman expoſed the fallacy of thoſe calculations which have been laid before the Houſe. To hear him utter a ſentiment to which every man who loves his country muſt ſubſcribe, ſaid that right hon. gentleman "If you were to give me the trade and commerce of England, I would not part with the Parliament. If you could even realize the phantom of thoſe calculations, I would not for theſe rob my country of its Parliament." What is honour to a man? What is chaſtity to a woman? What is dignity to a country? Sir, they are ſynonimous terms, and thoſe who could bargain for their ſurrender, as they muſt be inſenſible of their value, muſt be undeſerving of their poſſeſſion, and never had them to ſell. They talk of riches, the are no compenſation for ſervitude. Sir, we have no right to diſpoſe of our country; I care not what Blackſtone and Sommers, thoſe Engliſh lawyers, may ſay; I will not argue againſt the ramrod impotence of the other ſide of the Houſe, but I will record on my commentaries that you have no right to ſacrifice your country. It is a delegation which at the end of ſeven years or ſooner, we are bound to return as it was committed to our care. We have no right to ſurrender the Parliament of Ireland to a foreign power. I call it a foreign land. It has been ſtated in this and the other Houſe that I ſaid England was the inſtinctive enemy of this country, I ſay ſo ſtill, the propoſitions which are to be the ground-work of the Union prove it. The propoſitions of 82 prove it. The commercial reſtraint of Ireland prove, that England is our jealous enemy in commerce; and therefore I ſaid it. We ſhould not truſt that country with our rights, and above all with our Conſtitution.

We are told that we muſt ſubmit to this Union, becauſe if we do not, in three years we will be irrevocably a bankrupt nation: we are to be bankrupt and that is declared by the very men who are to iſſue the commiſſion. In the adminiſtration of Lord North, very ſtrong aſſertions of that kind were made, and yet not one of thoſe aſſertions were ever realized. And as I knew that noble Lord to be a man of ſenſe, and as I know the men who made this obſervation now is not of a mind to think long enough to be certain of the event, I will therefore vote againſt an Union. Mr. Egan here went into the propoſitions laid down relative to the ſavings in peace and war, and having obſerved upon them at conſiderable length, ſaid, if nothing elſe would influence him, thoſe calculations alone would determine him to vote againſt the Union. He then concluded, "I cannot ſit down without repeating what I mentioned when this buſineſs was laſt brought forward, when the noble Lord mentioned the ſubject of compenſation for the boroughs; I did tell the noble Lord very fairly, that if I ever heard it again mentioned, I would take down his words, and would either vote his impeachment or expulſion. And do I now declare, if this Houſe is not haſtily taken away, if ſome abler man than I am does not do it, I will myſelf do it, though I ſhould ſtand alone.

Mr. BURROWES.—I ſhould feel myſelf unworthy of a ſeat in this Houſe if I apologized, even at this late hour, and to this exhauſted aſſembly, for ſpeaking with the utmoſt freedom upon this vital queſtion. The approach of diſſolution is a ſeaſon peculiarly fit for truth and ſerioufneſs, and if miſchief ſhall ariſe from a free diſcloſure to public view of the circumſtances in which we ſtand, they alone are anſwerable, who by ſetting this queſtion afloat, have torn the veil from objects which cannot bear, and ought not to be ſubmitted to public ſcrutiny. I own this meaſure has not taken me by ſurpriſe. I have long anticipated it in the preparatory ſteps of your government, and I have many friends who may recollect that I told them many years hence, that the ſolemn engagement by which the members of the Whig Club (an inſtitution, to which I had not the honour to belong) pledged themſelves againſt an Union, was of more real value than all the other comparatively trifling objects, about which they were occupied. The advocates for an Union muſt admit two propoſitions: that an independent domeſtic legiſlature is, generally ſpeaking, a good, and that our independent conſtitution has worked well. I do not exaggerate when I ſay, that Ireland has more improved ſince 1782, than any nation that ever exiſted, within ſo ſhort a period. Sir, if we were not eye-witneſſes of our own advancement, it would ſtrike us with aſtoniſhment. To any man who could put Ireland, as in 1782, in juxta-poſition with Ireland in her preſent ſtate, as to population, wealth, agriculture, and commerce, the difference would appear ſo aſtoniſhing as to be ſcarcely aſcribable to natural cauſes and natural means. I am, therefore, well founded in ſaying, that the evils flowing from our Independence muſt be weighty and manifeſt indeed, to juſtify a ſurrender of our Conſtitution. To thoſe who ſay that it does not ſubvert our Conſtitution, becauſe we will ſtill have our Repreſentatives in the United Parliament, I ſhall only anſwer, that upon the ſame grounds of reaſoning, if we were to ſend deputies to the United Aſſembly of France, that Aſſembly ſo intermixed might be called our Repreſentatives, and we ſhould juſt as much become thereby ſovereigns of France, as we ſhall become (as a right hon. gentleman has told us) ſharers of the ſovereignty of England. To any man who agrees with me in deeming it eſſential to our conſtitutional liberties, to be legiſlated for and taxed by thoſe deputies *alone* who are choſen by Iriſhmen, and that reſidence in Ireland is alſo an eſſential quality of our Conſtitution, it is unneceſſary to prove this to be an eſſential change. No man can doubt that this act virtually and in fact re-eſtabliſhed Britiſh ſupremacy. An hon. friend of mine (Mr. Smyth) has ſaid that all our poſitions on this ſide of the Houſe are unfounded, and all his own ſelf-evident; and therefore I preſume it is, that he has not condeſcended to refute the former or prove the latter: he appears to me to have aſſumed two fatal fallacies, and to have built his whole reaſoning upon them. He ſays, legiſlative independence neceſſarily tends to ſeparation, and that an Union of Parliaments neceſſarily creates an identity of feelings and intereſts in the two nations; how theſe effects are to follow he has not

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pointed, nor can I conceive. As long as the Crown, the ſource of active power, are united in one family, reſident in Great Britain, and as long as the ſame king continues an integral part of each legiſlature, ſeparation appears to me to be impoſſible; the conſolidation of the prerogatives of the two Crowns forms an anchor to the Conſtitution of ſuch immoveable weight, as to be proof againſt all the ſtorms and ſurges of democracy. In the ſame manner that the royal negative protects the prerogative, does the union of the crowns preſerve the connexion of the countries; this at leaſt is undeniable; it cannot be dreaded that the countries will be ſeparated by any legiſlative act; the King of Great Britain never can be ſuppoſed to concur in ſuch act. It appears to me that the ſame ingenuity which infers ſuch imbecility of connexion from independent legiſlatures, could, with equal eaſe, and equal ſtrength, prove that the ſeparate eſtates of Parliament are inconſiſtent with the ſecurity of the prerogative, and that, to preſerve the executive, you muſt inveſt it with the whole legiſlative power.

The danger then to connexion from independence muſt be extrinſic and operate from without. Will the People of Ireland be better affected to a Parliament in Weſtminſter than to a Parliament in Dublin? Will they prize the Conſtitution more after they have been compelled to ſacrifice their liberties to it, than while they were ſuffered to think that they might be connected with Great Britain without being enſlaved? as far as it depends upon the feelings of Iriſhmen, and abſtracted from the operations of military deſpotiſm, which cannot laſt, in my opinion the principle of connexion will periſh with our independence. It has been ſaid that Parliamentary debates excite ſedition—perhaps they may at times be intemperate; and I know of nothing human that is perfect. But I contend that conſiderable advantages ariſe even out of the abuſes of our Parliamentary inſtitution. Even in the moſt deſpotic governments the exterior forms and ſymbols of authority are neceſſary to create reſpect, and attach the feelings and prejudices of the vulgar to the power to which they are bound to ſubmit. He knows not the nature of our Conſtitution!—he knows not human nature, who cannot ſee much benefit reſulting from that chair, from the very robes in which our venerable Preſident is clad, from the ſplendid dome under which we deliberate, from the very buſtle and tumult of this aſſembly, and even from thoſe conflicts which in certain reſpects we may have occaſion to lament. You cannot baniſh the political ſentiment from the human mind, and if it has not a domeſtic and conſtitutional want, it will be the more bold, viſionary, and enterprizing. Therefore it is, that I always conceived that an oppoſition, though it verged to faction, was extremely deſirable in our Conſtitution; and if I were to attempt to connect our late popular exceſſes with the proceedings of this Houſe, I would ſay that they were more promoted by our acquieſcence than by our oppoſition to the meaſures of government, and if our debates had been more frequent and more impaſſioned, Jacobiniſm would have been leſs prevalent without theſe doors. But I cannot avoid obſerving how unreaſon-

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able it si to contraſt our independence with Britiſh connexion, at the very moment that the latter probably owes its exiſtence to the former. The noble Lord has ſaid that the ſuppreſſion of the rebellion is to be aſcribed chiefly to the vigor of government! but I ſay that the vigor of government would not have availed, if it had not been ſtrengthened by an internal legiſlature, and that both united would have failed, but for the yeomanry of Ireland fighting under the obligation of a ſolemn oath to maintain the Conſtitution of Ireland, and feeling that they were ſtruggling for their own liberties, and the rights of their poſterity—in that conteſt almoſt the whole property of Ireland was anti-revolutionary; but if it was conceived that we ſtruggled againſt one revolutionary party, but to promote the long projected Union of another not leſs odious! The conduct of the yeomanry and the iſſue of that conflict might have been widely different.

My learned friend's ſecond aſſumption, namely, that identity of intereſt and feeling, will neceſſarily follow parliamentary Union, is totally unproved, and even leſs tenable than the former. Can he conceive, that a Legiſlative Union between England and France, leaving a vaſt preponderance of power with the latter country, would identify the intereſts and feelings of both? Could he even hope that the antient hoſtilities between thoſe countries would gradually ſubſide, under ſuch an arangement? I do not ſay that the caſe is the ſame, but it is illuſtrative. Two diſtinct countries cannot incorporate with any ſafety to the inferior, unleſs an identity of intereſt and of feeling, ſhall have preceded the incorporation. The Unioniſts ſeek that as an effect, which is neceſſary to their meaſure as a pre-exiſting cauſe. They cannot deny that the Britiſh portion of the legiſlature will be abſolute; but they contend that the new relation of identity of people will ſecure us againſt an abuſe of power If they will prove it to me that there is ſuch a pre diſpoſition in the two countries; if they ſatisfy me that Ireland will ſtand towards England like Yorkſhire or Cornwall or any other Engliſh county, I ſhall acknowledge my error and embrace their project; but I cannot forget hiſtory, and overlook the natural courſe of human affairs out of compliment to their ſpeculations. My honourable friend is quite indignant that we at this ſide of the Houſe ſhould dwell upon the paſt oppreſſions of Great Britain, which even the Miniſter acknowledges, and condemns. I anſwer, that however goading the detail of Britiſh oppreſſion may be, it is rendered neceſſary by the attempt to reduce us again to the ſtate under which we languiſhed for centuries. For centuries we were conſidered as a diſtinct people and treated as an abject province, inſulted, impoveriſhed and degraded by Britiſh legiſlation. In 1782, we threw off the yoke, and in 18 years made advances unparalleled in the hiſtory of any other country; yet we are now called upon to lay down the conſtitution under which we flouriſhed, and ſubmit to that ſupremacy by which we were ſcourged—and to induce us to commit this folly, we are told that the ancient feelings of Great Britain will at once vaniſh

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and that we will be preciſely in the ſituation of an Engliſh county. Sir, I would as ſoon believe that my honourable friend could with his breath cool the earth heated by the collected rays of a long ſummer's ſun, which evaporate as ſlowly as they accumulate, as that the prejudices of centuries would give way to the mere influence of a name. Why is Yorkſhire ſafe and free with but two votes in the Britiſh Parliament? Why is Manchester ſafe without any? Becauſe there is no contraſted intereſt or contraſted feeling between theſe places and Britain at large, and if there was a competition between Yorkſhire and any other Engliſh county, the reſidue of Great Britain would form an impartial umpire between them. But can any man deny that rival feelings exiſt and that rival queſtions may ſpring up between Great Britain and Ireland? Can any man doubt but that an Engliſhman will look at Ireland, and an Iriſhman at England as a diſtinct country, even though they ſhould be commanded by an act of Parliament to conſider the two iſlands as one and the ſame. I ſay that Ireland with its hundred intermixed members, can have leſs chance againſt Britiſh prejudice than even under its conſtitution before 1782, and the claims of any ſingle county of England muſt for ever prevail againſt Ireland, becauſe, the reſidue of England will in future, as in paſt time lean againſt us, and we never will be conſidered and treated as Engliſhmen. To compare Ireland with Yorkſhire, is to confound things widely different—if, indeed, England were ſurrounded by ten or a dozen ſuch iſlands as Ireland, and if the repreſentatives of all theſe inferior iſlands united, ſhould exceed the repreſentatives of England as much as the repreſentatives of England exceed any one of them, then a ſituation analogous to the counties of England would ariſe, and the influence of England might be overborne by combinations. But it aſtoniſhes me, that gentlemen do not ſee, that the very idea of terms and conditions neceſſarily implies future, as well as paſt diſtinctneſs, and amounts to an admiſſion that our 100 members merged in the Britiſh parliament, are totally inadequate to ſecure juſtice for Ireland—when to the conſiderations I have ſtated, I take into account the hoſtile feelings generated by this foul attempt by bribery, by treaſon and by force, to plunder a nation of its liberties in the hour of its diſtreſs—I do not heſitate to pronounce, that every ſentiment of affection for Great Britain will periſh, if this meaſure ſhall paſs, and that inſtead of uniting the nations, it will be the commencement for an æra of unextinguiſhable animoſity.

The ſurrender of our conſtitution is urged upon another ground, if poſſible more ſtrong than any I have ſtated—namely, our religious diſſentions; I admit the exiſtence of this toil, and I pant for its removal—but before I embrace ſo deſperate a remedy, I deſire to be inſtructed how, and by what proceſs it will operate? In producing the effort aſcribed to it. It is not reaſonable that upon the mere word of the Miniſter, I ſhould apply this deadly medicine to a diſeaſe, which for many years has been abating, and which, I ſuſpect, has been kept lingering amongſt us for the ſake of the remedy.

medy. It is a moral malady and must be removed by moral means. Will an Union extract the poiſon from thoſe tenets which inflame religious bigotry?—Or will it diffuſe charity and toleration through the land?—Will it alter an iota in any man's creed, or in his practice? Will it quench Catholic ambition, or allay the ſpirit of Proteſtant monopoly? The Miniſter anſwers thoſe enquiries by a metephyſical quibble; ſays he, the Catholic out-numbering the Proteſtant, feels his claim to political equality, founded in manifeſt juſtice, and preſſes forward for its attainment. The Proteſtant, from his inferiority, dreads that equality would lead to aſcendancy, and therefore oppoſes Catholic claims. But paſs an Union and inſtantly as it were the effect of magic, we will be one people. The proteſtant therefore, in the Empire will out-number the Catholic, and conſequently Catholic Emancipation can be withheld without injuſtice or conceded without danger. Now I appeal to common ſenſe of any plain man, will the feelings of the Iriſh Catholic acquieſce in this ſophiſtry? Will he feel his proportion or his natural claims varied any more by a conſideration of the Proteſtants in England, than of the Catholics in Spain? Will he not ſtill feel Ireland to be his country, and if his relative number gives him any title to a participation of political power, which the argument ſeems to admit, will that title be diminiſhed when the principal Proteſtants of Ireland ſhall become abſentees? Or will he become the better attached to the connexion, becauſe the political power of his country is transferred to England for the very purpoſe of extinguiſhing his hopes for ever? He cannot forget that he owes the repeal of every political reſtraint, but one, to an Iriſh parliament, and that that one was originally impoſed upon him by that very parliament to which we are called upon to transfer our ſupreme authority, ſo that the natural effect of this meaſure will be to ſuperad national to religious prejudices; to ſplit our inhabitants into Proteſtants who will be conſidered as mere Engliſh, and Catholics who will be conſidered as mere Iriſh, and who will therefore be the more diſpoſed to look to connexion with ſome other nation, where this metaphyſical compariſon wil not operate, to their degradation.

But ſuppoſe the Miniſter ſhall change what I underſtand to be his immutable purpoſe, and admit them into the Imperial parliament, let it not be credited, that even ſo the nation will be tranquillized. I admit that when all are proſtrate, none can be aſcendant; but I add, that no numerous deſcription of men here will be ſatisfied. I deny that the Miniſter hopes or deſires by this arrangement to bury all religious diſtinctions in the tomb of Iriſh independence; he will ſtill play party againſt party, ſeat againſt ſeat. The revenue and the magiſtracy, which he may parcel out to day amongſt the Proteſtants, and to morrow amongſt the Catholics, will he hopes, keep us divided, enfeebled, and degraded. Our political power will be nothing, and any tranſitory authority which may be held or exerciſed by any deſcription of us, will depend upon the mere will and caprice of the Miniſter---this is a condition to which no claſs of Iriſhmen will voluntarily ſubmit.

Mr

Mr. G. Ponsonby said that the noble Lord (Castlereagh) when this measure of Union was reprobated as a measure of finance, and merely for the purpose of giving to the British Minister a dominion over the Irish House, had triumphantly said, that instead of encreasing, it would lessen the contribution of Ireland; yet this night the noble Lord was pleased to say that such was the state of the country that it could not go on without Union, or paying a contribution to England? Could, then, the noble Lord say, that it was not a measure of finance? The noble Lord professed that an Union would consolidate the strength of the empire, but what, said Mr. Ponsonby, can consolidate the strength and encrease the resources of a country? Not mere Acts of Parliament, but the affections of the people. The noble Lord said that the measure was opposed by every man who was a rebel; then it was clear it could not conciliate the rebellious and disloyal—would a measure which was to lay at rest the question of their emancipation, be calculated to please the Catholics?—Certainly not. Were the Protestants attached to it?—The petitions which covered the table furnished sufficient proof of the contrary; and as to the Presbyterian part of the community, a measure which went to destroy the democratic part of the Constitution, which diminished the Representative body two-thirds, could not be hoped to receive their support or approbation. Here, then, said Mr. Ponsonby, is a measure, which, by irritating all classes of the public, was to consolidate the strength and encrease the resources of the country. The noble Lord speaks of advantages to be acceded to this country in consequence of an Union—why, Sir, said Mr. Ponsonby, these advantages have been promised long before this Union was spoken of: but, says the noble Lord, you have no right to them without you contribute—let the noble Lord propose his rate of contribution and we will agree to it. (A cry of hear! hear! from the Opposition side of the House.) But, Sir, we will not surrender our resident Parliament to the noble Lord. We will not transfer to another country the trust reposed in us by the Irish People. Much has been said, Sir, from the other side of the House, of Catholic claims, and the sentiments of that body with respect to the Union; but who, Mr. Annesley, have set up those gentlemen as the proxies of the Catholics? Has one petition come from that body, praying this House to destroy itself? No, Sir, on the contrary, the Catholics of Ireland are against the measure—(a cry of no! no! from the opposite side of the House)—and I am confident, added Mr. Ponsonby, that the Catholics of Ireland would be satisfied never to come before this House with a claim, rather than assent to this measure, which would leave this country a province, ruled by a military government. Mr. Ponsonby concluded by professing that he opposed the measure as destructive of public liberty in both countries.

Mr. P. Hutchinson defended the measure of Union, and declared the sentiments of the Catholics to be favourable to that measure.

Sir Boyle Roche.—Mr. Speaker, I wish for your indulgence and that of the House, while I explain as briefly as I can, my motives for voting upon this important question. In the first place, I am sorry to have it to say, that the late rebellion broke out in this country with marks of atrocity unequalled perhaps in the history of mankind. The Jacobin traitors at the head of it, held out the lives and properties of the best people in this kingdom, as inducements to the lower orders to engage in the rebellion; and if I have not been ill-informed, nine-tenths of the people in this country were concerned in it. In this situation, Sir, I think it necessary for the salvation of the country, that some step should be taken to reconcile the people to the government. I have often stated in this House that we could not go on as we are, and that the same kind of government which we lived under for a century past, could not do for us in the present situation we are in. It is true, Sir, that a respectable gentleman, not now in his place, did in the latter end of the last Parliament, I think it was on the night the North of Ireland was declared to be in a state of rebellion, he did propose Parliamentary Reform and Catholic Emancipation as the *Panacea* to cure us of all our evils; I was one of those who thought the remedy worse than the disease, and the true friends of the people in Parliament rejected it with scorn. From the time that Lord Westmoreland came here as Chief Governor, one continued system of abuse of Parliament was carried on by the gentlemen alluded to; and as Parliament was held up in an odious light to the people, it had the effect of bringing forward the rebellion immediately. This unfortunate business succeeded as the managers of it expected—to wit—the disuniting all orders of the people so much, that his Majesty's troops in every part of the kingdom were mostly employed in preventing the different orders of the people from murdering one another. This is one of my reasons for voting for a Legislative Union with the sister kingdom, as the only means of securing our lives and properties. Near two years are past since the rebellion broke out, yet there is no gentleman can live at his country seat but at the risk of his life, and every symptom of disorder appears through every part of the kingdom. Every honest man must look steadily to the precarious state of the Protestant establishment of this country; its overthrow has been the great object of the rebellion. The population of this country is made up of two violent sects, I mean Catholics and Presbyterians; they are both hereditary enemies to one another, and they could agree in no point but the overthrow of the established church; and had they succeeded in their attempt upon it, *Peter* and *John* would bleed one another plentifully for the chair. It appears to me, that an Union upon fair, honourable, and equal terms with the Protestant kingdom of England, would put the church of Ireland for ever out of the power of its enemy. In the state we are now in, it is there we must look for permanent security for our religion, for our lives and property. From the beginning I saw in this contest the pride of the few militating against the interest of the many; for I do rely on it, that sharing in

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the trade, manufactory, and civilization of Great Britain, ſhould be the pride of every honeſt Iriſhman. In ſhort, I think, that every honeſt and loyal Iriſhman ſhould glory in calling the fleet of England his countrymen. There it is where we ought to feel our true independence. The word independence has been the conſtant theme of declamation in this country. But where are our own fleets and armies to maintain it, without which it is a nullity? Do we ſend our ambaſſadors to foreign courts? No. Have we any thing to ſay upon the great queſtion of war or peace? No. Where, then, is to be found our independence? It muſt be in a firm and eſtabliſhed Union with our ſiſter kingdom. There has been a great deal ſaid upon the ſubject of petitions and addreſſes from different parts of the kingdom; and it has been loudly declared in this Houſe as the voice of the people. Now, Sir, if what I aſſerted be a fact, that nine-tenths of the people have been concerned in the laſt rebellion, that being the caſe, I give but very little credit indeed to the ſignature of aggregate meetings, brought together by deſigning people, for the purpoſe of creating diſturbances in the kingdom.—For my part, I rely upon it, that the great property of this kingdom is in favour of an Union, and theſe are the people whoſe conſent is abſolutely neceſſary upon this occaſion. The calm and dignified proceedings of the Houſe of Lords, is a proof of what I have ſaid. A great part of the power and property of the nation reſide there, yet there is ſcarcely any difference of opinion in that Houſe. All theſe things conſidered, I vote for the Speaker's leaving the chair.

Mr. William Johnson ſaid, that ſo much of perſonal character had entered into the preſent diſcuſſion, that he was ſure he would be forgiven if he took up the time of the Houſe for a few ſeconds in making ſome obſervations on what had been urged on this head: and firſt, he ſaid, he would take notice of that indiſcriminate cenſure which had been ſo laviſhly thrown upon the ſupporters of this meaſure by the gentlemen on the other ſide of the Houſe. He looked through the rows which he ſaw before him, he looked to the individuals by whom he was ſurrounded, and he ſaw nothing that could warrant that aſſumption of ſuperiority which had been aſſerted on this occaſion. Whether he divided human pretenſions into property, talents, or virtue, he found in his eſtimation of all thoſe things, ſufficient to call for more modeſty and diſcretion than had yet been found in the gentlemen at the other ſide; for himſelf he trampled under foot, with mingled contempt and indignation, the ſlanderous aſſertion that no man could ſupport an Union that was not bought by the miniſter. The man who utters this, be he whom he may, he knows that what he utters is not true, or if he imagines it for a moment to be ſo, he draws on his own head the calumny, and gives the whiſperings of his conſcience for the conviction of his underſtanding. Has the head of perhaps the firſt monied houſe in Europe, who delivered his ſentiments in this Houſe ſome time ſince in favour of an Union with ſo much wiſdom and dignity, has he been bribed by the miniſter? have the Chief Judges of the land been bought by the miniſter? have, in fine, the

united Peerage of the land been bought by the miniſter? Has the extended property, within and without theſe walls which is now in favour of this meaſure, been bought by the miniſter? No, Sir; but I will tell you what has bought them—the ſtate of the country and the ſtate of Europe. What has bought them, has bought me; unacquainted with the miniſter, the caſtle, or its followers, I took up the queſtion of an Incorporate Union; I took it up in the boſom of privacy and retirement; it was forced on me by the growing calamities of the country, and I deliberated on it uninfluenced by a ſingle motive, other than an anxious deſire to meet the peculiar evils by which we were afflicted---I gave my opinion to the public with freedom, but I truſt without arrogance; for this I know ſome individuals have preſumed to cenſure me; but, I thank God, that while I feel the approbation of my own mind, ſuch things "paſs by me as the idle wind which I regard not."—When I ſee ſuch men who have thus preſumed to cenſure *me*, cultivate with aſſiduous adulation characters, who not long ſince were deemed almoſt peſtilential, I am ſatisfied; I am glad that I have eſcaped their good opinion, if I poſſeſſed it, and I feel, as it were, a refuge in their enmity, if I have excited it; I turn from them to thoſe by whom I am ſtill countenanced and ſupported. I know numbers of men of retired habits but enquiring minds, above the ſtorms of the world, but making all their movements where ſituation and temper place them beyond temptation or deluſion, who go the full length that I do upon the preſent queſtion; I could mention the names of ſome ſufficient to ſilence, if any thing could ſilence, the idle declamation to which we have been condemned to liſten.

But, Sir, I proceed to the queſtion before the Houſe: The conſideration of an Incorporate Union between this country and Great Britain, has been recommended to the conſideration of this Houſe by the third and higheſt branch of the Legiſlature: thus recommended, it is at leaſt entitled to diſcuſſion, and I enter upon it with an anxious and ſolemn impreſſion of its high importance to our welfare as a nation; Sir, I ſhall not ſtop at the queſtion which has been made in this caſe, whether the ſettlement of 1782 was final or not? I conſider it an idle and utterly irrelevant diſpute, which may exerciſe ingenuity, but which can never forward or impede the adoption of an Incorporate Union. I will conſider the queſtion of Union merely on the ground of national utility, all other views of it are, in my mind, an idle waſte of ſpeculation, which can never enable us to form a right judgment upon it; to judge of its utility, we muſt conſider it as it relates to, or may affect thoſe intereſts which are the great leading intereſts of every community—Conſtitution, internal quiet, trade, and commerce. I put conſtitution firſt, as it is the parent and ſpring of all national good or evil, and becauſe I am of opinion that all further inquiry upon the ſubject will be uſeleſs, if our condition in this reſpect be not improved by an Union. Sir, I have been all my life a lover of civil liberty—I never yet ſet commerce in competition with Conſtitution. I would prefer the freedom of the latter, to all the riches, even if realized,

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which ever floated in the dreams of avarice. With this impression on my mind, I have ever considered the settlement of 1782. To that abortive attempt to give us independence, I attribute much of the evils with which we have been afflicted. I shall examine it a little in detail. There is one thing which I consider essential to liberty, in all governments like ours: it is that the executive authority should reside within the sphere of legislative controul; I mean that the territory over which the power of each extends, should be commensurate. If the executive of one country reside in another, within which the legislature of the first can exercise no manner of controul, but is deprived of all those leading securities which it ought to have for the due administration of its affairs; the immediate Ministers of the Crown by whom it will be advised and digested, being necessary attendants upon the person of the Sovereign, are discharged from all effectual responsibility to the Legislature of the country which they thus govern at their discretion. But the case will be still worse if the Executive Authority not only reside in a country to which legislative controul does not extend, but if the existence of that Executive Authority both as to the hands in which it shall be placed, and every modification of its powers, be utterly and by express provision of law, beyond the influence or controul of the Legislature of that country over which it presides. Now, Sir, such is precisely the state of this kingdom, under its present Constitution. I am speaking of the Constitution as settled in 1782, which, it is now contended, places us on a perfect equality with a British subject, as to constitutional liberty. The settlement in 1782 left the connexion of the countries, through the medium of a common Executive, precisely as it had been before; that is, it left this kingdom of Ireland annexed and united to the Imperial Crown of England, and justly and rightly *depending* upon, belonging and united to the same for ever. This provision placed to all perpetuity the Executive Authority of Ireland in the same hands which should wield the Executive Authority of England. And further to secure a similar extent of power to the Executive here, which should be enjoyed by the Executive in England, we have enacted, "That the Kings and Queens of England, by undoubted right, are Kings and Queens of this realm, and ought to enjoy the state, title, majesty, power, pre-eminence, jurisdiction, prerogative and authority of Kings and Queens of the same." This mode of connexion by the absolute surrender of the Executive Authority of this kingdom to the Executive Authority of another country, and thereby to the Legislature of that country, as it existed before the settlement of 1782, so it was left untouched by that settlement. That settlement did not more than secure the theoretic independence of our Legislature, and provide, in a great degree, as I shall shew before I sit down, for its practical subjection. Let me here, however, observe, that I cast no blame upon the settlement of 1782, or the framers of it, from the imperfections as to constitutional liberty, which I shall shew to have resulted from it. Sir, they all avow, from the *impracticable* attempt to give a free Constitution to Ireland, and at the

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ſame time to preſerve the connexion of the two countries through the medium of a common Executive, and the operation of diſtinct Legiſlatures, the impracticable attempt to ſecure *connexion* and preſerve *diſtinctneſs*. For the ſake of the former we give up all controul as to the appointment and modification of our own Executive Authority and have committed that controul and modification, without reſerve, to the diſcretion of a foreign Legiſlature; and for the ſake of the latter, we delare the utter incompetence of any power under Heaven to legiſlate for us, except the King, Lords, and Commons of Ireland. The conſtitutional principles endeavoured to be confirmed by the ſettlement of 1782, and under the operation of which the two countries were therefore to be governed, were a common Executive preſiding over the whole, with a diſtinct and independent Legiſlatures for each of the two countries, and thus conſtituting two abſolute Sovereignties in one empire. The great difficulty lay in eſtabliſhing thoſe conſtitutional principles, and at the ſame time ſecuring the permanent connexion between the two countries; and indeed, this difficulty is ſo great, that I have no heſitation in pronouncing it be practically impoſſible; I have no heſitation in ſaying, if Ireland were as practically independent of Great Britain as this theory ſuppoſes, the connexion could not laſt a ſingle day. Such muſt alſo have been the opinions of thoſe who effected the ſettlement of 1782, for amid all their ardour for Iriſh independence, they have endeavoured to ſecure the connexion by previſions and regulations, which induce of neceſſity a real practical ſubjection. I do not blame them for this; there are but two ways in which Ireland can ever be ſtrictly independent--Separation or Union. Now, Sir, as every country naturally labours after independence, and will in the end ſucceed if ſhe has ſtrength and means; it follows, that Union is the only ſecurity we have againſt Separation; and if I ever could be tempted to wiſh for the latter, it would be in deſpair of the former. The ſettlement of 1782, endeavoured to ſteer a middle courſe between Union and Separation, and like all political compromiſes, miſſed the good it ſought to obtain, and fell into the evil it wiſhed to avoid; it laid the ſeeds of ſeparation, in endeavouring to ſecure connexion; and in the purſuit of theoretic independence, it effected a real ſubjection. I have already obſerved that it left it as it had been with reſpect to the dependent annexation of the Executive Authority of this country upon the Executive Authority of Great Britain, and thus ſecured to a foreign Legiſlature a kind of property in the third eſtate of our own; giving them a dominion over our allegiance uncontroulable by our Conſtitution, and enabling them to transfer it according to their will and pleaſure. This will not be conſidered as any very ſtriking proof of national independence, and ſurely furniſhes to the Separatiſts an unplauſible topic for national degradation. The dependence on taxation of the Executive of this country upon the Executive of Great Britain, was intended to ſecure the connexion between the two countries. It was obvious, however, that this alone would not be ſufficient, and that diſtinct independent legiſlatures, held together

gether merely by the tye of a common, though on the part of one country a dependent executive authority, would ſoon diſagree in ſuch a way as to lead neceſſarily to ſeparation. It was therefore enacted, that no bill ſhould receive the Royal Aſſent here unleſs returned into this country under the Great Seal of Great Britain, that is, without the ſanction of the Britiſh Cabinet, for it cannot be ſuppoſed that the Lord Chancellor who has that Great Seal, would uſe it either without or againſt the approbation of that Cabinet.—Here, then, in the exerciſe of the moſt eſſential prerogative of the Crown of Ireland in the completion of legiſlative will, in which every thing dear to the rights and intereſts of this country may be involved, we are at the policy of ſix or ſeven individuals to us foreign, and irreſponſible, even the inaction of this Cabinet is ſufficient to controul the joint will of our two Houſes of Parliament, they ſtand between us and the Throne, impervious and irremoveable, and may extinguiſh our laws in all the ſilence of an inquiſition; but this Cabinet is not merely irreſponſible to us, but it is irreſponſible to the Parliament of Great Britain. Through the medium then of this irreſponſibility we are in fact, according to our preſent Conſtitution, ſubject in our legiſlative functions to the controul of the Britiſh Parliament, and we have thus provided by the ſettlement of 1782, for the dependence of our executive, and the controul of our legiſlative authorities, and we have placed this dependence upon, and lodged this controul with the legiſlature of another country. The conſequence therefore is, that with reſpect to the prerogative of the Crown and the Adminiſtration of the Government of this country, our Parliament is without that efficient controul which is the pride and boaſt of the Britiſh Conſtitution. Another conſequence of the nature of our connexion with Great Britain, which this ſettlement of 1782 left preciſely as it found it, is that we are without any *rightful* participation in the extended poſſeſſions of the empire. Were the dominion of the Britiſh empire to reach over half the habitable globe, the authority of this country is bounded for ever by the ſhores with which ſhe is ſurrounded. Confined to the buſineſs of taxation and mere municipal regulation, we are without a voice or a name in the firſt theatre of the world: our trade to all the poſſeſſions of Great Britain is held by curteſy, or if you will, by treaty, inſtead of being a rightful inheritance, unalienable from us or our poſterity, is enjoyed in a great degree upon the terms of an implicit ſubmiſſion of our legiſlative will to the regulations made and to be made by the Parliament of another kingdom, and is liable to be loſt or impeded upon any the ſlighteſt difference which may ariſe with that legiſlature, whoſe curteſy, or whoſe faith forms our only ſecurity for its enjoyment. Let us add to all thoſe things an almoſt utter and neceſſary preclusion from any interference in imperial concerns; no voice, I mean no effective voice in the great queſtions of peace or war, alliances or treaties; no poſſible means of calling the individuals to account who may in theſe momentous particulars corruptly or improvidently ſtake our deareſt intereſts to the foundation aſcertained and provided for by the

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ſettlement of 1782. But it is ſaid that becauſe England would have five hundred repreſentatives in the United Legiſlature, and we would have but one hundred, our neceſſary ſubjection to the will and pleaſure of England would neceſſarily follow from this diſparity of repreſentation.

There never was an objection ſo apparently true, and ſo radically falſe as this: that it ſhould be inſiſted on by unthinking men, and taken up by factious men, does not ſurpriſe me, but that it ſhould make an impreſſion upon the thinking and the wiſe, would indeed be matter of aſtoniſhment. This objection is not founded upon any allegation that the number of repreſentatives to be ſent from this country are not in due proportion of her population and wealth, becauſe let the number of our repreſentatives grounded on theſe relations be what they may, they muſt ever be in a great proportion inferior in number to the repreſentatives of Great Britain. The objection therefore being founded on the mere inferiority in point of number of Iriſh repreſentatives, can never be got over but by eſtabliſhing an exact equality as to numbers in the repreſentation of each kingdom: it follows therefore from this, as was ſenſibly obſerved in the Houſe of Commons of Great Britain, that there never would be a fair incorporate Union between two countries which were not mathematically equal in wealth, population and territory; but as two countries ſo circumſtanced never yet exiſted, nor ever will exiſt in the world, it follows that no fair incorporate Union ever can or ever would have taken place between any two countries whatever; for if they are not equal in the reſpects I have mentioned, the repreſentation muſt be unequal, and then the country whoſe repreſentation is inferior, muſt be, according to the hypotheſis, in a ſtate of ſubjection which would be unfair. Now Sir, it is true good ſenſe and reaſon, as well as logic, that whatever argument leads neceſſarily to abſurdity muſt be founded in falſhood. But, Sir, what gives riſe to this fallacy is, another poſition equally fallacious—it is ſaid, that after an Union when any queſtion ariſes between the two countries, the Engliſh repreſentatives will outvote the Iriſh. This is ſtated as if it were a matter of courſe that queſtions ſhould ariſe between the two countries after an Union; this is very well calculated to impoſe upon uninformed and unthinking men, and therefore I do not wonder that it has been reſorted to with ſo much pertinacity. Now what is the truth?—After an Union all conſtitutional queſtions muſt be at an end between the two countries for ever: this fruitful ſource of diviſion will be thereby for ever annihilated, and this country may then hope to enjoy what yet ſhe has never been able to do "a modeſt ſecurity and a long repoſe:" The laws by which the two countries will be governed after an Union, muſt be perfectly ſimilar, unleſs in caſes where a diſſimilarity is provided for by the articles of Union; it is obvious therefore, that it is only the conſtruction of the terms of the Union upon which any queſtion can ariſe between the two countries; for it will be contended that whether we will be governed by the ſame

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laws with the reſt of the empire in all caſes where diſſimilarity is not expreſsly provided for by the articles of Union, can ever be conſidered as furniſhing a queſtion of diſpute between the two countries; it follows then that it is only upon the articles themſelves that any diſpute can ariſe which can be called a queſtion between this country and Great Britain. Now all ſuch queſtions muſt of neceſſity be queſtions of conſtitution merely, if the circumſtances of the two countries admitted of ſuch an incorporate Union, as has taken place between England and Wales, no queſtion could ever ariſe between them. Now, Sir, the Union at preſent propoſed differs from that only in this, that the peculiar circumſtances of the two countries now intended to be united, require ſome ſtipulated arrangements adapted to and flowing from the nature of thoſe peculiar circumſtances. Once thoſe arrangements are agreed upon, no difference can ariſe, ſave as to what was mutually underſtood to have been intended between the parties. This is obvious from what took place with reſpect to Scotland: there the diſſimilarities between the two coun r es were much more numerous than in the preſent inſtance; the laws, uſages, juriſdictions and religions were all different, and required to be ſecured by correſponding articles. In the courſe of almoſt a century what queſtions have ever ariſen between England and Scotland? Why, Sir, they have been two; one with reſpect to the malt-tax, and the other with reſpect to the peerage; and the deciſion in both theſe matters is now admitted by common conſent, to have been ſtrictly conformable to the articles. It had been his intention to take a much wider view of the ſubject as it related to the Conſtitution, and alſo to have made ſome obſervations on the ſpeech of the hon. member oppoſite to him (Mr. Ponſonby), but the lateneſs of the hour and the fatigue of the Committee induced him to trouble them no longer at that time.

Mr. Ogle.—Sir, ſince I have had the honour of a ſeat in this Houſe, I never treſpaſſed on the indulgence of the chair at ſuch an hour as the preſent; nor would I now, Sir, but for ſome things that have been ſaid on the queſtion. I ſhall certainly, Sir, vote for your leaving the Chair, becauſe if a majority of this Houſe ſhall agree to that motion, an end will be put to the queſtion *in toto*. I will never give my vote in this Houſe to a meaſure which would ſhake the ſtability of the Britiſh empire, degrade Ireland, and reduce this flouriſhing metropolis to ruin. It is advanced, that our Conſtitution is defective—but what, Sir, is the remedy propoſed?—It is to ſurrender it irrevocably into the hands of the Britiſh Miniſter. I have heard the religious diſſentions of this country made a plea for acceding to an Union. Sir, it is a ſubject which I can never hear introduced into this Houſe without ſorrow, nor ſpeak to without reluctance. My ſentiments are now what they ever have been on the Catholic queſtion—they ſtand unchanged. I am not their religious enemy, I would give them every extent of civil right, but I will never conſent to give them political power. My idea of the Conſtitution of 82 is a Proteſtant King, Proteſtant Lords, and a

Proteſtant Houſe of Commons, all founded on the principles of the revolution. It has been my lot, Sir, to ſupport *Proteſtant Aſcendancy* through all its difficulties and embarraſſments—I will continue to do ſo as long as I have life, and my ſentiment is, that it is impoſſible any connexion between the two countries can remain, which is not founded on that principle. The noble Lord, in a ſpeech of his, early on this ſubject, did ſay that *much was to be done for the Catholics*. I cannot miſtake the words, Sir, for they made a deep impreſſion on my mind, and from the moment in which they were uttered, confirmed me as the decided enemy of the meaſure. The noble Lord has ſaid that the meaſure of Union has been oppoſed by every rebel in the country, I muſt beg, Sir, to deny the aſſertion, and to correct the noble Lord's memory. His Lordſhip knows that the rebel Popiſh biſhops and prieſts, and the hords of Popiſh ſavages and barbarians of the county of Wexford have not oppoſed the Union. The noble Lord knows that they have not—for they have petitioned government in favour of the meaſure, and their petition has been moſt graciouſly received.

Doctor Browne, ſaid, that he perſiſted in his opinion to go through the conſiderations of all the propoſitions, though, until they came out of the mill, and it was ſeen how they might be modified by parliament, it was impoſſible for any man to ſay whether he would ultimately approve the maſs; but, in this his mind was now ſettled, that under the exiſting circumſtances, Union, if upon good terms, was deſirable as a refuge from ruin, and therefore, he muſt wiſh and hope that the terms ſhould come out ſuch as might be advantageous and acceptable to the nation. He never had diſguiſed the great foundation of his opinion, however unpolite or unpalatable it might be; it reſted on long obſervation of the ſtate of the country and of the ſtate of Parliament; and particularly what happened in the laſt ſeſſion.

I have, (continued he,) ever ſince I ſat in this Houſe condemned the ſyſtem of Parliament; I ſaid it muſt end in its extinction. I did, when the rebellion broke out, though I abhorred and ſhuddered at the atrocities of the rebels, think that many things were done in and after its ſuppreſſion, more founded in reſentment and rage than in cool and ſound policy; but even ſuppoſing thoſe ſeverities neceſſary, I do not wiſh to ſee them repeated; it may be neceſſary to cut off an arm or a leg, but I do not wiſh to ſee the operation; and theſe two abuſes, the corruption of Parliament, and the ſcenes of the rebellion, have given to my mind this bias to an Union.

When the preſent chief governor came over, and wiſhed to appeaſe thoſe evils, I naturally approved his meaſures, and I became warmly attached to his perſon; his candour, his goodneſs, and his wiſdom, attached me, and no other motive. I did then think that Union was neceſſary, and I ſaid ſo to many reſpectable perſons who well remember it: when the meaſure actually came on I thought the nation was taken unawares, and had not proper time;

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I had doubts of the competency of Parliament; I felt a temporary hope that experience would teach us the abſolute neceſſity of altering the ſyſtem of Parliament, and departing from the ſyſtem of violence, if we wiſhed to preſerve the Parliament, and perhaps falſe complaiſance to a portion of my conſtituents, had ſome effect in counteracting my real opinion; the Parliament inſtantly afterwards returned to its old ſyſtems; violence and bills of violence were redoubled with multiplying force; moſt of the opponents of Union were as ready to agree in them as any other men; an abſolute military government was eſtabliſhed, under which we ſtill live, though happily ſo adminiſtered that we do not feel it; every thing returned to its former ſtate, and I returned to my former opinion; in ſo doing, I do not think I have been inconſiſtent; I do not differ from other gentlemen who have condemned the ſyſtems of Parliament—we differ only in inference: they think it will be better, I am convinced it never will, and therefore act accordingly.

But as to the greater part of the gentlemen who oppoſe the Union, hear what their language is; we are in oppoſition only on this one meaſure; we do not oppoſe it to ſave the people from taxation; no, there is no quantity of taxation and contribution which they are not willing to give: Is it to ſave the people from power? No: there is no power which they are not willing to part with, even the whole power of the parliament, and all its control to the executive. Is it to ſave the people from the ſcourge? No; they are ready and will re-enact all the laws of the laſt ſeſſion in the preſent: aſk for a window tax, calculate it at what you pleaſe, let it produce five times as much, we have no objection; aſk for unlimited powers, you need not aſk for them, we would force them on you; do you complain of the Parliament having the power of war and peace? we engage never to exert it; do you complain of its having power to appoint a regent? we will diſclaim it; all the properties of a free and independent parliament we will give up, but leave us the name: Are theſe arguments to be addreſſed to the people of Ireland? What doth it all come to? "Leave to us our power and individual importance, let us recur to the old colonial method of governing or rather grinding the country, and we do not care what you do," When I ſaw, and when I heard theſe things, is it wonderful that I did not find myſelf much attached to an oppoſition to Union upon ſuch principles; no men have been more effective in bringing us to the neceſſity of Union by miſtaken and ſevere modes of government than theſe very gentlemen.

It has been ſaid, that I paſs a libel on the Parliament; I do not mean to do ſo, if I did, this ſhould not be the place; I am not ambitious of being ſent to priſon, or of kneeling at your bar; but every one muſt laugh at the encomiums paſſed on the Parliament out of doors, by thoſe who for twenty years, have been repreſenting it as the great nuiſance and grievance of the nation, and who now ſpeak of it as the paragon of virtue, and the quinteſ-

cence of excellence, as the paradiſe of diſintereſtedneſs; I know not what epithet of hyberbole they would not beſtow upon it—"Timeo Danaos;" give me leave to ſuſpect theſe praiſes, they want the Parliament, not becauſe they love it, but as a theatre for future machinations and dangerous deſigns.

But it is ſaid, is the Engliſh parliament better? I believe it is infinitely, but if it were not, what would that argument go to? It might go to the extinction of parliament altogether. I cannot help it, ſaid the good Biſhop Butler, when arguing for the immortality of the ſoul, he was told, why this will prove dogs and horſes to be immortal; I cannot help it, if the argument be a good one, it muſt remain ſo; I ſay, if I were writing an Utopia, I would ſay, if ever the time came that parliament ſerved as a ſtalking horſe, under which to ſhoot the arrows of the executive; as a name under which the executive might do what it would not dare do without its influenced ſanction, or, as a circus, in which to combat for the deſtruction of the conſtitution; I ſhould think the exiſtence of that parliament of little conſequence; this is not the caſe of the Engliſh parliament; I do not preſume to ſay that it is of any other.

But would the Engliſh united parliament be kinder to this country? No man ſeems to dare to anſwer this queſtion; I will anſwer it; I believe in my heart and ſoul it would; the reaſon is plain, becauſe it would not be actuated by thoſe paſſions, thoſe reſentments, that thirſt for revenge, that rooted memory of injuries which exiſts here. We have heard it this night lamented, that perſons who are ſaid to have been in rebellion, were ſuffered to open their mouths, we hear it every day in converſation lamented, that they are ſuffered to exiſt; What, was there to be no amneſty, no pardon, no oblivion, no termination to theſe diſtractions? Yet, this is natural, it is incident to human nature; and, therefore, I ſay, men at a diſtance, more cool, leſs impaſſioned, will think more kindly of the groſs of the inhabitants of this country, and, I do aſſert, that in all my intercourſe with the Engliſh, I have found them more reaſonable, more compaſſionate, more kindly diſpoſed to the people and peaſantry of this country, than are its gentry.

England is perpetually ſpoken of as a foreign nay as a hoſtile country; Does this lead to peace? Is it wiſe? Is it true? The policy of England to us was falſe for 600 years; It was, but has ſhe not for a long time paſt acknowledged her error, retracted her claims and altered her ſyſtem? And what is the wiſdom of perpetually reminding a ſincere friend of old bickerings and ancient errors; in commercial countries there may be ſome jealouſy of England, let this be well watched in the articles of Union, but in all other reſpects I cannot conceive why England ſhould poſſibly entertain any ſentiments hoſtile to us, and every man converſant in England knows the contrary to be the fact.

But of all the charges againſt England the moſt audacious as moſt falſe is in my opinion that of her cauſing or fomenting the

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disturbances and distractions of this country; let any man lay his hand upon his heart and say that he really believes this. Good heaven! Sir, have we occasion to look abroad for the causes of our dissentions? Do we not know and see every moment the bitter animosities of catholic to protestant and protestant to catholic, of ancient inhabitants to modern settlers, of old claimants to new possessors, of tenants who think themselves oppressed and landlords who complain of murder and massacre, of rebels to loyalists, and loyalists to rebels; What has England to say to all this? Did England create catholics? Did England create orange-men? Did England create men's hearts or their passions? No: England is endeavouring to do all she can to allay and prevent these distractions, and it is the passions, the prejudices and the fury of the parliament, the gentry and the people of Ireland, which stand in her way.

See how just is this accusation; she sends over a chief governor here on purpose to cool and moderate and quiet and allay those furious animosities, and for that very reason a party is made against him by the very men who complain of England's fomenting our disorders; had that great man yielded to the violence of such advisers perhaps he would not have found so many opposers to an Union.

Foolish and deluded people I cannot help exclaiming; I know your spirit, but surely a more versatile people never were sent upon the face of the earth; you seem in love with oppression, and when a power comes here which endeavours to extricate you from it, you long to return to those scourgings and whippings and burnings which first disgusted me into the support of Union, and like a Russian wife seem to like those best who beat you most, and surely you will find them amongst its opponents.

I think therefore in favouring an Union I am a friend to the people; but if they are of a contrary opinion—if they wish, as the King of Prussia said of the people of Neufchatel, to be damned to all eternity, I cannot help it; and I should be sorry that they were forced or made by violence even to be happy; but let me first hear the voice of the nation; I hear the voice of violence, I hear the voice of party, I hear the voice of lawyers bawling because their mart will be gone, and of politicians because their personal importance will be lessened, but I cannot hear the cool, sober voice of the nation at large.

I must next advert to the inflammatory language heard here; men admit the competency of parliament and yet say they will not obey it; they say parliament is wise and good, and yet the next moment they will not obey it, but, say they, it is influenced and packed; this is not very consistent, but if this be so it ought to be reformed or extinguished; say they it is not free, there are different modes of affecting its freedom, it may be influenced by government or intimidated by mob, seats may be filled by administration or bought up by the purse of a party; a man's freedom is not a little affected, if following his own sentiments is

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to be followed by calumniating his character or knocking him on the head. And here give me leave to say, that these vile calumnies, the monstrous abuse, the lying slanders, cast upon every man who is friendly to an Union, is one reason which gives me a strong bias to it; that cause is not good which requires such supports.

Another thing which has been truly observed gives me a strong bias to an Union; it is that however loyal men disagree upon the subject, the disaffected have no difference; it was said they would be delighted with the measure as leading to separation; I have not found it; on the contrary, they are outrageous against it; must not I think that measure a guard against separation, which the friends of separation so vehemently detest.

As to the propositions of Union themselves in detail, there are some things which I dislike, and many which I would wish to see modified; I wish the Peers were to be elected, I wish the boroughs were not to be bought, or if it must be so, that it had been a private transaction, and I even think it would have been wise in England to have done it with their own money, not to give pretext for discontent at the burthen in this country. I have some doubts whether our quota or proportion of taxation of two seventeenths may not be too much, and I am extremely anxious that something very considerable indeed should be done for the city of Dublin, I wish the city would point out itself what it thinks most for its own advantage, and I think the Parliament should be most liberal and go great lengths indeed in making compensation to it if it is likely to suffer.

I have the honour of being descended from a long series of clergymen of the Church of England, and must naturally be attached to it, but I do not see what mischief could ensue, if after an Union the Catholics were put on the same footing with any other Dissenters from the established church; at present, if admitted into Parliament, they might acquire too much weight in this disolated kingdom, and danger might ensue, but then they would have exactly the proportionable weight in the whole empire which they ought to have, neither more nor less; they would have no pretext for complaint, but be on a footing with all other his Majesty's subjects; Why then is not this done? I verily believe because an Irish Parliament would not suffer it; in the united one it is open to be done, no, says one hon. gentleman, this excludes the Catholics for ever; no, says another, my objection is that this doth not exclude them for ever. These are contrary objections, but I think the latter assertion is evidently true, and therefore I hope and think that the United Parliament will do that with safety which the Irish Parliament always has refused to do as dangerous.

And now, Sir, with all these objections, give me leave to ask, if Union be rejected, what system is to be pursued? I may object to part of the proposals, but I must wish on the whole that they should be acceptable, because otherwise what follows? Says an honourable friend of mine, an Union must be followed by a completely military government; I hope not But what will the rejection of Union be followed by? An infinitely more military government, sought for

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and approved by moſt of thoſe men who oppoſe the Union, by the re-enaction and continuation of all the ſevere laws of former years, by all the ancient ſeverity, by the old colonial ſyſtem, probably by a revival of all the horror and diſtraction which we have not long ſince eſcaped.

As I hear it is, though not in the degree which wild imagination repreſents, I own the apprehenſion, leaſt I ſhould by my vote injure one tradeſmen or his family in the city of Dublin, affects my mind more than all the declamations which could be made for years about the free and independent Parliament, which I never ſaw and never ſhall ſee, and about the pride of the nation oppoſed to its felicity; But are not the poor of Dublin as wretched now as they can be? I know much about them, I have felt much for them, and, according to my ability, have endeavoured to ſhew it. Can an Union make them worſe? I hope not; I hope it may bring in that capital and thoſe manufactures which are wanted to make their condition better; at all events, how can they be worſe off than now without an Union? We may talk of Union, but the ladies of Dublin might, adopting a ſingle faſhion, by not flying to foreign manufactures, by wearing the really beautiful dreſſes of their own country, do more for the poor of Dublin in a year, than an Union could effect againſt them in ten; there is one of our misfortunes, it is abſolutely wicked, and I never ſee the preſent dreſſes of the female ſex without melancholy and ſorrow.

One word more as to the Catholics; I am a ſincere Proteſtant, not like many, a merely political but a religious Proteſtant, with opinions founded on reaſon, ſtudy, and reflection; but I wiſh that every privilege ſhould be granted to the Catholics, conſiſtent with the ſafety of the eſtabliſhment, for to the eſtabliſhment alſo on much reflection I am a ſteady friend.

Every body ſays we cannot go on as we have done, yet no new plan is propoſed by the oppoſers of Union; in fact they never could agree upon one; the major part are of opinion that Union is neceſſary, that if they had been let alone they would have kept down the country with a ſtrong hand, as had been done for one hundred years paſt, and that nothing was wanting but not to have ſtopped them in the career of whipping, ſcourghing, ſhooting, burning, and refuſal of all amneſty, to bring matters to their old footing; and, therefore, will wiſh to return to their old meaſures; the reſt will be for redreſs of grievances, and the old queſtion of Catholic emancipation will inſtantly be revived; in truth, I think it follows inevitably, that we muſt incorporate with the Catholics, to give them a liberty of getting into Parliament, while the boroughs continue as they are, would be trifling and mockery, they therefore muſt wiſh for reform. Thus all the old queſtions will be revived, all the old diſtractions, and after three, or four, or ſix years of miſery, the whole property of the nation, or at leaſt the Proteſtant part of it, will recur back to Union as the only reſource.

Such is the picture which I form to myſelf of future events in caſe this meaſure be rejected; and, under theſe impreſſions, as I have

ſaid,

ſaid, though I may diſapprove of parts of the detail, I muſt neceſſarily wiſh that the whole may be ſo modified, as to meet the wiſhes of the nation, and paſs into ſtability.

Mr. Goold.—"Sir, I cannot patiently liſten to this fantaſtic cruſade, this war of pert ribaldry—(Here Mr. G. was called to order)—He reſumed—Sir, I repeat, that I cannot liſten to an hoſpitably received foreigner waging his fantaſtic cruſade of words againſt the liberties of Ireland. I will not allow the fitneſs of the Iriſh People to bear oppreſſion; it is not true! The hon. gentleman ſays he knows nothing of the opinion of the Iriſh People, he ought not to be ignorant of them; the petitions on that table ought to inſtruct him, but he knows that he can deſpiſe the ſenſe of his conſtituents, he knows he can deſpiſe their inſtructions—If the hon. gentleman cannot hold his place in this Houſe conſiſtent with his private ſentiments, let him reſign it. (Mr. G. was here again called to order.) He continued, that he conceived himſelf perfectly in order by adverting to the ſentiments of any portion of the conſtituent body, and expreſſing what ſhould be the conduct of a repreſentative inſtructed of thoſe ſentiments. He was an eye-witneſs when the hon. gentleman entered into the moſt ſolemn engagement. (Here the cry of order was again repeated,)

Col. Barry ſaid, that his hon. friend was in order, and ought not to be controuled in any thing relating to the ſubject of Union.

Dr. Duigenan was amazed at what had fallen from the hon. gentleman who ſpoke laſt. He denied that the Repreſentative was bound by the inſtructions of the Conſtituent—ſuch doctrine was ſetting up a democracy in that Houſe.

Col. Barry—The ſubject which the Learned Doctor had entered into was not at iſſue between them, and he could only account for the hon. and learned gentleman's irrelevant obſervation, by ſuppoſing that he had but juſt awoke out of ſleep.

Mr. Goold—"Sir I have been repeatedly called to order, but more ſymptoms of iraſcibility have been manifeſted by thoſe who affected to correct me, than I am ſure I have betrayed. Sir, in ſupport of my opinion that the repreſentative ſhould obey the inſtructions of his conſtituents, I can quote the authority of one of the greateſt ſtateſmen England ever knew, who expreſsly ſaid that "*the wiſhes of the People ought to be as a law to the Houſe of Commons.*"

Mr. Martin—I call the hon. gentleman to order.

Mr. Goold—Sir, the hon. gentleman who has called me to order, has travelled ſo much, and informed himſelf ſo well of the laws of decorum, that I muſt yield to his knowledge of *etiquette.*

Mr. Martin (emphatically)—And of *honour.*

Mr. Goold—What I advanced I will repeat; whomſoever the cap fits let him wear it: and I am as ready to lay down my life in defence of the Conſtitution, I will not ſhrink from a conſtitutional doctrine.—

Mr. Martin again called to order.

Mr.

Mr. Goold—I will proceed undiſmayed and unintimidated by any man or ſet of men, when the rights of the People are at iſſue; and I do ſay, that he who derelicts from a ſolemn teſt, not only violates the duty of a Repreſentative, but alſo the laws which are obligatory on a man of honour.—

Mr. Attorney General hoped there would be more moderate language; the event which had taken place in the morning called for it.

Mr. Browne appealed to the Houſe, if he had not ſtudiouſly avoided all ſpecies of perſonalty; beſides that he truſted that ſuch a conduct was foreign to the natural bent of his mind, he felt himſelf delicately circumſtanced with reſpect to the conſequences which might reſult without the walls of that Houſe. He denied that he had ever ſubſcribed to any teſt, or had pledged himſelf to his conſtituents as to any line of parliamentary conduct. At the time of his election the idea of an Union was conſidered ridiculous; but even ſo he would not ſuffer his freedom of opinion and judgment to be fettered. To eſtabliſh this he read a letter from Counſellor French of Kildare-ſtreet,* who had been profeſſionally engaged in the election. He acknowledged that a numerical majority of his conſtituents were adverſe to an Union, but he averred that the moſt important portion, and thoſe the moſt deeply intereſted, the governing members were all, except one, decided friends to the meaſure. As to the perſonality againſt him, which an hon. gentleman was pleaſed to indulge in, he would paſs it by with the ſame indifference that he would the babling of a parrot.

* " *Having had the honour and happineſs of being acquainted with the late moſt reſpectable Provoſt, Doctor Murray, he applied to me to be his Aſſiſtant Counſel at the late election for members for the Univerſity, which I declined, as I thought it would be inconſiſtent with the line in my profeſſion which I had adopted, of doing buſineſs only in my chambers. However, my eſteem for Doctor Murray was ſuch, that I thought it my duty to meet and conſult with the gentlemen appointed by him as aſſiſtant counſel. Theſe motives excited in me a curioſity to attend the general election in the College, and on that occaſion I obſerved that the candidates were repeatedly and warmly preſſed by ſome of the electors to give an explicit declaration againſt an Union of this country with Great Britain. Though I cannot recollect the particular expreſſions of the gentlemen making ſuch requiſition, or of the anſwers of Dr. Browne, on that occaſion; yet, I am clear in my opinion that he did not bind himſelf by any engagement either for or againſt ſuch a meaſure, and that he declared himſelf clearly that he would not engage himſelf, as poſſibly circumſtances would oblige him, conſiſtent with his duty, to ſupport the meaſure, though at that time he did not ſee the probability of ſuch circumſtances occurring. This is the concluſion I have drawn from what occurred in my hearing at the election; and I believe I am not miſtaken in this concluſion, for the ſentiments expreſſed on that occaſion by Dr. Brown made an impreſſion on me, and appeared to me then, as they do now, to be ſuch as a wiſe, conſcientious, and honeſt Repreſentative ſhould adopt.* " ROBERT FRENCH."

The SPEAKER said he would vote against the principle, without putting the House to the necessity of a second division.

On the question for agreeing in the first proposition, namely, the principle of Legislative Union—

Mr. O'DONEL rose, and said, Sir, I cannot allow you to put the question on this important subject, of a magnitude superior to any ever debated within the walls of this House, without expressing my most decided disapprobation; and poor indeed should I appear to myself, and contemptible to my country, if I could content myself with giving a silent vote. It was my intention not to have troubled this Committee, but when I see and hear a question put by you, Sir, and listened to by this Committee, whether we should for ever extinguish the legislative right of our country, I cannot, as a REAL IRISHMAN, sit silent—(a loud laugh from the Treasury Bench.) Is this decency?—is this order?—is this insignificant and impertinent laugh to encourage deliberation?—I see a set of men who often cry order and practice disorder; who talk of decorum, without knowing how to practice it; who having sold the liberties of *their* country endeavour to stifle *my* voice and deter me from delivering my sentiments in defence of my country; but let me tell that side, that were their numbers double, and fortified with arms as they have been strengthened by corruption, they have not collectively or individually the power to silence *me*, or prevent me from declaring my utmost detestation at a measure, formed by the English Minister, and nearly carried into effect by his *Irish* creatures, to rob the PEOPLE of their RIGHTS.

Mr. Annesley, perhaps I may never have again the opportunity of raising my feeble voice in this House, to support my country—O my country! I boast in the recollection that *my* ancestors were coeval even with that constitution which is about to be destroyed, and while I see Englishmen acting as emissaries in the ranks of the Parliament of Ireland to destroy *its* constitution, and thereby think they perform *their* duty to *their* country, let *me* be allowed to make an attempt in favour of *mine*.

I see the honourable gentlemen laugh, but they should rather weep; this nights sad vote will involve them with the destruction of their country; it is a serious, a melancholy, a dangerous moment; we appear cool, as if this was a question merely between 161 at that and 116 at this side of the House, as if the people were not concerned, as if they took no part; No, no; there is no such thing—the people have discussed it---the people are discussing it---the people will discuss it---and THE PEOPLE WILL OPPOSE IT, even if you shall be wicked and foolish enough to agree to it. I think I see the indignant Britons holding out the finger of scorn, and pointing them out as the reprobate betrayers of their country---I think I see them refuse to associate with the base trustees, who converted every thing to profit by the loss of honor, respectability and character. Gracious God, Mr. Annesley, do you know the question you have now read to the Committee for our consent? you know it not, else you could not have read it with such coolness---

Does

Does this Committee know its object? that is impoſſible; elſe you, Sir, might have fallen a juſt victim to its indignation. I will tell it you--it is that we ſhall conſent *for ever to ſurrender* the rights of Ireland and of Iriſhmen. The noble Lord may ſtand up in the floor to interrupt me, let me entreat him while we yet have a Houſe of Commons left us and a privilege of ſpeech, to act with *decency*, if not, Sir, I muſt inſiſt you, as Chairman, to enforce it from the triumphant youth.

The noble Lord, however he and I may differ in opinion and conduct, knows that I am ſpeaking as an Iriſhman, the honeſt indignation of a true and ſincere heart, at this treacherous and baſe attack, and the infamous means which have been uſed to form the majority on which he ſeems to plume himſelf—a majority, and I ſay it with pleaſure, *too weak, too inſignificant*, and *too paltry* ever to carry into effect this ruinous and diſgraceful meaſure; the noble Lord alſo knows that I am ſpeaking the honeſt dictates of my heart—FOR HE FOUND ME PROOF AGAINST ALL HIS CORRUPTION.

I have oppoſed the Union through every ſtage; I ſhall continue to do ſo. One principle alone actuated and directed my conduct—the love of my country—the certainty that neither I or this Houſe have a right or a *power* to vote away the property and privileges of Iriſhmen. Let the Miniſter of both countries look to it: let thoſe who have ſold *their* birth-rights for a pot of porridge look to it: if they perſevere, the conſequences will be dreadful—on their heads be it: for my part, in the preſence of this Houſe, in the hearing of my country, and in the awful preſence of my God, who yet I truſt with his omnipotent arm will avert this dreadful puniſhment—*I waſh my hands out of all concern* with the waſte of blood which muſt follow from the further continuance of this deſtructive propoſal. I have ſpoke as an Iriſhman—I have acted as ſuch—and in the hour of danger, no monarch ſhall command my ſervices in oppoſition to that claim which every Iriſhman is ſubject to—when his country is in danger.

For the queſtion	115
Againſt it	161---Majority 46

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